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Abstract 
Malaysian Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) No. 136, Impairment of Assets, was issued in 
2005. The standard requires public listed companies to report their non-current assets at no 
more than their recoverable amount. When the value of impaired assets is recovered, or partly 
recovered, FRS 136 requires the impairment charges to be reversed to its new recoverable 
amount. This study tests whether the reversal of impairment losses by Malaysian firms is 
more closely associated with economic reasons or reporting incentives. The sample of this 
study consists of 182 public companies listed on Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) that reported reversals of their impairment charges during 
the period 2006-2009. These firms are matched with firms which do not reverse impairment 
on the basis of industrial classification and size. In the year of reversal, this study finds that 
the reversal firms are more profitable (before reversals) than their matched firms. On average, 
the Malaysian stock market values the reversals of impairment losses positively. These 
results suggest that the reversals generally reflect increases in the value of the previously 
impaired assets. After partitioning firms that are likely to manage earnings and those that are 
not, this study finds that there are some Malaysian firms which reverse the impairment 
charges to manage earnings. Their reversals are not value-relevant, and are negatively 
associated with future firm performance. On the other hand, the reversals of firms which are 
deemed not to be earnings managers are positively associated with both future firm 
performance and current stock price performance, and this is the dominant motivation for the 
reversal of impairment charges in Malaysia. In further analysis, this study provides evidence 
that the opportunistic reversals are also associated with other earnings management 
manifestations, namely abnormal working capital accruals and the motivation to avoid 
earnings declines. In general, the findings suggest that the fair value measurement in 
impairment standard provides useful information to the users of financial statements. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Background and motivation  
 
In 2005, the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) issued Financial Reporting 
Standard (FRS) No. 136, Impairment of Assets. The standard requires public companies listed 
on Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, KLSE) to restate 
their non-current assets at the lower of its carrying amount or recoverable amount. This 
recognition ensures that the assets carried in the balance sheet are not overstated. FRS 136 is 
based on International Accounting Standard (IAS) 36, Impairment of Assets, issued by the 
International Accounting Standards Board
1
 (IASB). Impairment losses occur when the 
carrying value of the assets is higher than their recoverable amount. According to the 
standard, this difference should be recorded as a loss in the income statement, and such loss 
should be recognised whenever the situation arises. Subsequent to the recognition of an 
impairment loss, the recoverable amount for the impaired asset might increase, due to internal 
or external factors. The standard requires that, if there is an indication that the impairment 
loss previously recognised for a particular asset (other than goodwill) no longer exists, the 
company needs to recalculate the recoverable amount of the asset; and, if the amount is 
higher than its carrying amount, the impairment loss recognised in prior periods needs to be 
reversed, or partially reversed.  
 
Recoverable amount is measured as the higher of the asset’s fair value less the cost to sell, 
and its value in use. In FRS 136, fair value less cost to sell is defined as “the amount 
obtainable from the sale of an asset or cash-generating unit in an arm’s length transaction 
                                                 
1
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is an independent accounting standard-setter responsible 
for developing International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
 
2 
 
between knowledgeable, willing parties, less the costs of disposal”, and value in use is 
defined as “the present value of the future cash flows expected to be derived from an asset or 
cash-generating unit”. Both fair value less cost to sell and value in use are different from 
historical cost measurement, and involve some estimates in their determination. For example, 
under paragraph 26 of the standard, in the case where the current bid prices are unavailable in 
determining the fair value less cost to sell, the reporting entity needs to estimate the value 
based on the price of the most recent transaction related to the asset. Similarly, the 
determination of value in use requires managers to estimate future cash flows that are 
expected to derive from the asset, including the expectations about possible variations in the 
amount or timing of those future cash flows (Malaysian Accounting Standards Board 
[MASB], 2005, para. 30). The use of estimates in the determination of the recoverable 
amount grants managers discretion, which could enhance the informativeness of earnings. 
Managers can use their knowledge about the business, and choose accounting reporting 
methods and estimates that match the business economic situation. However, the discretion in 
the standard also provides an opportunity for self-interest managers to manage earnings. This 
study examines whether the application of fair value and value in use measurements in FRS 
136 have been used by the Malaysian companies to provide useful information to the users of 
financial statements or to manage earnings. In particular, this study focuses on the reversal of 
impairment losses reporting, and tests which motives; informative or opportunistic reversal 
recognition, is the dominant motivation of reversal reporting in Malaysia. 
 
Most standard-setters around the world emphasise the reporting of a financial position that 
fairly reflects the firm’s value. The issuance of impairment standards for non-current assets is 
an example of the improvement in accounting reporting standards, which has switched from 
historical cost accounting to fair value accounting. It is argued that fair value accounting is a 
3 
 
better measurement for reporting because it reflects the relevant and current value of the 
assets (SFAS
2
 No. 157). Financial disclosures that uses fair value also provides investors with 
insight into prevailing market values, further helping to ensure the usefulness of financial 
reports for stakeholders in assessing risk, return and the valuation of the firm (SFAS No. 
157). Herrmann et al. (2006) also argue that fair values of property, plant and equipment 
provide greater feedback value and more timely financial information. Thus, the application 
of fair value/value in use measurement in the impairment standard by public companies, if 
applied in an unbiased manner, should provide valuable information to users.  
 
The use of fair value/value in use measurement in the impairment standard is consistent with 
the objective of the financial reporting conceptual framework, because it provides relevant 
information to the users. The IASB’s Conceptual Framework states that the objective of 
financial reporting is to provide information to assist users in making economic decisions, 
such as investment, credit and similar resource allocation decisions. Three qualitative 
characteristics of accounting information described in the framework are relevance, 
comparability and timeliness. Relevance refers to the capability of financial information to 
make a difference in the decisions made by users. Financial information is useful if it has 
predictive and/or confirmatory value. Comparability means that the information regarding a 
reporting entity can be compared with similar information concerning other entities, or with 
similar information relating to the same entity for another period or another date. Timeliness 
means that the information is available to decision-makers in sufficient time to be capable of 
influencing their decisions. These characteristics are closely related with reporting an asset at 
fair value in the financial statements of the reporting entity.  
  
                                                 
2
 Statement of Financial Accounting Standard, FASB. 
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Fair value accounting is increasingly being adopted by many countries across the world. 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are placing much more emphasis on the 
use of fair value in the measurement of assets and liabilities. The process began over 25 years 
ago, and the application of fair value measurement is required in many national standards 
(Cairns, 2006). In general, fair value accounting offers a means to measure assets and 
liabilities that appear on a reporting entity’s balance sheet. IFRS 13, Fair Value 
Measurement, defines fair value as “the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to 
transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement 
date” (IASB, 2012). The term “fair value” is a general term in IFRS, and is applicable to all 
assets and liabilities measurements, irrespective of whether the balance sheet amount is 
actively traded or not in the open market. The term “market value” is used as a fair value 
measure for assets and liabilities that are actively traded in the open market. This is the first 
and preferred measure for fair value. For assets, liabilities and equity components where 
quoted prices in an active market are unavailable, the IASB requires the use of market 
information and accepted valuation techniques. Therefore, the entity needs to estimate fair 
value using market information. If the assets, liabilities and equity items are not traded in an 
active market, the estimation of fair value is difficult. In this situation, the IASB prohibits the 
use of estimated fair value, because it cannot be reliably determined.  
 
In US GAAP (as cited in Landsman, 2007), fair value is defined as “The price that would be 
received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market 
participants”. In the Statement of Financial Accounting Statement (SFAS) No. 157, Fair 
Value Measurements, the FASB (as cited in Landsman, 2007) establishes a framework for 
measuring fair value, and develops a hierarchy of preferences for the measurement of fair 
value. Level 1 estimates, the preferred level, are the fair value measures based on the quoted 
5 
 
prices of the assets and liabilities. Level 2 estimates are those based on the market prices of 
similar or related assets and liabilities. Lastly, Level 3 estimates are those based on reporting 
entity estimates, and are allowed to be used in the absence of information, as in Levels 1 and 
2. 
 
Several accounting studies support the argument that fair value measurement provides greater 
predictive value than historical cost measurement (Aboody, Barth & Kasznik, 1999; Barth & 
Clinch, 1998). In general, these studies document that the revaluation of non-current assets 
explains future firm performance. The findings support the argument that reporting an asset at 
a revalued amount provides the predictive value to users. Fair value of an asset also provides 
feedback value to users. Feedback value is defined in SFAC No. 2 as “the quality of 
information that enables users to confirm or correct prior expectation”. The value, at 
historical cost, on the acquisition date of an asset is equivalent to the fair value. However, fair 
value changes over time, and thus, reporting an asset at fair value on the balance sheet 
subsequent to the acquisition of the asset provides valuable feedback to users. It helps users 
to confirm or correct their expectations relating to the asset based on current economic 
conditions. On the other hand, historical cost provides “book value” information of the asset, 
where it is equivalent to the original cost minus accumulated depreciation. Book value may 
provide feedback value in the wrong direction, because it systematically decreases over time, 
even when the underlying asset is appreciating (Herrmann, Saudagaran & Thomas, 2006). 
 
Although fair value accounting is argued as a better measurement method, compared to 
historical cost accounting, the opponents of the method claim that the measurement of certain 
assets cannot be determined reliably when no active market exists. Management must 
estimate the assets fair value, which can be subject to discretion or manipulation. As 
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explained in the introduction of this chapter, the use of an estimate in projecting future cash 
flows may provide managers with a wide degree of discretion. Managers may engage in 
opportunistic earnings recognition, using the estimates to increase or reduce earnings for their 
private benefits. 
  
The recognition of opportunistic earnings, even if it is not in violation of the accounting 
standards, may lead to inaccurate information about the company and a shifting of 
profits/losses to different periods. This practice produces less reliable earnings information 
that does not reflect a firm’s financial performance. It reduces the quality of reported 
earnings, and its usefulness for investment decisions, thus reducing investor confidence in the 
financial reports. However, accounting earnings are more reliable, and of higher quality, 
when managers’ opportunistic behaviour is controlled through monitoring systems. Agency 
theory suggests that problems created by moral hazard can be mitigated by governance 
mechanisms, such as those that promote careful contracting and close monitoring of 
employee activities (Eisenhardt, 1989). Hence, it is crucial for an organisation to have an 
effective corporate governance mechanism to safeguard the rights of the investors in getting 
the true and fair information of the company (Abdul Rahman & Mohamed Ali, 2006). 
Corporate governance is a crucial tool designed to ensure that the company’s resources are 
employed for the benefit of the shareholders (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney, 1996). 
 
In general, the primary objective of monitoring mechanisms is to resolve the agency 
problems by aligning management’s interests with the interests of shareholders (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Healy & Palepu, 2001). The management tends to manage earnings when 
the incentives to do so are high. For example, managers are likely to manage earnings to 
achieve earnings benchmarks (Burgstahler, 1997; Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Degeorge, 
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Patel & Zeckhauser, 1999), to avoid debt covenant violation (Sweeney, 1994; DeFond & 
Jiambalvo, 1994), to increase managers’ compensation (Healy, 1985), and to influence the 
share price (Teoh, Welch & Wong, 1998b; Dechow & Shrand, 2004). Hence, the monitoring 
provided by a good standard of corporate governance is crucial in reducing management’s 
ability to manage earnings. In Malaysia, the Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) was 
introduced by the Security Commission of Malaysia in 2001,
3
 as a response to the 1997/98 
Asian financial crisis and a number of business collapses in Malaysia. The main objective of 
the codes is to improve the monitoring role of the board of directors, and to provide 
guidelines in relation to the criteria and structure of an ideal board committee. 
 
1.2 Objectives and methodology of the study 
 
The objective of this study is to investigate the application of FRS 136, Impairment of Assets, 
by Malaysian public companies in the preparation of their financial statements. It examines 
whether firms reverse the previously recorded impairment losses for economic reasons or to 
manage earnings. FRS 136 is an adoption of IAS 36 in Malaysia. Such a principles-based 
standard should allow managers to appropriately communicate their private information, and 
thereby improve the informativeness of earnings in relation to the economic position of the 
company (Barth, Landsman & Lang, 2008). The application of the standard also involves 
many estimates and judgments (Titard & Pariser, 1996) which may provide an opportunity 
for managers to manage earnings (Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Duh et al., 2009).  
 
This study also investigates whether the motivation to reverse the impairment losses is 
associated with other manifestations of earnings management. It examines whether the 
                                                 
3
 To date, the Security Commission of Malaysia has issued three versions of the code. The latest version is 
MCCG 2012. Before that, the last was MCCG 2007. 
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impairment loss reversals relate to abnormal accruals and incentives to avoid earnings 
declines. The expectation is that firms with high abnormal accruals and firms that are likely 
to avoid earnings declines are more likely to report reversals opportunistically. This study 
also examines the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in monitoring the 
opportunistic behaviour of managers. Corporate governance is essential to protect the rights 
of shareholders.  
 
In summary, the research questions of this study are: 
1. Does the reversal of impairment loss reporting in Malaysia portray the reality of 
economic performance, or is it associated with opportunistic earnings management 
behaviour?  
2.  Is reversal reporting associated with other manifestations of earnings management?  
3.  What is the influence of corporate governance in reversal reporting? 
 
To answer the research questions, the study analyses a sample of Malaysian public companies 
that recognise at least one reversal of an impairment loss in their income statements during 
2006 to 2009. The reversal firms in the sample are matched with firms which do not reverse 
impairments, on the basis of industrial classification and size. The data are analysed using 
univariate and multivariate tests. In the univariate analysis, the return on equity ratios of 
reversal firms and control firms are compared. If Malaysian public firms reverse the 
impairment charges for economic reasons, the firms should perform better than the control 
firms, because such reversals should reflect the recovery of the impaired assets through the 
improved operating performance of the assets. In the multivariate analysis, firm performance 
measures are regressed on the reversals recognised by the sample firms. Reversals are also 
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regressed on manifestations of earnings management, to establish if managerial opportunism 
plays any role in impairment reversals. 
 
1.3 Contributions of the study 
 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge in financial reporting of fair value/value in 
use, asset impairment literature, earnings management and corporate governance. Prior 
studies investigating the value relevance of fair value measurement focus on banks and 
financial assets. This study provides evidence that reporting non-financial assets at fair value 
is relevant to users. Fair value measurement in the reversal decisions provides information 
concerning future firm performance. The evidence in this study reveals that reversals by firms 
with less incentives to manage earnings are related to future firm performance. This indicates 
that reporting an asset at fair value or value in use is, to some extent, reliable, and provides 
predictive value (as described in the IASB conceptual framework) to users of financial 
statements. Hence, the application of fair value measurement in the impairment standard 
helps the reporting entity to achieve the objective of financial reporting, as described in the 
IASB’s conceptual framework. The findings also support the efforts of the IASB and FASB 
to continue issuing standards relating to fair value measurement, disclosure and recognition. 
Although measurement errors and reporting incentives may affect the objective of fair value 
and value in use measurements, this study demonstrates that the benefits of the application of 
fair value and value in use measurement may outweigh the self-interest fair value 
measurement.  
 
Previous studies detailing asset impairment provide extensive evidence on opportunistic 
impairment recognition. They relate the impairment announcement and recognition to the 
10 
 
firm’s performance and stock-market reaction. In general, those studies provide evidence that 
the impaired assets perform worse in the future, indicating that firms are suffering from the 
impaired assets. To date, there are limited studies examining the reversals of impairment 
charges. For example, Duh, Lee and Lin (2009), and Zhang, Lu, and Ye (2010), examine the 
recognition of opportunistic reversal in Taiwan and mainland China. Collectively, these 
studies conclude that firms reverse the impairment charges primarily to manage earnings. In 
Malaysia, only a few studies examine impairment reporting, particularly focusing on 
compliance to the standard. For example, Laili, Carlin and Finch (2009) investigate the 
compliance of Malaysian firms in relation to FRS 136 audited by the “Big 4” firms. They 
report substantial cross-sectional variation among the sample of Big 4 Malaysian audit firms, 
and distinctly poor compliance levels. Unlike prior studies on impairment reversals, this 
study examines both motives for reversals; that is, those reported for economic reasons and 
those due to the recognition of opportunistic reversals. This is consistent with two 
perspectives of earnings management: the informative perspective and the opportunistic 
perspectives (Beneish, 2001). The flexibility in accounting standards may be used by 
managers to opportunistically recognise the accruals. However, it also allows managers to 
signal their private knowledge about the underlying economic condition of the firm. This 
study provides evidence that reversal firms, on average, recognise the unrealised gain that 
reflects the changes in non-current asset values. Thus, the discretionary element in FRS 136 
allows managers to communicate their expectations regarding current and future firm 
performance, and this is the dominant motivation for the reversal of impairment charges in 
Malaysia. This study also provides evidence that some firms reverse the impairment charges 
opportunistically. In summary, this study identifies two motivations pertaining to reversal 
recognition by the Malaysian public firms: one group of companies (the majority) reverses 
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the impairment charges for economic reasons, while the other group (the minority) reports the 
reversals to manage earnings. 
 
Prior studies on earnings management focus more on aggregate accruals models to detect 
earnings management. The interpretation of the findings using aggregate measurement is still 
controversial, due to the difficulty in separating discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals. 
McNichols (2000) suggests that future research on earnings management should depart from 
its high reliance on the aggregate accruals approach. Dechow, Hutton, Kim and Sloan (2012) 
suggest that, in future research, earnings management could be detected with improved test 
power using reversal accrual in individual accounts, such as goodwill impairment and 
property, plant and equipment. A small volume of published research in earnings 
management using specific accruals also provides an attractive area for research. The 
findings of this research are beneficial to standard-setters and regulators, as the specific 
standard being used to manage earnings is identified. The evidence could help future 
improvement in the development of the standard. Thus, the findings of this study contribute 
to, and extend, the literature on earnings management using specific accruals. The study 
provides direct evidence on the use of the specific standard FRS 136, Impairment of Assets, 
to manage earnings. It is relevant to the general literature pertaining to the existence of 
earnings management under IFRS, but, unlike other studies, it provides evidence based on a 
specific accrual. 
 
This study links earnings management using specific accruals to other manifestations of 
earnings management (i.e. the aggregate measure of earnings management, the DeFond and 
Park (2001) model) and the motivation to avoid earnings declines. Most prior studies 
examine specific accruals and aggregate measures of earnings management separately. 
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Studies that relate the specific accruals to aggregate measures do not examine extensively the 
relationship between both measures of earnings management.
4
 This study is unique compared 
to other earnings management studies on specific accruals. It identifies opportunistic reversal 
recognition by examining the level of abnormal accruals, in addition to the motivation to 
avoid earnings declines. As firms may use various techniques and incentives to manage 
earnings, firms with high abnormal accruals may also use reversals to manage earnings. This 
study provides evidence that the opportunistic reversals are associated with abnormal 
accruals and incentives to avoid earnings declines. The findings from this study suggest that 
research in this area should not consider each reporting incentive in isolation. This is because 
firms’ management may use more than one type of accrual to manage earnings.  
 
The findings from this study also contribute to the current corporate governance literature 
available. Prior studies examine the efficacy of corporate governance in mitigating 
opportunistic earnings reporting using an aggregate measure of earnings management. The 
findings from this study support the argument that good corporate governance practices are 
also crucial in mitigating opportunistic reporting under a specific standard. Studies on non-
current asset impairment document that CEO change is a significant determinant for 
impairment recognition (Strong & Meyer, 1987; Elliot & Shaw, 1988). This study provides 
further evidence that the change in management is also associated with the reversals of 
impairment losses. Some new management recognises impairment charges in the year of 
appointment, with an intention to reverse the charges later when there are incentives to do so. 
 
 
                                                 
4
 For example, Duh et al. (2009) examine the difference of discretionary abnormal accruals measured using the 
Modified Jones Model between reversal firms and control firms, but it is not significant, and they conclude that 
the aggregate measure (Modified Jones Model) may fail to address managers’ use of accounting discretion, as 
provided by an accounting standard to manage earnings.  
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1.4 Organisation of the study 
 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the reporting requirements under 
FRS 136, and the related literature on asset impairment and impairment reversal, reporting 
issues of fair value accounting, and prior literature on earnings management and corporate 
governance. This is followed by Chapter 3, which discusses the methodology employed in 
this study. It presents the data and sample selection, and discussions of three empirical 
analyses in this study; analysis on the information content of reversals, analysis on the 
influence of reporting incentives in reversals, and the link between opportunistic reporting 
and the motivation to avoid earnings declines. Chapter 4 presents the findings from the 
analysis of the association between reversals and firm performance. Chapter 5 reports the 
findings on the influence of reporting incentives on the information content of reversals. 
Chapter 6 subsequently presents the findings from the analysis of the association between 
reversals and the motivation to avoid earnings declines. Lastly, Chapter 7 concludes the study 
with a summary of the results, and suggestions for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews issues of fair value accounting and value in use, in the context of FRS 
136, Impairment of Assets. It also reviews the earnings management and corporate 
governance literature. Section 2.2 presents the issue of fair value accounting. Section 2.3 
discusses the concept and requirements of FRS 136, Impairment of Assets, and the accounting 
treatment for impairment reversals, and reviews the literature on asset impairment and 
impairment reversals. The section also discusses the application of fair value measurement in 
the recognition and measurement of reversal of impairment losses. Section 2.4 provides an 
overview of the research issues in earnings management. Among others, the issues include 
the incentives for earnings management, types of earnings management and the several 
methods used in the earnings management literature to detect this behaviour. Section 2.5 
reviews the literature relating to corporate governance’s role in mitigating earnings 
management. The last section summarises the content of the chapter. 
 
2.2 The move to fair value accounting 
 
There is an increasing trend across the world to adopt fair value accounting in the preparation 
and presentation of financial statements. In general, fair value accounting is a method used to 
report assets and liabilities at the market price. Under this method, at the acquisition date, an 
asset purchased is recorded at cost. Subsequent to the initial recognition, the value of the 
asset is adjusted to the current value, and the changes are reported in the income statements. 
In contrast, under historical cost accounting, the changes in the value of the assets are not 
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adjusted, and the assets are reported in the balance sheet at book value: cost minus 
accumulated depreciation. 
 
Capital market regulators and standard setters in many jurisdictions believe that fair value 
provides more relevant measures of assets, liabilities and earnings than historical cost, 
because it reflects current information (Danbolt & Rees, 2008). They also believe that the 
measure appears to meet the conceptual framework of financial reporting better than other 
measurements (Whittington, 2008). This is because fair value information fulfils the 
characteristics of useful information required by the framework (i.e. comparability and timely 
information). Herrmann et al. (2006) add that fair value provides predictive value to the users 
of financial statements. Such value helps the users to predict the future profitability of the 
firm. 
   
Accounting standard-setters around the world have issued standards requiring the recognition 
of assets and liabilities at fair value and changes in their fair value in income statements. 
Accounting standards issued by the IASB are accepted and adopted in many countries, 
including Malaysia. The IASB has issued IFRSs, and allows the measurement of assets and 
liabilities at fair value in most of its accounting standards. In fact, the use of fair value 
accounting has long been required under UK GAAP (Cairns, 2006). Furthermore, in initial 
recognition of assets and liabilities, the use of fair value measurement has long been required 
under International Accounting Standards (IAS)
5
. The same accounting treatment is required 
for the revaluation of property, plant and equipment since the introduction of IAS 16, 
Accounting for Property, Plant and Equipment, in 1982. In general, IFRS requires the use of 
fair value measurement in four main accounting treatments: for the measurement of 
                                                 
5
 IAS is a series of accounting standards issued by the IASC between 1973 and 2001. 
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transactions at initial recognition; for the allocation of the initial amount at which a 
transaction is recognised among its constituent parts; for the subsequent measurement of the 
assets and liabilities; and in the determination of the recoverable amount during impairment 
testing (Cairns, 2006). Two key fair value standards issued by the IASB are IAS 32, 
Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation, and IAS 39, Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurements. In 2011, the IASB issued IFRS 13, Fair Value 
Measurement, which set out a framework for measuring fair value in a single IFRS. In the 
US, the FASB has issued several standards that require the measurement and disclosure of 
accounting amounts using fair values. Among the most significant are those standards related 
to the financial instruments, such as SFAS No. 107, Disclosures about Fair Value of 
Financial Instruments, and SFAS No. 119, Disclosures about Derivative Financial 
Instruments and Fair Value of Financial Instruments.  
 
In Malaysia, the accounting standards issued by the MASB were based on IASB Standards, 
with additional guidance tailored to deal with specific issues that are not addressed in the 
IAS/IFRS, illustrations or additional clarification for the better understanding of the context 
of the standards, and compliance with local laws and regulations. In 2008, the MASB issued 
a statement regarding its plans to bring Malaysia to full convergence with the IFRS. From 1 
January 2012, Malaysia undertook a full convergence of Malaysian accounting standards to 
IFRS. On 19 November 2011, the MASB issued a new MASB-approved accounting 
framework, named the “Malaysian Financial Reporting Standards (MFRS) Framework”. This 
framework will cause accounting standards in Malaysia to be fully IFRS-compliant. 
 
As the Malaysian accounting standards are based on the IFRS, the use of fair value 
measurement is also a requirement of Malaysian public companies, in preparing their 
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financial statements. Until 1 January 2013, the MASB has issued three fair value accounting 
standards: FRS 132, Financial Instruments: Presentation (equivalent to IAS 32), and FRS 
139, Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement (equivalent to IAS 39), issued on 
February 2006, and FRS 13, Fair Value Measurement (equivalent to IFRS 13), issued on 
November 2011. 
 
2.2.1 Prior studies on fair value accounting 
 
Landsman (2007) reviews capital market studies on the value relevance of fair value 
information to investors. In general, he concludes that disclosed and recognised fair values 
are informative for investors. However, the degree of informativeness is affected by the 
measurement error and sources of information, external and internal appraisers. In the UK 
and Australia, upward revaluation is permitted. Studies in these jurisdictions examine the 
information content of revalued assets at fair value. Using a large sample of Australian firms, 
Easton, Eddey and Harris (1993) examine the association between revaluation of tangible 
long-lived assets and stock market prices. They document that the assets have incremental 
explanatory power relative to other earnings components. Similarly, Barth and Clinch (1998) 
conduct a similar analysis on the revaluation of financial, tangible and intangible assets, and 
find that revalued investments are incrementally priced. A positive association is also found 
between intangible assets revaluation and share prices. They find little evidence indicating 
that independent appraiser-based revaluation is more value-relevant than director-based 
estimates. Cotter and Richardson (2002) test whether there are differences between the 
appraisals made by internal and external appraisers. They find that independent appraisers are 
more likely to be used for the revaluations of land and buildings, and directors are more 
likely for investments, plant and equipment and identifiable assets.  
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Aboody et al. (1999) extend the previous studies on the fair value measurement, by 
examining the association between revaluations of fixed assets and firm performance, 
measured using accounting-based measures and market-based measures. They report 
evidence that supports the relevance of fair value measurement. In particular, they find that 
upward revaluations are positively associated with changes in future firm performance, and 
that current-year revaluations are positively priced by the market. However, the study also 
finds that managerial incentives affect the usefulness of revaluations. They report that the 
relationship between revaluations and firm performance is weaker for high debt-to-equity 
firms. In an overview of the valuation of property, plant and equipment, Herrmann et al. 
(2006) posit that fair value measurement for property, plant and equipment is more value-
relevant to decision-makers. They argue that the fair values are helpful in predicting future 
profits, provide relevant information regarding dividend restrictions and more timely 
financial information. 
 
Much of the fair value studies in the US focus on assessing the relevance and reliability of 
fair value measures of financial instruments in banks, since banks are largely comprised of 
financial assets and liabilities. Barth (1994) examines the value relevance of investment 
securities in US banks that are reported at fair value. The study reports that the fair values are 
incrementally associated with bank share prices. However, the study also finds mixed results 
concerning whether unrecognised securities’ gains and losses provide incremental 
explanatory power relative to other components of income. The study claims that errors in 
estimating the fair values are the primary explanation for the mixed results. Using a sample of 
banks, with data pertaining to 1992 and 1993, Nelson (1996) assesses the value relevance of 
the fair values of bank assets and liabilities disclosed under SFAS 107. Consistent with 
findings in Barth (1994), the study reports that the fair values of investment securities are 
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incrementally informative to investors. Venkatachalam (1996) evaluates the association 
between the fair values of banks’ derivatives disclosures provided under SFAS No. 119 and 
the share prices of the banks. Findings from the study suggest that the fair value estimates 
explain cross-sectional variation in share prices. A recent study by Kanagaretnam, Mathieu 
and Shehata (2009) examines the value relevance of fair value information for a sample of 
Canadian firms that are listed in the US stock exchange. They report that changes in the fair 
value of available-for-sale investments are positively valued by the market. 
  
In Malaysia, Hassan and Saleh (2010) examine the value relevance of financial instruments 
disclosure by 484 Malaysian public companies, from 1999 to 2003. In particular, they 
examine whether each disclosure requirement, as stated in Malaysian accounting standard no. 
24 (MASB 24),
6
 Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation, and fair value 
information are positively valued by the Malaysian market. They find that both the disclosure 
quality of financial instruments information and fair value information are value-relevant. 
Kwong (2010) investigates the value relevance of the book value of equity and earnings 
before and after the adoption of IFRS. He highlights that some major attributes of financial 
reporting after the convergence with the IFRS include the measurement of balance sheet 
items using fair value and the recognition of fair value gain or loss in income statements. He 
reports that book value and earnings are significant in jointly explaining the variations in their 
associated market values. When the IFRS became mandatory to reporting entities in the 
Malaysian market, the role of earnings and income statements in the stock market valuation 
became increasingly important, compared to the role of the book value of equity. Based on 
these two studies, overall, the Malaysian market perceives that fair value information is 
value-relevant in its decision-making. 
                                                 
6
 This is an old Malaysian accounting standard issued in 2001, before the issuance of FRS 132, Financial 
Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation, in 2006. 
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2.2.2 Limitations of fair value measurement 
 
Although fair value accounting is argued as a better accounting measure compared to 
historical cost accounting, however, in practice, fair value may not be well-defined. The 
guidance to determine the fair value is described in the IASB and FASB GAAP. However, 
the measurement for certain assets cannot be determined reliably when no active market 
exists for the assets. This is a major problem for non-financial assets (Landsman, 2007). The 
limitation is a cost to investors, because the fair value measurement might not be measured 
with sufficient precision to help them assess adequately the firm’s financial position and 
earnings potential. In the absence of an active market, management must estimate the assets 
fair value, which can be subject to discretion or manipulation. Estimates in projecting future 
cash flows may provide managers with a wide degree of discretion regarding which rules to 
apply. As documented in the earnings management literature, the discretionary element in 
accounting standards may be exploited, since it provides both the opportunity and incentives 
for managers to decide when to inflate the assets value and/or earnings for their private 
benefits.  
 
Landsman (2007) claims that having to rely on managers’ estimates of asset and liability fair 
value introduces the general problem of information asymmetry. In fair value estimates, 
managers possess private information regarding the appropriate values to select for model 
inputs, in addition to the true underlying economic value of an asset to the firm. Lhaopadchan 
(2010) reviews the accounting treatment and reporting consequences of the application of fair 
value measurement in respect of acquired goodwill. She claims that managerial self-interest 
and earnings management concerns appear to motivate many goodwill impairment decisions.  
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In summary, the use of fair value in the measurement of assets and liabilities in financial 
statements receives substantial support from capital market regulators and standard-setters. 
The fair value measure provides useful information to users of the financial statement in their 
economic decision-making. Such financial information is believed to meet the financial 
reporting conceptual framework because of the qualitative characteristics provided by fair 
value (i.e. comparability, timely information and predictive value). However, there are some 
criticisms concerning the reliability of the fair value measurement, particularly in relation to 
non-financial assets with no active market. Estimates are used to determine the fair value of 
such assets, and the flexibility given in the determination of the fair value may open an 
opportunity for earnings manipulation. 
 
2.3 FRS 136, Impairment of Assets, and prior studies 
 
The reporting requirements and accounting procedures as described in Malaysian Financial 
Reporting Standard (FRS) No. 136, Impairment of Assets, prior literature on assets 
impairments/impairment reversals and the use of fair value in impairment testing is reviewed 
in the following sections.  
 
2.3.1 The reporting requirements under FRS 136 
 
FRS 136 was issued in 2005, and became effective from the financial year beginning 1 
January 2006. The main objective of the standard is to ensure that the carrying amount of an 
asset does not exceed its recoverable amount. The standard supersedes FRS 1362004, which 
was formerly known as MASB 23. The latter standard provides only little guidance on 
accounting for impaired assets. Before the issuance of both standards, accounting treatment 
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of asset impairment was diverse, and no specific standard outlined when, how and how much 
should be recognised. Previously, companies generally wrote-down an asset when there was 
evidence of permanent impairment in the ability of the impaired assets to recover, with the 
write-down reported as a loss in the income statement. The inconsistencies in measuring and 
reporting an asset impairment and lack of authoritative guidance reduce the reliability and 
comparability of financial statements (Titard & Pariser, 1996). Thus, FASB
7
 and IASB
8
 issue 
a standard dealing specifically with this economic event, which provides comprehensive 
guidance on the treatment of assets impairment. The main differences between asset 
impairment and asset write-down are that an asset impairment test is performed for a class of 
assets where an assessment needs to be performed at each balance sheet date, and the 
carrying amount needs to be reduced to the recoverable amount, which is measured as the 
higher of fair value less the cost of disposal and value in use. Meanwhile, for asset write-
down, an assessment is only performed for a particular asset when there is a permanent 
diminution of the asset, and the carrying amount is reduced to the fair value of the asset.  
 
FRS 136 is based on International Accounting Standard (IAS) 36, Impairment of Assets, 
issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). Initially, IAS 36, 
Impairment of Assets, was issued on June 1998, and became effective from 1 July 1999. On 
31 March 2004, the standard was revised. The IASB developed this revised IAS as part of the 
board project on the development of an accounting standard for business combination, IFRS 
3, Business Combination. Among the main changes in this standard are the frequency of 
impairment testing, the measuring of value in use, identifying the cash-generating unit to 
which an asset belongs, allocating goodwill to cash-generating units, the timing of an 
impairment test for goodwill and the prohibition of reversal for goodwill. On 22 May 2008, 
                                                 
7
 The FASB has issued the Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 144, Accounting for the 
Impairment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets (formerly know as SFAS No. 121). 
8
 The IASB has issued IAS 36, Impairment of Assets, to deal with accounting for impairment. 
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the IAS 36 was firstly amended, in relation to the disclosure of estimates used to determine 
the recoverable amount, and, secondly, on 16 April 2009, regarding the units of accounting 
for goodwill impairment testing using segments.  
 
In line with Malaysian Accounting Standards Board’s (MASB) plan, in convergence with the 
IFRS, Malaysian FRSs are modelled on the IFRS. The issuance of a standard related to the 
impairment of assets began in 2002, when MASB issued MASB 23, Impairment of Assets, 
and this was followed by FRS 1362004. This standard is equivalent to IAS 36, issued by the 
IASB. Later, in 2005, FRS 136 was issued, superseding the old FRS. The objective of FRS 
136 is to ensure that the carrying value of an asset does not exceed its recoverable amount. 
The carrying value is the book value of the assets, while the recoverable value is the higher of 
an asset’s net selling price and its value in use. An impairment loss occurs when the carrying 
value is higher than the recoverable amount. This difference should be recorded as a loss in 
the income statement, and such loss should be accrued whenever the situation arises. An 
enterprise should assess, at each balance sheet date, whether there is any indication that an 
asset may be impaired. If any such indication exists, the enterprise should estimate the 
recoverable amount of the asset. Subsequent to the recognition of an impairment loss, the 
recoverable amount for the impaired asset might increase due to internal or external factors. 
The standard requires that, if there is an indication that the impairment loss previously 
recognised for a particular asset (other than goodwill) no longer exists, the company needs to 
recalculate the recoverable amount for the asset; and, if the recoverable amount for the 
current period is higher than its carrying amount, the impairment loss recognised in prior 
periods needs to be reversed. Indications of reversal include: the increase in the asset’s 
market value; significant changes with a favourable effect on the entity that have taken place 
during the period in the technological, market, economic or legal environment; the reduction 
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of the market interest rate; significant changes in the extent or manner an asset is used; and, 
lastly, the economic performance of an asset which is, or will be, better in the future. 
 
2.3.2 Prior studies on impairment after the issuance of the impairment standard 
 
Studies on asset impairment after the issuance of the impairment standard focus on the 
response of the managers to the mandatory requirement for impairment testing. Reinstein and 
Lander (2004) conduct a survey, discussing how accountants, auditors and financial analysts 
view the new impairment standard. They report that the impairment standard is believed to 
improve financial reporting more effectively than the previous standard. The application of 
the standard encourages the reporting entity to report its non-current assets which reflect the 
current value of the assets. Li, Shroff, Venkataraman and Zhang (2011) examine the 
information content of goodwill impairment loss from the perspective of market participants. 
They find that investors and financial analysts lower their expectations concerning the 
announcement of an impairment loss. Impairment loss also appears to be a leading indicator 
of a decline in future profitability. They argue that the reaction can be largely attributed to 
investors revising their expectations of future performance based on the information 
conveyed by the impairment. 
 
However, the standard has been criticised as giving management substantial flexibility to 
exercise judgments in determining and reporting an impairment loss (Titard & Pariser, 1996; 
Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Alciatore et al., 1998; Riedl, 2004). For example, determining an 
appropriate discount rate that reflects current market assessments and the appropriate risks 
will often be difficult. This process requires consideration and input from financial 
management, line management and, perhaps, valuation professionals. Input from these parties 
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will also be required to formulate assumptions regarding growth rates used to project cash 
flows until the end of the asset’s useful life, which also requires significant judgment to 
formulate. Carlin and Finch (2010) analyse the variances between independent risk-adjusted 
estimates of firm discount rates and those adopted by 124 Australian and New Zealand-based 
firms. They find that the firms apply lower than expected discount rates, and interpret the 
evidence as an opportunistic exercise of discretion, to avoid unwanted impairment losses. 
Titard and Pariser (1996) also argue that the international accounting standards give 
managers considerable discretion in regard to the timing and the value of write-downs of 
impaired assets. FRS 136 requires that the impairment test should be made on every reporting 
date, and the recognition can only be made if the indication of impairment exists. This 
condition provides discretion for management as to the timing of the asset write-down. In 
addition, the amount of impairment depends on the market value of assets and estimated 
future cash flows. The use of estimates in projecting future cash flows provides discretion for 
managers to determine the amount of impairment and the reversals (Sevin & Schroeder, 
2005). When managers are provided with choices in determining the value of assets, 
expenses and the profits of their firms, this accentuates the risks encountered when creative 
or aggressive accounting are employed (Healy & Wahlen, 1999).  
 
A descriptive study by Finch (2006), regarding the recognition of impairment by large 
Australian listed firms, finds that managers are taking a very conservative approach to the 
calculation of impairment, with a goodwill impairment of only 0.02% of the goodwill value 
and average implied effective life, across all firms of 75.5 years for intangible assets. The 
author argues that firms may be engaged in creative accounting by reporting asset 
impairment, which results in the increase of reported earnings and the higher book value of 
assets. Sevin and Schroeder (2005) examine whether SFAS 142, Goodwill and Other 
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Intangible Assets, provides an opportunity for earnings management using firms that 
recognised an impairment loss in 2002. They report that a significantly higher proportion of 
small firms reported negative earnings in 2002, as opposed to the previous year. They suggest 
that the standard is used more by small firms with negative earnings as part of a “big bath” 
strategy. Similarly,  Jordan and Clark (2004) examine Fortune 100 companies reporting 
goodwill impairment in the initial year of the issuance of the standard on goodwill 
impairment. They report that firms taking goodwill impairment charges in the year of study 
possess significantly lower earnings than their counterparts, which do not record the write-
down, suggesting that the firms adopted the big bath strategy. Their result is robust, when the 
two groups of companies recorded similar earning levels in the previous year. In the US, 
Riedl (2004) examines the use of SFAS No. 121, Accounting for the Impairment of Long-
Lived Assets, for big bath behaviour of firms before and after the issuance of the standard. 
The result displays a higher association between impairment reporting and “big bath” 
behaviour after the issuance of the standard, and this behaviour is more likely to reflect 
opportunistic reporting by managers than providing private information of the firms 
performance. Riedl suggests that, consistent with criticisms of this standard, the reporting of 
impairment under the new standard has decreased in quality. Lapointe-Antunes, Cormier, and 
Magnan (2009) examine the goodwill impairment recorded by Canadian firms after the 
adoption of the revised standard on purchased goodwill. They report a negative relationship 
between reported losses and share price. They interpret this result as consistent with 
investors’ perceptions of losses as sufficiently reliable measurements to incorporate within 
investment decisions. In another study of listed Swedish corporations, CEO replacement was 
found to be positively associated with impairment recognition (Broberg, Collin, Tagesson, 
Axelsson & Echele, 2007). The authors conclude that the corporations, to a certain extent, use 
impairment charges to regulate earnings. A recent study by Bens, Heltzer and Segal (2011) 
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examine the effect of fair value measurement on the information content of goodwill 
impairment following the implementation of SFAS No. 142, Goodwill and Other Intangible 
Assets. They find that the move to fair value has not increased the information content of 
goodwill write-offs, but rather, has somewhat reduced it. They claim that their evidence is 
consistent with the critics of SFAS 142; that is, fair value tests are easier to manipulate and, 
therefore, the results are less informative for investors.  
 
In Malaysia, Carlin, Finch, and Laili (2008) examine the compliance with disclosure 
requirements as set out under FRS 136, using the 36 largest Malaysian listed companies in 
2006. They find that the compliance level is unsatisfactory, and that there is substantial 
variation in the disclosure information provided by the firms, pertaining to impairment 
testing. They highlight some possible explanations. Among others are the misinterpretation of 
the materiality rules and their impact on disclosure, the need for the exercising of judgement 
and teething problems, and the implementation of the new process. A recent study in 2010, 
by the Financial Statements Review Committee, a committee established under the Malaysian 
Institute of Accountant (MIA), reports that the disclosures by some selected public 
companies, as required by accounting standards, are not complete and adequate. Among the 
standards with which companies fail to fully comply is FRS 136. The companies fail to 
disclose the following: indicators of impairment; whether the recoverable amount is fair value 
less the cost to sell or value in use; and, if the loss is reversed, what the indicator that leads to 
such reversal.  
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2.3.3 Prior studies on asset write-downs before the issuance of the impairment 
standard 
 
Before the issuance of FRS 136, the accounting for asset impairment is dependent on the 
reporting entity decision, and is recorded as an assets write-down only when there is a 
permanent reduction of the assets’ value. Substantial accounting studies investigate the asset 
write-down reporting behaviour before the issuance of the standard on impairment.
9
 Most 
prior studies on assets write-down focus on the examination of market reaction to the 
announcement of assets write-down, the magnitude of impairment and the frequency of 
occurrence. Strong and Meyer (1987) investigate asset write-downs among 120 firms during 
the period 1981-1985. For each write-down firm, they compare the financial performance 
before write-down to the non-impaired firms in the same industry. Financial performance is 
measured by the total return to shareholders, the market-to-book ratio and the cash flow per 
share for three years before the announcement of a write-down. The results indicate that the 
financial performance of the write-down firms tended to be neither in the top nor the bottom 
quintile relative to their control companies. They also find that the most significant 
determinant of write-down decision tend to be change in senior management, especially when 
the manager come from an outside firm. Furthermore, the authors examine the effect of this 
write-down announcement on the share performance of the firms. They find that firms report 
positive average cumulative abnormal returns, on average, 11 days before the announcement, 
but report negative returns during the announcement period. However, the return is typically 
positive 10 days after the announcement. Finally, they document that, the larger the write-
down, the greater the announcement period negative abnormal return. The authors note that 
these findings support “the bigger the bath, the better” hypothesis.  
                                                 
9
 Alciatore et al. (1998) review extensive literature of accounting research on assets write-downs. 
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Elliot and Shaw (1988) examine the financial accounting performance and market returns of 
240 firms that wrote down their assets during 1982-1985. Their results exhibit that firms 
taking an asset write-down had significantly lower return on assets and on equity in the year 
of write-down. The companies also experience declining asset growth, a significant drop in 
stock return and slowdown in earnings to market value performance. Similarly, Bartov, 
Lindahl and Ricks (1998) find that price declines precede write-off announcements, and, 
interestingly, the abnormal returns continue to decline for a two-year period. Zucca and 
Campbell (1992) study the write-down behaviour of 77 write-down firms, with 67 non-write-
down firm as control samples. In general, the write-down firms tend to perform poorly, 
relative to the control group. Furthermore, they find that the majority of the write-downs are 
recorded when the earnings are below the expectations, and the remaining are recorded when 
earnings exceed expectations, suggesting that firms engage in both the big bath and 
smoothing strategies. Elliot and Hanna (1996) find that firms taking a write-off are more 
likely to have additional write-offs in future. Rees, Gill, and Gore (1996) provide evidence 
that firms taking write-off record significant negative abnormal accruals (excluding the write-
off amount) in the year of write-down, but do not reverse in subsequent years.  
 
Loh and Tan (2002) examine the firm-specific and macroeconomic factors that influence the 
write-off decision in Singapore, and report that the unemployment rate, GDP growth rate and 
occupancy rate of properties are important factors in a firm’s write-off decision. For the 
firm’s specific attributes, they find that return on assets and a change in chairman are key 
determinants in asset write-off decisions. Another study concerning the determinants of 
write-down decisions, by Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996) demonstrates that manipulation 
and impairment factors drive write-down decisions. However, when they analyse write-down 
decisions by the type of assets, both factors play little or no role in determining inventory and 
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property, plant and equipment (PPE) write-down, but play a significant role in goodwill and 
restructuring charges write-downs. To sum up, most of the prior studies focus on the market 
reaction to the announcement of asset impairment, write-down firms’ performance and 
determinants of asset write-off decisions, and only a few studies examine the influence of 
corporate governance attributes on impairment reporting. 
 
2.3.4 Prior studies on impairment reversals 
 
Studies on impairment reversals are limited, and focus mainly on mainland China and 
Taiwan. Duh et al. (2009) study the reversal of impairment loss reporting by Taiwanese 
firms. They report that the companies will reverse further when such reversal will avoid an 
earnings decline in the subsequent period. The study also provides evidence that corporate 
governance in reversal firms is weak compared to non-reversal firms. Chen, Wang and Zhao 
(2009) investigate whether the reversal of impairment losses by public listed companies in 
China is associated with economic factors or reporting incentives. They find that reporting 
incentives as a proxy for earnings management dominate managerial decisions. They also 
find that asset impairment reversals provide investors with value-relevant information, but 
that this association is significantly weaker than other earnings items. Lastly, they suggest 
that a high-quality accounting standard may not necessarily lead to high-quality accounting 
information, without the necessary supporting infrastructure for constraining managerial 
opportunistic behaviour. Ai (2007) examines the value relevance of assets impairment and 
the reversals in China, using 2001 to 2003 data. She finds that impairment and reversals are 
both positively associated with share price. When both impairment and reversals are 
regressed on stock returns, she finds only reversals associated with the returns, suggesting 
that the reversals are reported on a timely basis. The study also tests whether asset 
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impairment reversal explains future performance. She reports that the reversal is positively 
associated with future operating cash flow, but only over more than a one-year period.  
 
A recent study by Zhang et al. (2010) also provides evidence on opportunistic impairment 
reversal reporting by firms listed on Chinese stock exchanges during the transition period 
following the announcement of the prohibition of reversal of impairment losses. They find 
that the announcement renstrains these firms from taking a “big bath”. They also find that 
firms with substantial impairment and small positive earnings reverse significantly more 
impairment losses of long-lived assets during the transition period. They conclude that the 
accounting standard changes affect the firm’s behaviour even before the new standard’s 
effective date. In Malaysia, to the knowledge of the present author, there is no study on the 
reversal of impairment losses. Only a few studies examine the compliance of the Malaysian 
firms to FRS 136 (Laili et al., 2009; Carlin et al., 2008). This provides an interesting 
opportunity for research, because Malaysian accounting standards are based on the IFRS, and 
follow the common law system, whereas prior studies on impairment reversals focused on 
mainland China and Taiwan, which are code law countries. Moreover, China has its own 
accounting standards, which are different from the IFRS. Hence, this study may provide new 
insights into how firms react to the issuance of the impairment standard. 
 
2.3.5 Comparison between impairment reversal and revaluation 
 
FRS 116, Property, Plant and Equipment, describes the accounting treatments for fixed 
assets. The application of the standard is closely related to asset impairment. Generally, the 
standard allows companies to choose between the cost model and the revaluation model for 
the treatment of fixed assets. Under the cost model, fixed assets are carried at cost minus 
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accumulated depreciation and accumulated impairment loss. Under the revaluation model, the 
assets should be reported at the net revalued amount in the balance sheet. Under the 
revaluation model, the difference between market value and the book value, both upward and 
downward, should be recorded in the revaluation reserve account, and the balance recorded in 
the equity section. The upward revaluation will increase the equity account, while the 
downward revaluation will reduce the account.  
 
Fixed assets treated under both models are subject to impairment tests. At each balance sheet 
date, companies need to assess whether there is any indication of impairment. If at least one 
of the indications exists, the related asset should be written down if its carrying amount is 
higher than its fair value. The difference is recorded as a loss in the income statement for cost 
model. In subsequent years, when the indications for asset impairment no longer exist, the 
company may reverse the loss, but should not exceed the value if the assets are not impaired 
originally. The reversal value will be recorded as the adjustment to the accumulated 
depreciation/amortisation and gain on reversal of impairment loss. Under the revaluation 
model, the treatment for impairment loss will be a little different from the cost model. The 
processes of the impairment test and the determination of impairment loss are similar under 
both the cost and revaluation models. However, under the revaluation model, the loss is 
recorded as a revaluation decrease, and, consequently, will reduce the revaluation reserve 
account. 
 
The standard also allows the impairment for revalued assets to be reversed when the 
conditions for impairment no longer exists. It requires that the reversal of an impairment loss 
recognised previously should be treated as a revaluation increase. The assets are adjusted to 
reflect current values by increasing the value of an asset and crediting the equity account 
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(namely, the revaluation reserve), and are not recognised as income. Impairment is viewed as 
downward adjustments of fair value, and is reported accordingly as a reversal of previous 
revaluations. 
 
When an asset has first been revalued upwards, then written down to reflect impairment, and 
later adjusted for the reversal of impairment, the required procedure is to report the reversal 
of impairment. As discussed before, impairment loss is accounted for as a reversal of upward 
revaluation. Then, the reversal of the impairment loss will be viewed as yet another upward 
revaluation, and accounted for as an addition to an equity account, and thus should not be 
reported through earnings. If impairment has eliminated the entire revaluation capital 
account, and an excess loss has been reported in earnings as impairment loss, then a reversal 
should later be reported in earnings (provided the earlier write-down had been so reported), 
with any balance taken directly to the revaluation reserve account. 
 
There are a number of published studies examining asset revaluation behaviour. Aboody et 
al. (1999) investigate the revaluation of UK firms, and suggest that upward revaluation may 
be used to signal better future performance. They find that upward revaluations of fixed 
assets by UK firms are significantly positively related to future firm performance. Moreover, 
they also report that current year revaluations (revaluation balances) are significantly 
positively related to annual returns (prices), indicating that revaluations reflect asset value 
changes. They also find that large downward revaluations are significantly positively related 
to returns, and vice versa, for small downward revaluation. In Australia, Easton et al. (1993) 
investigate the relationship between the revaluation of tangible long-lived assets, and share 
prices and returns. They suggest that the inclusion of the revaluation reserve-to-book value of 
assets is more aligned with the market value of the firm. Moreover, they also report that the 
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balance of the revaluation reserve and the annual revaluation have significant explanatory 
power when the debt level is relatively high. Another study in Australia finds that a 
revaluation announcement is associated with upward share price movements, and suggests 
that the market appears to absorb the information quickly into the price (Sharpe & Walker, 
1975). However, Emanuel (1989) finds no association between revaluation announcement 
and share price using data from New Zealand. In summary, studies in asset revaluation 
suggest that asset revaluation is associated with a firm’s performance, and better reflects the 
firm’s value.  
 
2.3.6 Fair value measurement in FRS 136 
 
The use of fair value measurement is also required in the application of FRS 136. In 
impairment testing, the reporting entity needs to determine the recoverable amount of an 
asset. The amount is the higher between the asset’s fair value less the cost to sell and its value 
in use (para. 18 of FRS 136, 2006). Fair value less costs to sell is defined in the standard as: 
 
The amount obtainable from the sale of an asset or cash-generating unit in an arm's length 
transaction between knowledgeable, willing parties, less the costs of disposal. 
 
The above definition is similar to the definition of fair value as described in Section 2.2. 
Hence, the use of the fair value measure is clearly stated in the impairment standard. In a case 
where the fair value cannot be determined, the standard requires the reporting entity to use 
the assets value in use as its recoverable amount. Value in use is the present value of future 
cash flows expected to be derived from the use of an asset. The cash flow projections should 
be based on reasonable and supportable assumptions that represent management’s best 
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estimate of the firm’s economic conditions. The most recent financial budgets approved by 
the management should also be considered in the projection of future cash flows.  
 
Cairns (2006) states that fair value less costs to sell, in IAS 36, are, by definition, based on 
fair value, but are lower than fair value. Furthermore, value in the use of assets is based on 
estimates of future cash flows discounted at current market rates of interest. Therefore, they 
are indicative of the amount that rational, willing and knowledgeable parties would take into 
account when considering the exchange of the asset. Thus, these amounts approximate fair 
value. Cairns also claims that the use of fair value in IAS 36 forms an important part of 
impairment testing; that is, to determine the recoverable amount of non-current assets. He 
also claims that an entity can recover impaired assets by selling them, in particular by 
exchanging them with another knowledgeable, willing party in an arm’s-length transaction. 
Therefore, fair value is one of the possible solutions for the recoverable amount of PPE and 
intangible assets. 
 
2.4 The exploitation of non-cost-based measures of value: earnings management 
 
As explained in Section 2.3.2, the valuation of an asset at fair value or value in use involves 
estimations and judgement by management. Estimations provide discretion to managers, and 
may be exploited to inflate, reduce or shift earnings to different periods. FRS 136, 
Impairment of Assets, is observed to give substantial flexibility to managers, and may provide 
an opportunity for managers to manage earnings (Titard and Pariser, 1996; Alciatore, 1998; 
Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Riedl, 2004). Prior studies provide evidence that managers use the 
impairment standard to manage earnings (Duh et al., 1999; Zhang et al., 2010). This section 
reviews the research issues concerning earnings management, which includes the definition 
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of earnings management, the motives for earnings management, the type of earnings 
management and the models used to detect earnings management. 
 
2.4.1  Definitions 
 
Two of the most popular earnings management definitions are: 
 
(a) “A purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent 
of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to, say, merely facilitating the neutral 
operation of the process)” (Schipper, 1989). 
(b) “Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting 
and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers” (Healy 
& Wahlen, 1999). 
 
Beneish (2001) notes that, so far, no consensus has been achieved in terms of definition of 
earnings management, and that this would lead to a different discussion on interpretation 
regarding accounting research. He comments that the above definitions deal with external 
financial reporting, but the second definition also discusses timing, real investment and 
financial decisions as methods to manage earnings. Beneish views earnings management in 
two different perspectives: the opportunistic and the information perspective. The first 
perspective refers to an action to obtain private benefits, while the latter perspective suggests 
that managers use their discretion to provide information about future cash flows. Most prior 
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studies focus more on opportunistic earnings management, and there are very limited studies 
investigating information perspectives (Beneish, 2001). 
 
2.4.2 Motives for earnings management 
 
Many studies find that the motivations for earnings management are associated with debt 
covenants, compensation agreements, and the issuance of share and insider trading (Beneish, 
2001). Dechow et al. (1996) report that earnings manipulation motives related to the issuance 
of shares at a higher price represent the highest frequency of cases reported among 92 
companies subject to enforcement action by SEC, followed by the motive to report upwardly 
the value of earnings per share and the contractual incentive. Most accounting scholars 
classify earnings management motivations into several categories: (1) capital market 
incentives; (2) compensation contracts; and (3) debt covenants. All motives use accounting 
numbers as a tool to test whether the intended targets have been achieved or not. Some 
motives are concerned with the managers’ personal interests, and some are more to protect 
the reputation and the survival of the business and its managers.  
 
Capital market incentives are related to the intention of managers to influence the share price. 
The extensive use of accounting reports by investors and financial analysts may provide an 
incentive for managers to manage earnings. They may manipulate the reported earnings to 
influence the share price during the issuance of the shares to the public. This effort may 
benefit the company and the managers by reducing the cost of acquiring new capital. 
Seasoned equity offering is one type of capital market incentive. It provides an incentive for 
managers to manage earnings before the issuance of shares, to increase the price. Seasoned 
equity offering, sometimes called secondary equity offering, is the issuance of new shares to 
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the public by an already publicly listed company. These offers may relate to shares sold by 
existing investors (non-dilutive), new shares (dilutive) or both. Studies from Teoh et al. 
(1998b) and Rangan (1998) provide evidence that this incentive is associated with managers’ 
intent to manage earnings prior to seasoned equity offerings. Teoh et al. (1998b) report that 
issuers who adjust their discretionary accruals, to manage earnings before the offerings, tend 
to possess a lower net income after the offer. Rangan (1998) reports a similar result, and finds 
that earnings management concerning the offer period reflects the changes in net income and 
stock return. He concludes that investors temporarily overvalue the shares, and are 
disappointed by the subsequent decline in net income. 
 
Initial public offering is another type of capital market incentive. It refers to the offering of 
new shares when a company is going public for the first time. It would also provide an 
incentive for managers to manage earnings, to an even greater extent than seasoned equity 
offering. Dechow and Shrand (2004) state that managing earnings is more beneficial during 
initial public offerings, due to the greater probability of misleading investors. Some studies 
document evidence of this motivation (Teoh et al., 1998a; Teoh, Wong & Rao, 1998; 
DuCharme, Malatesta & Sefcik, 2001). Most of the studies find that companies do manage 
earnings prior to initial offerings. However, Aharony, Lin and Loeb (1993) do not find strong 
evidence for this motivation. 
 
Incentives to manage earnings in mergers are likely to occur, as both parties involved – 
acquirer and target – tend to do so to increase share price. Christie and Zimmerman (1994) 
provide evidence that acquirees tend to report income-increasing depreciation, inventory and 
investment tax credit. Another study by Easterwood (1998) finds evidence for the use of 
discretionary accruals by takeover targets, to report high earnings, as compared to a control 
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group during the quarter before and after the merger. Similarly, Erickson and Wang (1999) 
find that the takeover targets have incentives to inflate earnings. In contrast, managers are 
found to adopt income-decreasing earnings management that will reduce the share price in a 
management buyout activity (Perry & Williams, 1994; Wu, 1997). Income-increasing 
earnings management was also found in insider equity transaction (Beneish & Vargus, 2002).  
 
Prior studies detailing incentives to meet earnings forecasts or targets are vast and varied. 
Studies in this area aim to investigate whether firms manage accruals to meet or barely beat 
the targets to influence the share. Early studies by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) examine 
this incentive using a distribution approach, and find that the number of firms that report 
slightly negative earnings are lower than the frequencies of companies which reported 
slightly positive earnings. They claim that both findings are unusual. Degeorge et al. (1999) 
find similar results at three thresholds: reporting positive earnings, maintaining current 
performance and meeting analyst forecasts. They also find evidence that the future 
performances of firms merely meeting thresholds appear worse than those of control groups. 
Peasnell, Pope and Young (2000) investigate whether the association between board 
composition and earnings management, measured using motivation to meet earnings targets, 
differs between the pre- and post-Cadbury periods. They find that, in the post-Cadbury 
period, the income-increasing accruals management to meet earnings target is reduced when 
the proportion of non-executive directors is high. Using a sample of 121 reversals of 
restructuring charges recorded between 1990 and 1999, Moehrle (2002) finds that some firms 
record the reversals to beat analysts’ forecasts, and to avoid reporting negative earnings and 
earnings declines. Research in this area is also conducted across the globe, using the 
distribution. Similar results were found in Thailand and Singapore (Charoenwong & Jiraporn, 
2009), China (Yu, Du & Sun, 2006) and Malaysia (Mohd. Saleh, Mohd, Iskandar & Rahmat, 
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2005a). These studies also consider corporate governance in their empirical investigations, 
and suggest a significant role for the corporate governance in mitigating the earnings 
management behaviour. For example, Mohd. Saleh et al. (2005a) investigate the effects of the 
size and code of corporate governance on the incidence of managing earnings, to avoid 
earnings decreases and losses by Malaysian public companies. They report that the 
significant incidence of earnings management to avoid losses by the firms is reduced 
following the introduction of the Malaysian code of corporate governance. 
 
In business operations, companies are subject to certain restrictions and regulatory 
requirements from the government financiers and creditors. In addition, various performance-
based measurements for management compensation have been adopted by top management, 
to align the interests of executives and shareholders. Debt covenants, share-based payment, 
tax incentives and government regulatory requirements are a few of the examples of 
contractual incentives. Lending arrangements are signed to ensure that companies maintain a 
certain level of earnings performance. Earnings-based bonus awards are provided to 
executives as a motivation to achieve a certain earnings level. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) 
comment that this contract might provide incentives for earnings management, as 
stakeholders may be unable to detect the opportunistic behaviour through accruals. 
 
Research findings in earnings management studies using debt covenant incentives provide 
some evidence of the existence of earnings manipulation. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner 
(1994), and Healy and Pelapu (1990), examine the behaviour of firms to manage accruals and 
accounting choice when the covenants are close to being violated. Holthausen (1981) 
investigates the depreciation method changes when firms are close to their dividend 
covenant. These studies provide weak evidence regarding the accruals manipulation of the 
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incentives. DeAngelo et al. report that troubled companies use income-decreasing accruals 
management, rather than attempting to inflate earnings.  
 
In an extreme case, Sweeney (1994), and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), investigate the 
behaviour of the violators of covenants. Despite the mixed results of the studies, they find 
that the violators do, to some extent, engage in opportunistic accruals management. DeFond 
and Jiambalvo report that violators accelerate earnings one year before the violation, and 
suggest that firms manage earnings when they are close to their contract covenant violation. 
Similarly, Sweeney finds income-increasing accounting changes as the companies approach 
the debt covenant violation point. This study suggests that the frequency of earnings 
management for avoiding technical faults on loan covenants is low. Jaggi and Lee (2002) 
compare the earnings management between troubled firms that were able to obtain waivers 
and firms that were unsuccessful in this regard. They find that successful firms use income-
increasing discretionary accruals, but they observe the use of income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals by firms that failed to obtain debt waivers.  
 
Nowadays, most businesses provide earnings-based performance incentives to top executives, 
as motivation to achieve a certain earnings level. The introduction of the rewards will 
motivate managers to exercise their duties in the interests of other stakeholders. However, a 
number of recent studies provide evidence that managers use discretionary accruals to adjust 
the earnings to the level of earnings targets set by the board of directors. An early study by 
Healy (1985) uses 1,527 firm-year observations from 1930-1980, and finds evidence to 
support the claim that managers manage earnings to maximise earnings-based awards. This 
study illustrates that, when earnings reported are between the range as set in the earnings-
based plan, managers will increase profits to maximise the bonus. When unmanaged earnings 
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are below the range or above the range, managers will reduce the earnings to create a reserve 
for future periods. Consistent with this result, Guidry, Leon and Rock (1999) use business 
unit financial data, and report that managers are likely to defer income when targets are not 
achieved. 
 
Gaver, Gaver and Austin (1995) examine the relationship between discretionary accruals and 
bonus plan bounds for a sample of 102 firms, from 1980-1990. Consistent with Healy’s 
(1985) findings, they find that managers use income-decreasing accruals reporting when 
reported earnings were above the upper level. However, when earnings before discretionary 
accruals fall below the lower bound, income-increasing discretionary accruals are observed. 
They conclude that the results are more consistent with the income smoothing hypothesis. 
The earlier findings provide evidence of the existence of accruals manipulation by managers 
in fulfilling their desire to maximise their bonus rewards. However, a number of recent 
studies on earnings-based rewards find that the incentives have decreased. Dechow and 
Shrand (2004) comment that the incentives have changed, along with the motive to maximise 
share-based compensation. This argument is supported by evidence reported by Cheng and 
Warfield (2005). 
   
2.4.3 Broad types of earnings management 
 
Accounting earnings contain two main elements: cash and accruals. The modification of any 
elements will affect the earnings numbers. The modification of accruals is viewed as 
unobservable earnings management, as it does not involve changes in real accounting 
transactions. Many studies have documented that this type of earnings management is 
pervasive and varied, compared to real manipulation through business transactions. Accruals 
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provide an opportunity for managers to manage earnings because they require the use of 
judgments and estimations. The greater the flexibility in using the judgments, the greater the 
scope of firms to manage earnings. The following events are some examples of situations in 
which managers can use judgments using accruals: 
 
(a) Accounts receivables: The determination of provision for bad debts requires managers 
to estimate the percentage of uncollectable receivables. 
(b) Inventory: Some of the costs related to the determination of the inventory value are 
capitalised, and some costs are expensed. The determination of inventory write-down 
requires the use of estimation. 
(c) Property, plant and equipment: How to determine the acquisition cost provides room 
for managers to use judgment in the classification of acquisition cost, either as assets 
or an expense item. The determination of an impairment loss, and its possible 
reversal, also requires the use of extensive discretion. 
(d) Pension and post-retirement benefits: This item provides a lot of discretion, as 
managers need to forecast the expected return of planned assets and the use of 
actuarial assumptions. 
 
Accruals manipulation involves the timing of the recognition of revenue and expense. An 
overstatement of profits in one period will reduce the future profits, with the same effect for 
expense items. For example, an overstatement of an impairment loss for a current period will 
be reversed in the future period, to increase earnings. As the determination of impairment 
recognition requires managers to perform business environment analysis (future cash flow 
estimation, an assessment of market conditions), managers may time the recognition of the 
loss in the current period. The use of accruals management is not necessarily a violation of 
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GAAP, as long as it does not involve fraudulent accounting. Dechow and Skinner (2000) 
provide an overview of how different types of accounting choices can be classified as 
earnings management and fraudulent accounting. Figure 2.1, below, illustrates this view: 
 
Figure 2.1: The distinction between earnings management and fraudulent accounting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Within GAAP 
Overly aggressive recognition of 
provision or reserves 
 
 
Conservative 
accounting 
 
 
 
Neutral earnings 
 
 
Aggressive 
accounting 
 
 
Fraudulent 
accounting 
Overvaluation of acquired in-process 
R&D in purchase acquisitions 
Overstatement of restructuring charges 
or asset write-off 
Earnings that result from the neutral 
operations of the process 
Understatement of provision for bad 
debts 
Drawing down provision or reserves in 
an overly aggressive manner. 
 
Violates GAAP 
Recording sales before they are 
realisable 
Recording fictitious sales 
 
Source: Dechow, P. M. and Skinner, D. J. (2000) 
The manipulation of real transactions will affect the cash flow of the enterprise. As the 
second element of earnings is cash, earning management through real transaction may affect 
the amount of earnings reported. Firms may undertake real economic transactions to 
influence the earnings in cash; for example, cutting research and development expenditure, 
boosting sales by offering products at a discount and disposing of fixed assets with high 
market values, as compared to book value. This type of earnings management is not a 
violation of GAAP, as long as the company properly accounts the transaction. Nonetheless, 
the “intent” in the decision taken (for example, to dispose of an asset), might contents a 
motive to manage earnings. 
 
Several studies provide evidence of the use of real transactions to manage earnings. Bartov 
(1993) finds that US firms manage earnings through the timing of fixed assets and long-term 
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investment disposals, to smooth the earnings changes. To boost profits, firms dispose of 
assets with unrealised gain, and defer the disposal of assets with unrealised loss; and vice 
versa when the profits are too high. Black, Sellers and Manly (1998) extend the study by 
examining the behaviour of UK firms and US firms in the treatment of fixed assets. The UK 
accounting standards allow firms to revalue fixed assets and record as revaluation reserves in 
the equity section of the balance sheet. In contrast, asset revaluation is prohibited in the US, 
and the asset should be reported at book value, or its impaired value. They find that the 
income smoothing through the use of assets sales is less prevalent in countries allowing asset 
revaluation. The small difference between the selling price and the book value of fixed assets 
for the revaluer provides little opportunities to inflate earnings. In a recent study, Zang (2012) 
provides evidence that managers use real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings 
management as substitutes, based on their relative costs. 
 
2.4.4 Accounting methods of managing earnings   
 
There are various methods used in earnings management. Stolowy and Breton (2004) give 
one name to all techniques of earnings management: accounts manipulation. This includes 
earnings management, income smoothing, “big bath” accounting, creative accounting and 
window-dressing. They define accounts manipulation as “the use of management discretion 
to make accounting choices or to design transactions so as to affect the possibilities of wealth 
transfer between the company and society (political cost), funds providers (cost of capital) or 
managers (compensation plans)”. Beneish (2001) classifies earnings management into two 
groups: income-increasing earnings management and income-reducing earnings management. 
The first method is used to increase earnings when the income is lower than a desired target. 
Prior studies find that the incentives for this method are related to debt covenants, 
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compensation agreements, equity offerings and insider trading (Beneish, 2001). The second 
method is used mostly to increase the likelihood of a negotiated or regulatory outcome; for 
example, to reduce the likelihood of wealth transfer (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978), and to 
obtain import relief (Jones, 1991). Arthur Levitt, the former chairman of the SEC, describes 
some other general methods for earnings management: big bath, creative acquisition 
accounting, “cookie jar” reserves, abuse of the materiality concept and improper revenue 
recognition (Levitt, 1998). 
 
The literature detailing income smoothing has a long history, starting from the early 1890s. A 
wealth of research concerning income smoothing demonstrates that the earnings management 
using income-smoothing is pervasive. Some definitions of income smoothing include the 
following: 
 
(1) Trueman and Titman (1988): 
“taking actions to dampen of fluctuations in their firm’s publicly reported net 
income.” 
 
(2) McNichols and Wilson (1988): 
“Income smoothing hypothesis predicts that firms choose accruals to minimise the 
variance of reported earnings. In particular when income would otherwise be 
unusually high, they will choose income-reducing accruals, and when earnings are 
unusually low, they will choose income-increasing accruals.” 
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(3) Black, Sellers and Manly (1998): 
“Income smoothing is a specific form of earnings management which posits that 
managers manipulate earnings to reduce volatility. Inherent to the income smoothing 
hypothesis is the assumption that earnings vary around some normal level, and that 
managers attempt to consistently maintain reported earnings as close to this level as 
possible.” 
 
Clearly, considering the three definitions, income smoothing refers to the behaviour of 
managers which reduces the variability and fluctuations of annual income to a certain level 
considered normal by the firm. One of the objectives is due to the perception of investors that 
firms have a normal level of earnings (Ronen & Sadan, 1981). Reported earnings are used by 
management for budgeting purposes. If the variations of reported earnings are too high, it 
would be difficult to forecast the percentage of the increment of all financial items. The 
objective of income smoothing for external factors lies in the theory of capital assets value. 
Based on this theory, the value of an asset is represented by the discounting of future cash 
flow expected to be generated from the use of the assets, and the discount rate is related to the 
uncertainty of the expectation. This uncertainty depends on the possible outcomes for each of 
the future periods. The linkage between the variability of the future income and the value of 
expected future cash flows is one of the main focuses of attention in the theory of asset value. 
From the investor’s point of view, the variability of the earnings stream will influence the 
amount of dividend paid, as directors consider the factors for a dividend formulation strategy. 
In addition, the stable earnings stream reflects the overall riskiness of the business, and has a 
direct effect on the investor’s capitalisation rate, and thus influences the share price 
(Beidleman, 1973). 
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There is no strong evidence concerning whether the smoothed income stream is either 
advantageous or disadvantageous to firms or stakeholders (Imhoff, 1977). Ronen and Sadan 
(1980) posit that the smoothing of income may not be as evil as one might think, and suggest 
that the technique can enhance the ability of investors to predict future income figures. 
Furthermore, Wang and Williams (1994) document evidence that income smoothing 
enhances the informational value of earnings, and suggest that the process of income 
smoothing incorporates managers’ private knowledge regarding the firm’s future 
performance. On the other hand, some studies view this behaviour as an attempt to mislead 
the shareholders and investors (Ronen & Sadan, 1981; Christensen et al., 1999). 
 
Despite the large volume of studies in the income smoothing literature, the results are mixed 
and inconclusive. Several studies provide evidence that income smoothing is widely practised  
(Craig & Walsh, 1989), and strongly support the smoothing hypothesis (Ronen & Sadan, 
1975; Ma, 1988). There is also evidence that income smoothing is not pervasive, and is fairly 
practised (Albrecht & Richardson, 1990; Ashari, Koh, Tan & Wong, 1994). Few studies 
focus on the factors associated with income smoothing. For example, Kamin and Ronen 
(1978), and Amihud, Kamin and Ronen (1983), report that, compared to owner-controlled 
firms, manager-controlled firms tend to smooth income significantly more. Company size 
and returns are also associated with smoothing behaviour (Moses, 1987; Craig & Walsh, 
1989).     
 
The big bath is another concept in earnings management. Under this method, if a company 
expects to have a series of hits to earnings in future years, it is better to recognise all the bad 
news in one year, leaving future years unencumbered by continuing losses. One way to 
practise the big bath approach is through the recognition of large asset impairment. 
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2.4.5 Models to detect earnings management 
 
The three main approaches used to detect earnings management are studies of aggregate 
accruals, studies of a specific accruals and studies of discontinuities in the distribution of 
income (Beneish, 2001). A number of models to investigate the existence of earnings 
manipulation have been developed, including those of Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986), Jones 
and Modified Jones (1991), and DeFond and Park (2001). The second approach focuses on a 
single account such as provision for bad debt, deferred tax and impairment of assets. The last 
approach examines the distribution of earnings.  
 
Under the first approach, the starting point to detect earnings management is the total 
accruals reported by firms. Generally, the models listed above will decompose the total 
accruals into discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals components, and the discretionary 
component represents a measure for earnings management. Healy (1985) introduces the first 
model used to determine the discretionary accruals. This empirical approach is the simplest 
model, as it defines total discretionary accruals as equal to total accruals. Healy uses a firm’s 
operating cash flows as a proxy for nondiscretionary accruals. Since the net reported earnings 
are comprised of operating cash flow and non-cash items, the totals accruals are the 
difference between the net operating income and the operating cash flows. The Healy model 
simply assumes that expected nondiscretionary accruals for the period are zero, and hence 
that any value for totals accruals is attributable to managerial discretion. DeAngelo (1986) 
points out that one advantage of using this model is that it can potentially reveal subtle 
income-reducing techniques, because such methods are less subject to detection by outsiders. 
However, this assumption has several limitations: the total accruals comprise both 
discretionary and nondiscretionary components (Healy, 1985), and it is highly restrictive, 
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considering that the level of working capital accruals will fluctuate in response to economic 
conditions and firm performance (Kaplan, 1985). 
 
The most widely used models for separating nondiscretionary and discretionary accruals in 
studies of aggregate accruals are the Jones’s original (1991) and modified models. These 
models relax the assumption that nondiscretionary accruals are constant. Following Kaplan’s 
(1985) suggestion, Jones controls for the effects of economic circumstances on the 
nondiscretionary accruals. The tests of this model are implemented with sufficient time-series 
data to estimate firm-specific coefficients, which are then used to estimate the discretionary 
accruals for a particular year. The Jones models regress total accruals on the level of 
property, plant and equipment (PPE), and changes in sales. The gross value of property, plant 
and equipment and revenue change are used to control for changes in nondiscretionary 
accruals caused by changes in the fundamentals. In particular, revenue is included as a 
control, because it is an objective measure of the firm’s operation before managers’ 
manipulation. The gross value of property, plant and equipment is used to control for the 
portion of total accruals related to nondiscretionary depreciation expense. The regression 
provides coefficients, which are then used to estimate discretionary accruals. The 
discretionary accruals are thus the residual components of the total accruals. The model is 
expressed as follows: 
 
TAi,t / Ai,t-1 = β0,i (1/Ai,t-1) + β1,i (ΔREVi,t/Ai,t-1) + β2,i (PPEi,t/Ai,t-1) + εi,t               (2-1) 
 
where: 
 
ΔREVi,t  is the change in revenues from year t-1 to year t, for firm i; 
51 
 
PPEi,t  is gross property, plant and equipment in year t, for firm i; 
εi,t  is the error term in year t, for firm i; 
and all other variables are as previously defined. 
 
The estimated coefficients from 2-1 are then combined with data from the test period, to 
generate the discretionary accruals: 
 
DACi,t = TAi,t/Ai,t-1 – [β0,i (1/Ai,t-1) + β1,i(ΔREVi,t/Ai,t-1) + β2,i (PPEi,t/Ai,t-1)]  (2-2) 
 
Ever since the model was introduced by Jones (1991), it has been expanded on numerous 
occasions within earnings management studies. However, as the credit sales could also be a 
source of earnings management through inflated receivables, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 
(1995) suggest that the first parameter should be corrected with the change in receivables. 
They modified the original Jones model by adjusting the changes in the revenues, by 
subtracting the corresponding change in receivables. Dechow et al. document evidence that 
the modified Jones model is more powerful than the initial model in detecting earnings 
manipulation, as presented below: 
 
DACi,t = TAi,t/Ai,t-1 – [β0,i (1/Ai,t-1) + β1,i(ΔREVi,t - ΔRECi,t) /Ai,t-1 + β2,i (PPEi,t/Ai,t-1)]        (2-3) 
 
Despite the widespread use of this approach in earnings management studies, the validity and 
reliability of this method has been criticised. After assessing all models mentioned above, 
Dechow et al. (1995) posit that these models generate tests of low power for the earnings 
management of economically plausible magnitudes, and are poorly specified when they are 
applied to samples of firm-years experiencing extreme financial performance. Dechow et al. 
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highlight the importance to control for expected earnings growth when measuring 
discretionary accruals. Furthermore, McNichols (2000) notes that the aggregate accruals 
models which do not consider long-term growth are potentially misspecified, and result in 
misleading inferences regarding earnings management practice. She also raises the question 
of how accruals behave in the absence of earnings management, as it is extremely difficult to 
be confident that estimates of discretionary accruals capture discretion from management, 
due to the little theory or evidence available for how these accruals behave with or without 
earnings management intentions. 
 
Taking a different approach, DeFond and Park (2001) use abnormal working capital accruals 
as a proxy for abnormal accruals. They model abnormal working capital accruals as the 
difference between the current year’s realised working capital accruals and the expected level 
of working capital accruals, where the historical relation of working capital to sales captures 
expected working capital. DeFond and Park view the difference as the portion of working 
capital accruals that is unlikely to be sustained, and is expected to be reversed against future 
earnings. The empirical model is: 
 
AWCAt = WCt – [(WCt-1/St-1) * St]    (2-4) 
 
where:  
 
AWCAt =  abnormal working capital accruals in year t; 
WCt  =  non-cash working capital in year t  that is defined as (current assets - cash and 
             cash equivalent) – (current liabilities – short-term debt); 
   WCt-1  = working capital in previous year; 
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         St  = sales in year t;     
       St-1  = sales in previous year.                 
AWCA in 2-4 captures the deviation of the current year’s working capital accruals from the 
normal level of working capital accruals required to support current sales. Thus, AWCA is 
interpreted as opportunistic earnings management. 
 
Dechow et al. (2012) propose a new approach to detect accrual-based earnings management. 
Their motivation stems from the limitation of the existing techniques in measuring earnings 
management. These techniques lack power in isolating discretionary accruals from total 
accruals. Under the new approach, Dechow et al. (2012) propose the inclusion of reversals of 
prior discretionary accruals in the earnings management models. They claim that the 
distortion of accruals in one period must reverse in another period. If the researcher correctly 
identifies the periods in which earnings management originated and reverses, incorporating 
the reversals increases the amount of variation in the discretionary accruals. Hence, the 
ability of existing accruals-based tests to detect earnings management can be significantly 
approved. They conducted several simulation tests by incorporating reversals in earnings 
management models, and found that the test power increases by around 40%. Furthermore, 
the tests are robust in mitigating misspecification across a broad set of economic 
characteristics. They also suggest that future research could use this technique to investigate 
earnings management in individual accruals accounts, such as property, plant and equipment, 
and goodwill impairment.  
 
Earnings smoothness is another method used to manage earnings. This method aims to ensure 
that reported income increases steadily on every reporting date. The Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concept (SFAC) No. 1 states: “Information about enterprise earnings based on 
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accrual accounting generally provides a better indication of an enterprise’s present and 
continuing ability to generate favourable cash flows than information limited to the financial 
effects of cash receipts and payments”. According to Dechow et al. (2010), the standard-
setter’s goal is a representation of fundamental performance that improves the cash flow’s 
predictability. They further posit that, based on this system, the earnings smooth random 
fluctuations in the timing of cash payments and receipts, making earnings more informative 
regarding performance than cash flows. Thus, smoothness is an outcome, and not the ultimate 
goal of the accrual system. However, the assumption that accruals-based earnings 
measurement will better reflect a firm’s performance is merely an assumption, and accruals 
can hide and delay the measurement of changes in fundamental performance, which would be 
useful when a decision is revealed (Dechow et al., 2010). They conclude that, even in the 
absence of accounting choices, smoothness is not a de facto indication of greater usefulness 
in decision-making. 
 
Most studies in earnings management measure smoothness by examining the variant of the 
variability of reported earnings relative to total assets, cash flows from operations, and the 
correlation between changes in accruals and changes in cash flows from operations. The first 
measure examines the volatility of earnings deflated by total assets. This method has been 
used by some researchers (e.g. Lang, Ready & Wilson, 2006; Barth et al., 2008). Lang et al. 
(2006) argue that, when all else is equal, if firms are smoothing earnings, the variability of 
earnings should be lower. However, the volatility of earnings may also be affected by firm-
specific characteristics such as the volatility of the cash flow stream. A better measure of 
income smoothing to capture the effect of cash flow volatility is achieved by examining the 
mean ratio of the variability of the change in net income, ∆NI, to the variability of the change 
in cash flows from operations, ∆CFO. Normally, firms with more volatile cash flows 
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typically have more volatile net income. If firms use accruals to manage earnings, the 
variability of the change in net income should be lower than that of cash flows from 
operations. A more direct approach to measure smoothness is to consider the correlation 
between accruals and cash flows (Corr(∆ACC, ∆CFO)). Authors such as Land and Lang 
(2002), and Lang et al. (2006), suggest that, when all else is equal, a more negative 
correlation is an indication of earnings smoothing, since managers will increase accruals as a 
response to poor cash flow performance. In short, the negative and higher value of the 
correlation between accruals and cash flows from operations indicates that firms manage 
earnings using accruals. 
 
Although the aggregate accruals model has been used extensively in detecting earnings 
management behaviour, the interpretation of the findings is still controversial, due to the 
difficulty in separating discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals. Due to this problem, 
McNichols (2000) suggests that further progress in the literature is required to depart from 
the high reliance on the aggregate accruals approach. An alternative method used to detect 
earnings management involves focusing on specific accruals. Beneish (2001) suggests that, 
by exploiting information concerning specific accruals, a potentially more powerful method 
to detect earnings management can be developed. This suggestion is based on his study of the 
ability of the modified Jones model to detect earnings management by firms identified as 
generally accepted accounting principle (GAAP) violators. He finds that the modified Jones 
model does not perform well in detecting GAAP violators. In addition, standard-setters are 
also very likely to be interested in evidence that specific accruals are being managed for 
future improvement (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Such studies are also crucial to developing 
more powerful accruals model (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). 
 
56 
 
McNichols (2000) lists three advantages of using specific accruals in earning management 
research. Firstly, the researcher can develop intuition regarding factors influencing the 
behaviour of the accrual and exploiting the knowledge of GAAP. Secondly, this method can 
be applied in businesses whose business practices cause the accruals in question to be subject 
to discretion and judgement. Lastly, the researcher can investigate the relationship between 
the specific accruals and explanatory factors directly. Nevertheless, this method is also 
subject to some disadvantages, including the requirement for more institutional knowledge, 
the reliability of specific accruals to reflect the exercise of manipulation, the small sample 
size and the limited generalisability of the findings (McNichols, 2000; Dechow et al., 2010). 
 
There is a small volume of published studies on earnings management using specific 
accruals, suggesting a platform for interesting future research agenda (Healy & Wahlen, 
1999).  For example, McNichols and Wilson (1988) focus on the provision for bad debts as a 
proxy for discretionary accruals. By modelling the provision for bad debts using a definition 
under GAAP, they attempt to isolate a discretionary accruals proxy that is substantially free 
of nondiscretionary components. They find that the discretionary component of the provision 
for bad debts is income-decreasing for the firm whose earnings are unusually high or low. 
This finding is inconsistent with the income smoothing hypothesis. A study by Teoh et al. 
(1998a) examines provision for bad debt and depreciation estimates prior to initial public 
offering. They conclude that, compared to control group-non-IPO firms, IPO firms tend to 
report income-increasing depreciation policies and bad debts allowances in the IPO year, and 
during several subsequent years. 
 
Some researchers choose a specific industry to study earnings management behaviour. 
Beaver, Eger, Ryan and Wolfson (1989) examine the loan loss reserves of banks. Studies of  
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insurance claim loss reserves also indicate that there are earnings management practices 
among insurance companies (Petroni, 1992; Penalva, 1998). In a different context, 
Visvanathan (1998) investigates the relationship between changes in valuation allowances for 
deferred tax and current earnings. The result does not indicate that the practices are subject to 
widespread earnings management. Instead of using deferred tax components, Dhaliwal et al. 
(2004) examine total tax expense. They provide robust evidence that firms lower their 
projected effective tax rates when non-tax sources of earnings management are insufficient to 
achieve targets.  
 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), and Hayn (1995), introduce earnings distribution method in 
studying the earnings management behaviour of firms. The main difference of this study is 
that the researchers do not have to estimate abnormal accruals. This method examines the 
distribution of reported income concerning thresholds, such as reporting small positive 
income or avoiding losses. Studies using this technique propose that firms have incentives to 
avoid reporting losses or earnings declines. The higher frequency of reporting slightly 
positive incomes and abnormal discontinuities at certain thresholds indicates that firms 
manage earnings. 
 
A number of studies use this method to detect earnings management. Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) report that the frequencies of small earnings increases and small positive earnings are 
abnormally high compared to the volume of small earnings decreases and small losses. They 
conclude that this phenomenon is pervasive, and find that 8-12% of firms with small pre-
managed income decreases inflate earnings to meet their targets, while 30-44% of firms with 
small pre-managed losses manipulate earnings to create a small amount of positive incomes. 
Further tests indicate that cash flows from operations and changes in working capital are 
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chosen by managers, to manipulate earnings. These reporting patterns are also observed in 
studies using quarterly reported earnings (Burgstahler, 1997). Similarly,  Degeorge et al. 
(1999) provide evidence that earnings management occurs at three thresholds: reporting 
positive profits, maintaining the current level of earnings and meeting analysts’ projections.  
 
Other studies, however, describe some of the weaknesses of the distribution approach. 
McNichols (2000) claims that this method does not differentiate between normal and 
abnormal accruals, which is required to measure the extent of earnings management. She 
posits that the distribution approach provides results that discriminate which group of firms 
are likely to manage earnings, rather than developing a better approach to estimate the level 
of earnings manipulation. Furthermore,  Durtschi and Easton (2005) provide evidence that the 
shape of the earnings distribution produced by studies using this method is influenced by 
several factors: deflation, sample selection criteria, and differences between the 
characteristics of observations to the left of zero and observations to the right of zero. Healy 
and Wahlen (1999) also claim that this approach does not provide direct implications for 
standard-setters. 
 
2.5 Corporate governance and earnings management 
 
Earnings management has been viewed as the opportunistic behaviour of managers, for their 
own benefits (Holthausen & Leftwich, 1983), and as misleading (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). 
Practitioners and regulators often view earnings management as pervasive and problematic 
(Dechow & Skinner, 2000). Thus, initiatives should be formulated to enhance the oversight 
of the financial reporting process by those entrusted as the shareholders’ guardians (Levitt, 
1998). Following these concerns, corporate governance is viewed as an important mechanism 
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used to safeguard the interests of shareholders. According to agency theory, the opportunistic 
behaviour of agents can be controlled through the adoption of proper monitoring mechanisms 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The appropriateness of the monitoring mechanism chosen is 
claimed to be crucial in terms of market competition amongst organisations (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). 
 
Following the worldwide financial crisis and corporate collapse, corporate oversights of 
public companies in the world have changed dramatically. Weak and malfunctioning 
corporate governance mechanisms are claimed to be the key factors responsible for causing 
and accelerating the deteriorating situations of the crisis (Suto, 2003; Sam, 2007). Various 
internal and external monitoring mechanisms have been suggested, and efforts are undertaken  
to improve these mechanisms. These mechanisms are claimed to be able to align the interests 
of agents more closely with those of the principals (Sam, 2007). 
 
After the 1997 economic turmoil and the major corporate collapse, the Malaysian 
government has conducted extensive reforms in legal, regulatory and reporting requirements 
relating to corporate oversights, shareholders protection and other monitoring mechanisms 
(Suto, 2003; Liew, 2007). Regulatory oversights of corporate governance are introduced to 
promote good governance and boost the confidence of investors in their capital markets, 
strengthening investors’ protection (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Among others, the reforms 
include the amendments to the Bursa Malaysia’s listing requirements and the setting up of the 
High Level Finance Committee of Corporate Governance to establish a framework for 
corporate governance. The Committee released the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance (the Code) (Finance Committee on Corporate Governance [FCCG], 2001), in 
March 2000, which was fully implemented in 2001. The Code introduces the principles and 
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best practices of corporate governance, to inculcate good corporate governance among 
Malaysian public listed companies (PLCs). The Code was revised by the Securities 
Commission in October 2007 and 2011, to further improve corporate governance standards 
and strengthen investor confidence. The implementation of the reforms, immediately before 
and after the crisis, has contributed to the resilience of the Malaysian corporate sector (Cheah, 
2010). 
 
2.5.1 The role of corporate governance 
 
Larcker, Richardson and Tuna (2007) define corporate governance as “the set of mechanisms 
that influence the decisions made by managers with the interest of shareholders”. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) give a straightforward definition: “Corporate governance deals with the ways 
in which suppliers for finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment”. Chisari and Ferro (2009) define corporate governance as “The available system 
of institutions or mechanisms that induce incentives in listed business firms, so as to 
distribute benefits between stakeholders, restricting discretion on such distribution”. One 
recent definition by Brickley and Zimmerman (2010) view the term broadly, as “the systems 
of laws, regulations, institutions, markets, contracts, and corporate policies and procedures 
(such as the internal control system, policy manuals, and budgets) that direct and influence 
the actions of the top-level decision makers in the corporation (shareholders, boards, and 
executives)”. Despite the various definitions given by authors, there is still no agreement on 
the definition of corporate governance. Common definitions focus on the separation of 
ownership from control, while others give a broader view which includes boards, financial 
statements, analysts, banks, government, media and so on. Agreement on the definition of 
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corporate governance could have significant applications for both the direction and 
interpretation of the research (Brickley & Zimmerman, 2010). 
 
There is a large volume of published studies describing the role of corporate governance in 
the corporate world. The main role of this mechanism has been explained in agency theory. 
Based on this theory, issues associated with the separation between ownership and control 
will lead managers (agents) to act in an opportunistic manner, by increasing their personal 
wealth at the expense of the owners (principals) of an organisation (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Managers, it is claimed, do not always act in the best interests of shareholders (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983). Managers also have substantial residual control rights (i.e. the rights to 
make a decision in circumstances not fully foreseen within the contract) (Grossman & Hart, 
1986; Hart & Moore, 1990, cited in Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Considering the separation of 
ownership from management, Jensen and Meckling (1976) posit that the opportunistic 
behaviour of managers can be controlled by monitoring mechanisms. Healy and Palepu 
(2001) suggest that, to reduce the agency problem, the board of directors can be a crucial 
mechanism used to monitor and discipline management on behalf of external owners. The 
shareholders (principals) will appoint a board of directors and external directors (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983), to reduce the risk of avoiding responsibility by agents. The board of directors 
is, then, responsible for monitoring the duties of managers.  
 
Similarly, Healy and Palepu (2001) propose that, to reduce the agency problem, the board of 
directors can be an important mechanism used to monitor the managers’ actions. Diverse 
ownership in complex organisations requires the need for the delegation of decision control 
(ratification and monitoring) and decision management (initiation and implementation) to 
managers (Rediker & Seth, 1995). This framework proposes different roles for inside 
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directors (i.e. top management) and outside members of the board. The primary role of inside 
directors is expected to be decision management, and that of outside directors to be decision 
control. To perform decision control tasks, outside directors are given the rights to ratify and 
monitor major corporate-level initiatives, as well as hiring and setting the compensation level 
of top management. In order for the outside directors to be effective in checking managerial 
decisions, they must have incentives to avoid colluding with management (Rediker & Seth, 
1995). 
 
External auditing is also an important corporate governance mechanism. An external auditor 
is appointed to ensure that the financial statements produced by the management of the firm 
are in compliance with approved accounting standards, rules and regulations, and are fairly 
presented the economic condition of the company (Peel & Clatworthy, 2001). Niemi (2005) 
claims that the demand for external auditing emerges from information asymmetries 
occurring between the client management and the stakeholders of the client organisation. It is 
also claimed that an organisation demands a positive quantity of auditing, because external 
auditors have some advantages (relative to the internal system) in certain aspects of control 
(Simunic, 1980). 
 
Maijoor (2000) posits that internal control mechanisms such as internal audits and the 
reporting of internal controls are now becoming part of the corporate governance systems to 
reduce the agency problem. Effective and independent internal auditing conducted on both a 
periodic and a non-periodic basis will be able to identify misconduct within an organisation. 
The main role of internal auditing includes the monitoring of financial statement integrity, 
assessing the internal control systems and identifying any misconduct concerning sensitive 
areas such as cash flow management, asset management, bribery, book-keeping accuracy and 
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completeness. It is claimed that the main work of internal auditors is to provide sufficient 
assurance that established policies, procedures and statutory requirements are followed, 
which is subsequently followed by a systematic review of the internal control system, the 
accounting and management information system and the risk management system (Kah Yun 
& Haron, 2004). Internal auditors understand and appreciate the organisation’s business 
process, acting as management consultants to reduce risks and help to run an organisation 
more efficiently and effectively, to increase the shareholders’ value (Fadzil, Haron & Jantan, 
2005). 
 
To sum up, various corporate governance mechanisms, as discussed above, are among the 
important parts of a corporation’s monitoring mechanism. It embraces both the internal and 
the external operations of a company. In other words, corporate governance is crucial in 
establishing mechanisms that ensure the company’s resources are employed for the benefit of 
the shareholders (Dechow et al., 1996). Best practice of corporate governance helps 
companies to avoid financial and operational problems (Mohd Iskandar, Rahmat, Mohd 
Noor, Mohd Saleh & Ali, 2011). The quality and nature of corporate governance can affect 
the structure of the financial system. If shareholders are poorly protected and companies are 
poorly governed, then one would not expect to witness a thriving market for publicly traded 
equity (Henderson, 1986). The quality of corporate governance also matters significantly for 
developing countries, in contributing to a country’s ability to achieve sustained productivity 
growth and lasting democratic political institutions, both of which are crucial for long-term 
national development (Lin, 2001; Malherbe & Segal, 2001; Oman, 2001).  
.  
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2.5.2 Prior studies on corporate governance and earnings management 
 
A growing body of literature investigates the ability of corporate governance attributes to 
reduce the opportunistic behaviour of managers to manage earnings. From an agency 
perspective, the ability of boards in overseeing and monitoring management activities is 
dependent upon their independence from management (Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996). 
This notion is supported by the extant literature, which suggests that outsiders or non-
executive directors may help to alleviate the agency problem by monitoring and controlling 
the opportunistic behaviour of management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2006).  
 
An early study by Klien (2002) on the relationship between good corporate governance and 
earnings management, presents evidence that the audit committee and board independence 
are associated with a lower level of abnormal accruals in the United States. This finding is 
supported by Peasnell, Pope and Young (2005), who find that the proportion of outside 
directors is negatively related to income-increasing earnings management, to avoid reporting 
losses and earnings reduction. However, their result does not find a comparable role for audit 
committee independence. Similarly, Xie, Davidson and Dadalt (2003) illustrate that the 
independence of outside directors is associated with a lower level of earnings management. In 
addition, they also report that the background of directors (e.g. experience in other 
corporation) and the number of the board members meeting are associated with a reduced 
level of earnings management. Davidson, Goodwin-Steward and Kent (2005) extend this 
research area in Australia, finding evidence to support the view that the board’s and the audit 
committee’s independence (proxy by non-executive directors) are crucial for constraining 
opportunistic earnings management. In India, Sarkar, Sarkar and Sen (2008) study 500 large 
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Indian companies, and report that it is not board independence per se, but rather board 
quality, that is crucial for mitigating earnings management. Sarkar et al. use board 
“busyness”, board “diligence”, directors’ shareholding and CEO duality as proxies for board 
quality.  
 
Bradbury, Mak and Tan (2006) examine board and audit committee characteristics in 
mitigating the opportunistic behaviour of managers, using Singapore- and Malaysia-based 
data. They find that both board size and audit committee independence are related to lower 
abnormal working capital accruals, and suggest that the audit committee is effective in the 
financial reporting process, by reducing the level of income increasing abnormal accruals, 
especially when all members of the audit committee are independent directors. Choi, Jeon 
and Park (2004) study the influence of audit committee characteristics on the earnings 
management behaviour of Korean public companies, and find that the independence and 
competency of the audit committee are associated with earnings management. Another study 
by Felo, Krisnamurthy and Solieri (2003) investigates the relationship between audit 
committee financial expertise, independence and size and the quality of financial reporting. 
They report that the percentage of audit committee members having expertise in accounting 
or financial management positively related to earnings quality, suggesting that mandating 
greater expertise on the audit committee, rather than simply requiring one expert on the audit 
committee, may be beneficial to enhancing earnings quality. Consistent with Felo et al.’s 
findings, Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klien and Neal (2006) document that audit committee 
financial expertise is associated with lower levels of earnings management, and is more 
pronounced when the committee members have prior work experience in accounting. 
Moreover, they also find that the relationship between earnings management and accounting 
financial expertise is stronger when these experts are independent.  
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In China, Lo, Wong and Firth (2010) find that firms with a board that has a higher percentage 
of independent directors, or which separate the roles of chairman and CEO, or have financial 
experts in their audit committees, are less likely to manipulate transfer prices in related-party 
sales transactions. The findings on the relationship between the board and audit committee 
independence, and earnings management, in Malaysia, demonstrate mixed results. Abdullah 
and Mohd Nasir (2004) examine firms from the Bursa Malaysia non-financial Main Board in 
1998, and present evidence that neither board independence nor audit committee 
independence effectively constrains the accrual management level. Similarly, another study 
by Abdullah (2002), on public companies prior to the revamp listing requirement mandated 
by Bursa Malaysia in 2001, indicates that  the composition of the board of directors has no 
significant relationship with earnings management. Mohd. Saleh, Mohd. Iskandar and 
Rahmat (2005b) analyse 561 firms listed on Bursa Malaysia in 2001, soon after the 
announcement of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance was mandated. They 
investigate some corporate governance characteristics in relation to earnings management. 
They also find similar findings that the independent characteristic of the board cannot limit 
opportunistic behaviour in firms with CEO duality status. Johari, Mohd Saleh, Jaafar and 
Hassan (2008) also conclude that a composition of one-third independent directors in the 
board, as suggested by Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance, is not adequate to monitor 
management from earnings management practices. 
 
However, Abd Aziz, Mohd Iskandar and Mohd Saleh (2006) document that board 
independence is significantly negatively associated with discretionary accruals. This result is 
inconsistent with previous studies. Similar results were found for the relationship between 
accounting literacy of the audit committee and discretionary accruals. Their results also show 
a significantly negative relationship between audit quality and discretionary accruals. These 
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findings are argued as consistent with the assumption in agency theory that superior audit 
quality can reduce agency cost. In sum, their study suggests that good corporate governance, 
the accounting expertise of the audit committee and high audit quality may mitigate 
managers’ opportunistic behaviour. Another study by Abdul Majid (2007) extends the 
literature on earnings management in Malaysia. The study focuses on two main independent 
variables: audit committee and board of director characteristics. Based on 106 public listed 
firms, using univariate and multivariate analysis, the study reveals that the size of the audit 
committee and directors’ shareholdings are significantly associated with earnings 
management. It is consistent with prior literature that a larger audit committee may help in 
curtailing this activity. Md. Yusof (2010) further investigates several pertinent audit 
committee characteristics, and their relationship with discretionary accruals, reported by 
MESDAQ
10
 companies. He finds no evidence to suggest that an audit committee with 
financial expertise (a former senior auditor or a former CFO), or a more diligent audit 
committee (meetings held), are significant in the absolute discretionary accruals. However, 
further analysis shows that more a diligent audit is negatively associated with income-
increasing discretionary accruals and income-decreasing discretionary accruals. Similarly, an 
audit committee with financial experts is negatively associated with income increasing-
discretionary accruals. 
    
One of the most commonly used metrics of corporate governance variables is board size. 
According to the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance, the board of directors should 
determine the optimum number of board members to ensure that the board discharges its 
duties effectively. Lipton and Lorsh (1992), and Jensen (1993), claim that board monitoring 
will be less effective if the board of directors is too large, due to the increase of free-riding 
                                                 
10
 Malaysian Exchange of Securities Dealing and Automated Quotation (MESDAQ) is a specialized market for 
technology-based and/or high-growth companies. 
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directors (Hermalin, 2003). This proposition is supported by Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells 
(1998), who report an inverse relationship between board size and firm performance in small 
and medium-size Finnish firms. Similarly, a study of US firms reports a negative association 
between board size and firm value (Yermack, 1996). However, some authors argue that larger 
boards are capable of monitoring top management activities, as this has more capabilities 
(Zahra & Pearce, 1989), and has varied expertise (Abdul Rahman & Mohamed Ali, 2006). 
Consistent with this view, Cheng (2008) and Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand (1999), 
report that board size is positively associated with firm performance. Xie et al. (2003) 
document a negative relationship between board size and discretionary current accruals. This 
finding is supported by Larcker et al. (2007), who find a similar relation between board size 
and abnormal accruals. Furthermore, a study of Malaysian firms presents evidence that a 
lower level of discretionary accruals is associated with a larger board (Wan Ismail, Dunstan 
& Zijl, 2009). However, Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2006), and Cheng (2008), 
demonstrate a positive relationship between the size of the board and abnormal accruals, 
suggesting that a larger board is ineffective in deterring earnings management.   
 
The Cadbury Report (1992) and the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance recommend 
that the role of a board’s chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) should not be assigned 
to the same person, to avoid the risk of directors being ineffective due to the excessive power 
granted to the CEO. If the top two positions are combined, it will affect the duty of directors 
to be independent, and the board’s intensity in monitoring top management will be reduced 
(Dobrzynski, 1991). In addition, the power of the CEO in setting the board’s agenda and 
controlling the flow of information could also impair the monitoring roles of the board in 
overseeing the managers (Solomon, 1993). If the board is highly influenced by management, 
it will not be able to control the management activities, as the chairman, who is also part of 
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the management, will overrule the board’s decisions (Abdullah, 2004). Prior studies provide 
little evidence on the relationship between earnings management and CEO duality. In a study 
of firms subject to enforcement action by SEC, Dechow et al. (1996) find that earnings 
manipulators are more likely to have CEOs who also served as board chairmen. Beekes, Pope 
and Young (2004), who examine the relationship between earnings quality and board 
composition in UK firms, document that firms with CEO duality have an impact on the 
relationship between board independence and earnings timeliness, where firms with more 
independent directors report bad news in a more timely manner than firms without CEO 
duality. Klien (2002) also reports that the level of discretionary accruals decreases in 
companies with the separation of the two positions. Among  Indian public companies, Sarkar 
et al. (2008) find that CEO duality is associated with earnings management behaviour. In the 
Malaysian setting, Mohd. Saleh et al. (2005b) find that firms with CEO duality are more 
likely to manage earnings than firms with the two roles separated, and suggests the separation 
of the two roles in public companies. However, Xie et al. (2003) find that CEO duality is 
unrelated to discretionary accruals. Malaysian studies by Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali 
(2006), and Johari et al. (2008), report similar results, suggesting that the separation of the 
role between the chairman and CEO has no effect in reducing earnings management.  
 
2.6 Summary  
 
This chapter reviews the reporting issue of fair value accounting, the reporting requirements 
under FRS 136, prior studies on impairment and impairment reversals, literature pertaining to 
the issues on earnings management and the role of corporate governance. As discussed in this 
chapter, FRS 136 requires companies to recognise an impairment loss when the recoverable 
amount is lower than their carrying amount. The standard also allows the reversal of the 
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impairment loss, and its reporting as an income item in the financial statements. The 
recoverable amount is based either on the fair value less the cost to sell or the value in use. 
Hence, in impairment testing, fair value measurement is used in the determination of 
impairment/reversal recognition. Fair value measurement is increasingly being adopted 
around the world, because it is believed that such measurement provides relevant information 
to users of the financial statement. In relation to the impairment standard, the financial 
reporting under this standard may provide useful information because of the use of fair value 
measurement in impairment testing. Fair value measurement helps users to predict future firm 
performance. Hence, fair value information on impairment/reversals should also provide 
users with the predictive value in the information. However, estimates used in the 
determination of fair value information may provide an opportunity for self-interested 
managers to manipulate earnings. To explore the informative value of fair value measurement 
in the reversal of impairment losses, this study examines whether such information provides 
future information about the reporting entity to the users of financial statement. 
 
As explained above, the use of estimates in the determination of fair value less the cost to sell 
or value in use may provide an opportunity for managers to manipulate earnings. Estimates 
require managers to use their judgement and private knowledge about the firms to predict 
future performance. Hence, the impairment and reversal of impairment recognition is 
discretionary, and may be used to manage earnings. To answer the question of whether the 
impairment reversals are recognised opportunistically, this study examines whether the 
Malaysian firms recognise the impairment reversals to manage earnings. There are lots of 
studies examining earnings management behaviour using aggregate accruals and extensive 
studies on the role of corporate governance to mitigate the activity. Only a few studies 
examine separately the incentives to manage earnings using specific accruals. Based on the 
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earnings management literature, studies on aggregate accruals and specific accruals are 
conducted separately, and the relationship between both studies is examined as additional 
with a minor concentration. As no extensively detailed study investigates the relationship 
between aggregate accruals and specific accrual, this study focuses directly on the association 
between both aspects.  
 
This chapter also discusses the role of corporate governance in mitigating the opportunistic 
behaviour of managers. Good corporate governance practices may control the behaviour of 
managers, and help to protect the interests of stakeholders. The last part of this study 
examines whether this mechanism plays a role in curtailing and reducing earnings 
management using impairment reversals. The next chapter discusses the sample and research 
methods used to answer the research questions. 
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CHAPTER 3: SAMPLE AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the sample and the methodology used to empirically answer the 
research questions: Does the reversal of impairment loss reporting portray the reality of 
economic performance, or is it associated with opportunistic earnings management 
behaviour? Is reversal reporting associated with other manifestations of earnings 
management? What is the influence of corporate governance in reversal reporting? The 
remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 explains the sample selection 
procedures and data sources. Section 3.3 describes the control group selection procedure. 
Section 3.4 discusses the methods used to examine the performance of all reversal firms. The 
first part of this section explains the procedures undertaken for the comparative analysis 
between reversal firms and non-reversal firms. Next, the models used to examine the 
association between reversal reporting and future firm performance are discussed. Lastly, the 
model used to examine the relationship between reversals and stock market returns is 
presented. All empirical analyses explained in Section 3.4 are performed to examine whether 
the reversals reported by Malaysian firms reflect the reality of economic performance. 
 
Section 3.5 explains the methods used to examine whether reporting incentives influence the 
recognition of impairment reversals. Specifically, this section explains the procedure 
undertaken to distinguish between reversal firms that are likely to manage earnings (reversals 
earnings managers) and those that report reversals based on the economic reality (reversal 
non-managers of earnings). The section explains the abnormal accruals model used to 
distinguish between both subsamples. The measurement of the model is also discussed. The 
73 
 
section also explains the differences in differences tests between reversals earnings managers 
and their control firms, and reversals non-managers of earnings and their control firms. The 
models used to examine the association between reversal reporting and future firm 
performance moderated by the incentive to manage earnings are also explained. Lastly, this 
section also explains the models used to examine the relationships between reversals reported 
by earnings managers and non-managers of earnings, and stock market returns.  
 
The research methods used to examine the association between reversals and the motivation 
to avoid earnings declines are presented in Section 3.6. The section explains the univariate 
and multivariate analysis undertaken in this study. The models used to examine the influence 
of corporate governance, debt levels and CEO changes on the association between reversal 
and motivation to avoid earnings declines are also explained in the section. The final section 
summarises this chapter. 
 
 
3.2  Sample selection procedure and data sources 
 
FRS 136, Impairment of Assets, is effective for financial statements covering periods on or 
after 1 January 2006, with early adoption encouraged. Before the issuance of FRS 136, the 
Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) issued MASB 24, Impairment of Assets, in 
2002, and later, FRS 1362004, in 2004. Public listed companies were expected to formally 
adopt FRS 136 in 2006, with some early adoption by public companies prior to 2006. 
According to the impairment standard, an impairment loss can be reversed whenever the 
indication of impairment is deceased. Therefore, companies recognising an impairment loss 
can reverse the previous impairment loss as early as one year after the recognition.  
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As the current study focuses on reversal reporting, and, to reflect current practices, Malaysian 
public listed companies recognising an impairment reversal from 2006 to 2009 are selected as 
the sample for this study. A list of all companies is obtained from the Bursa Malaysia 
website, at http://www.bursamalaysia.com/website/bm/listed_companies/list_of_ 
companies.html. Information regarding changes of companies’ names is obtained at 
http://www.bursamalaysia.com/website/bm/listed_companies/list_of_companies/change_of_
name.html. The information regarding changes of companies’ names is necessary, as several 
companies have changed their names during the period 2006-2009, and the previous names 
did not appear in Datastream. Furthermore, the annual reports for each company are 
presented in the Bursa Malaysia website, using the current year name, rather than the name as 
at the time that the list of companies was obtained.  
 
 
The annual reports of all companies can be viewed directly from the website, and are 
downloaded when the reversal firms are identified. If the annual reports are not available on 
the website, the respective companies’ websites are perused. The past annual reports are 
available under the “investor relations” section. Bank and financial institutions are excluded 
because they are not comparable with those of non-financial companies. This type of 
company has different accounting and regulatory systems in preparing companies’ annual 
reports.   
 
3.2.1 Identification of reversal firms 
 
This study follows several approaches to identify companies with reversal of impairment 
recognition during the period 2006-2009. An exploration of the data types in Datastream 
finds that only data types related to impairment loss recognition are available for four types 
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of non-current assets
11
. Therefore, the annual reports of all public companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia are examined to identify reversal firms. Reversal firms are those recognising a 
reversal of an impairment loss in income statements during the period of study. Data are 
gathered by reading the annual reports of all public companies from 2006 to 2009. Based on 
the listing statistics at www.bursamalaysia.com, there are 899, 863, 855 and 960 companies 
listed on Bursa Malaysia from 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009, respectively.  
 
A list of reversal firms is obtained through a keyword search. The words used are “reversal of 
impairment loss”, “write back of impairment loss”, “written back impairment loss” and 
“reversal of diminution in value”, as the firms use different words to report the account 
related with impairment reversal in the income statements and cash flows statements. If the 
searching process fails to find the words entered, cash flow statements are examined, in case 
companies use different terms to represent the reversal gain. All accruals items related to the 
income statements are presented in the cash flow statements for companies that prepare the 
statement under the indirect approach. According to FRS 136 paragraph 126(b), the amount 
of reversals of impairment losses should be presented in profit or loss during the period. 
These amounts are reported before tax, and should be presented in separate line item(s), as 
illustrated in Appendix A. 
 
The reversal amount and the type of non-current assets are collected, and are cross-checked 
in the notes of the accounts. As FRS 136 is only applicable to non-current assets, only 
impairment reversals related to non-current assets are collected to represent the sample (i.e. 
property, plant and equipment, investment in associates, other investment and investment 
properties). Goodwill impairment is excluded, as the standard prohibits the reversal of this 
                                                 
11
 The four data types are: impairment of property, plant and equipment, impairment of goodwill, impairment of 
intangible assets and impairment of financial assets. 
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asset. If firms report the reversal items in general terms – for example, “reversal of 
impairment loss” – without specifying the type of assets, an examination of each type of fixed 
assets is conducted to identify the respective account group. Reversal recognitions from the 
disposal of fixed assets are excluded from the sample, as the motives for disposal and reversal 
from impairment testing could be different. Even though the data collection process is time-
consuming, the data collected can be precisely identified. Following the above procedure, this 
study identifies an initial sample of 242 reversal firm-year observations for 151 non-financial 
firms. 
  
Table 3.1: Initial sample selection 
Sample period: 2006-2009 
Initial identified observations 
Less: Bank and financial institutions 
          Reversals made for disposal of fixed assets 
Initial reversal observations 
Number of firm-years 
274 
(11) 
(21) 
242 
 
 
Table 3.1 illustrates how the 242 reversals are selected. The initial keywords search yields 
274 reversals from 2006 to 2009, in four types of fixed assets. 11 reversals are attributed to 
financial firms, and 21 reversals are related to the disposal of assets. After excluding these 
reversals, the remaining 242 reversal observations represent the initial sample of this study. 
Table 3.2 presents the summary statistics of 242 initial reversal firm-year observations from 
2006 to 2009. Panel A of Table 3.2 summarises the sample breakdown by accounting year 
end. The reversal observations are 46, 68, 49 and 79 for 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009, 
respectively. These statistics represent 4.89%, 8.11%, 5.85% and 10.31% of total listed firms 
at Bursa Malaysia from 2006-2009. These figures display an increasing trend of reversal 
reporting in Malaysia, except for the year 2008.   
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics of initial reversal firm-year observations from 2006-2009 
 Number of firm-
year 
observations 
Percentage of firm-
year 
observations (%) 
Panel A: Year breakdown   
2006 46 19.01 
2007 68 28.10 
2008 49 20.25 
2009 79 32.64 
Total 242 100.00 
Panel B: Type of assets breakdown   
Property, plant and equipment 96 39.67 
Investment in associates 24 9.92 
Other investments 100 41.32 
Investment properties 13 5.37 
Multiple 9 3.72 
Total 242 100.00 
Panel C: Industry breakdown   
Technology and  telecommunications                11     (37)                4.55      (4.45) 
Industrial metals, mining, forestry, paper              8      (52)                3.31      (6.25) 
Oil, gas, water and electricity              6      (38)                2.48      (4.57) 
Media             6       (7)                2.48      (0.84) 
Property              34    (100)                14.05    (12.02) 
Industry products              66    (222)                27.27    (26.68) 
Construction and materials              28    (112)                11.57    (13.46) 
Travel and leisure             24     (29)                9.92      (3.48) 
Consumer products              59    (235)                24.37    (28.25) 
Total            242    832            100.00    100.00 
Figures in parentheses refer to the overall industry distribution in the Malaysian stock market, 
2006-2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
78 
 
The total reversal firm-years from 2006-2009 is 242, and these observations are associated 
with 151 firms. The different figures between reversal firms and reversal firm-years indicates 
that a few companies reversed in two years or more during 2006-2009. The sample size in the 
current study is larger (242 firm-years), compared with 67 reversal firms from January 1 
2005 to the first quarter of 2007, in Duh et al.’s study. Table 3.2, Panel B, illustrates the 
distribution of reversal observations breakdown by the type of fixed assets. A total of 96 
(39.67%) observations reversed impairment loss in property, plant and equipment (PPE), and 
100 (41.32%) firm-years recognised the reversal of impairment in other investments. PPE and 
other investment reversals represent almost 80% of the total recognition during 2006-2009. 
24 (9.92%) and 13 (5.37%) firm-years reversed the previously recognised impairment loss in 
investment in associates and investment in properties, respectively. 
 
Panel C of Table 3.2 reveals the reversal firm-years breakdown by industry. This industry 
classification is based on the Datastream 4.0 level 3 sector index, with a combination of 
seven sectors. Because of this, the number of sectors has reduced from 16 sectors to 9 sectors. 
This procedure is necessary to increase the matching number of reversal firms with non-
reversal firms. In general, the sample comprises a range of industries, with most in property 
(34, or 14.05%), industry products (66, or 27.27%), construction and material (28, or 
11.57%), travel and leisure (24, or 9.92%), and consumer products (59, or 24.37%).  The 
other four sectors with the lowest frequency are technology and telecommunications (11, or 
4.55%), industrial metals, mining, forestry, paper (8, or 3.31%), oil, gas, water and electricity 
(6, or 2.48%), and media (6, or 2.48%). The proportion of the firms in the sample under study 
in each sector is also proportionate with those in the overall stock market. The comparison 
between the industry distribution of the sample and the overall industry distribution (as 
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indicated in the parentheses of Table 3.2, Panel C) illustrates that the sample industry 
distribution is comparable to that of the Malaysian stock market. 
 
3.2.2  Data sources for corporate governance and other financial data 
 
Data on corporate governance variables is hand-collected from the 2006, 2007, 2008 and 
2009 annual reports for each firm-year. The process involves an examination of the corporate 
information section, directors’ profiles, statements on corporate governance, audit committee 
reports and directors’ reports to identify the board and audit governance characteristics. As 
the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance and the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements 
specify that public companies disclose the details of board members in annual reports, 
information regarding board independence can be gathered directly from these reports.  
 
Table 3.3 Financial data and codes 
Financial data Datastream code 
Abnormal working capital accruals (AWCA) 
   Working capital 
   Cash 
   Short-term debt 
 
WC03151 
WC02005 
WC03051 
Total assets WC02999 
Total sales WC01001 
Cash flow from operations WC04860 
Net income WC01751 
Operating income WC01250 
Book value of equity WC03501 
Market value of equity WC08001 
Share price P 
Dividend yield DY 
Market-to-book ratio MTBV 
Total liabilities WC03351 
Depreciation WC01151 
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Abnormal working capital accruals and other financial attributes are calculated based on data 
collected from Datastream. Data for the control group are also collected from Datastream. If 
the financial data is not available in Datastream, the relevant data is collected directly from 
the annual report, to ensure that the observation is retained in the sample. The Datastream 
codes for all financial variables used in this study are outlined in Table 3.3. 
3.3  Control group selection procedure 
 
FRS 136 requires public companies to recognise an impairment loss when the carrying 
amount of assets is higher than the recoverable amount. This unrealised loss can be reversed 
in the future if the asset value is recovered, or partly recovered, as a result of a higher 
recoverable amount. This procedure provides guidance on when and how to recognise an 
impairment loss. This standard also requires managers to use their professional judgement in 
estimating fair value less the cost to sell, and future cash flows to compute value in use. Some 
authors argue that this rule gives managers considerable discretion in the timing and amount 
of write-downs of impaired assets (Titard & Pariser, 1996; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Alciatore 
et al., 1998; Riedl, 2004). In order to examine whether reversal firms report impairment 
reversal opportunistically or for economic reasons, a control group is constructed to analyse 
the differences between both groups. Control companies are companies recognising an 
impairment loss, but which do not reverse the loss in the year of study.  
 
The one-to-one matching procedure is performed by first searching for the same industry as 
classified in Table 3.2, Panel C, and then the one with the closest firm size (proxied by the 
total assets in Datastream, while the difference in firm size should not exceed 30% of the 
reversal firm’s total assets), to obtain corresponding non-reversal firms. These control firms 
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are firms with beginning accumulated impairment loss accounts in any of four types of fixed 
assets in Table 3.2, Panel B, in the matching year, which did not reverse the impairment 
recognised under the four years under study (2006-2009). This matching procedure is to 
ensure that the final sample of reversal firms and non-reversal firms are firms in the same 
industry, and of the closest firm size. This results in some degree of similarity across the 
sample, with regard to product market and scale. This procedure yields a sample of 182 
matched firm-years, associated with 118 firms, and represents the full sample used in the 
empirical analysis below. 
 
The number of unmatched firm-years is 60, represent approximately 25% of the original 
reversal firm-years. Among the reasons for the unsuccessful matching of the 60 observations 
are as follows: the limited available potential of control firms in a particular industry; a big 
difference in the firm size between reversal firms and potential control firms; and a limited 
number of companies with a beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss. Out of 60 
unmatched firm-years, 4 observations are from technology and telecommunications, 8 
observations are from property, 4 observations are from oil, gas, water and electricity, 9 
observations from industry products, 4 observations from the media, 1 observation from 
construction and materials, 15 observations from travel and leisure, and, lastly, 15 
observations from consumer products. Industrial metals, mining, forestry and paper is the 
only industry that is completely matched to control companies. Table 3.4 presents the 
summary statistics of matched reversal firm-years. 
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics of matched reversal firm-years from 2006-2009 
 Number of matched 
firm-years 
Percentage of matched 
firm-years (%) 
Panel A: Year breakdown     
2006 31  17.03  
2007 43  23.63  
2008 39  21.43  
2009 69  37.91  
Total 182  100.00  
Panel B: Type of assets breakdown     
Property, plant and equipment 66  36.26  
Investment in associates 19  10.44  
Other investments 78  42.86  
Investment properties 11  6.04  
Multiple 8  4.40  
Total 182  100.00  
Panel C: Industry breakdown     
Technology and  telecommunications 7 (37) 3.85 (4.45) 
Industrial metals, mining, forestry, paper 8 (52) 4.40 (6.25) 
Oil, gas, water and electricity 2 (38) 1.10 (4.57) 
Media 2 (7) 1.10 (0.84) 
Property 26 (100) 14.29 (12.02) 
Industry products 57 (222) 31.32 (26.68) 
Construction and materials 27 (112) 14.83 (13.46) 
Travel and leisure 9 (29) 4.94 (3.48) 
Consumer products 44 (235) 24.17 (28.25) 
Total 182 (832) 100.00 100.00 
Figures in parentheses refer to the overall industry distribution in the Malaysian stock market 
during 2006-2009. 
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3.4 Reversal of impairment losses and firm performance 
 
 
The main objective of this study is to examine whether Malaysian public companies 
recognised impairment loss reversals as a response to changes in economic conditions of the 
firms. The first stage of the empirical analyses is an investigation of the reversal firms’ 
performance, measured using accounting and market-based performance indicators. This 
section explains univariate and multivariate analyses of the firm performance in the reversal 
year and one year ahead, using the full sample.  
 
3.4.1 Univariate comparisons between reversal firms and control firms 
 
The first analysis is a univariate comparison between reversal firms and control firms, to 
investigate any significant differences between the two groups. The size of the sample is 182 
observations for the reversal group, and 182 observations for the control group. The variables 
examined in this analysis are abnormal working capital accruals, sales, beginning balances of 
accumulated impairment loss, return on equity and adjusted return on equity. The abnormal 
working capital accruals are measured using the DeFond and Park (2001) model.
12
 Sales 
figures are measured as the natural logarithm of total sales. The beginning balance of 
accumulated impairment refers to the balance of accumulated impairment as reported on the 
balance sheet in the reversal year. Return on equity is calculated as net income in the reversal 
year divided by total equity at the end of the year. Lastly, the adjusted return on equity is the 
return on equity before the reversal amount. The reversal amount is excluded from the 
determination of return on equity, so that the ratio only reflects the performance of reversal 
firms without reversal items. 
                                                 
12
 The measurement of the abnormal accruals model is explained in Section 3.5. 
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The analysis involves the comparison of means between reversal firms and control firms, and 
the difference is tested using t-test analysis. This univariate analysis is essential to explore 
differences, in terms of performance and the level of abnormal accruals. Reversal firms are 
firms which recognised impairment in previous years and reversed the impairment as a 
response to the better performance of the fixed assets in generating revenue. The assets are 
also expected to generate positive cash flows in future. FRS 136 lists a number of indications 
for reversals. Among these are an increase in the market value of the assets, significant 
changes with a favourable effect on the entity which have taken place during the period in the 
technological, market, economic or legal environments, the reduction of market interest rates, 
significant changes in the extent or manner an asset is used and, lastly, the economic 
performance of an asset which will be better in the future. Meanwhile, the control firms did 
not reverse the impairment, because the favourable conditions did not occur. Thus, if reversal 
firms reverse the impairment loss based on the reality of the economic condition of the firm, 
it is expected that reversal firms report superior performance, as compared to the control 
firms. Regarding the abnormal accruals, if reversal firms report the reversals without the 
intention to manage earnings, then there should be no differences, in terms of abnormal 
accruals between both groups. 
 
3.4.2 Multivariate analysis: reversal of impairment losses and future firm 
performance 
 
FRS 136 allows firms to reverse the impairment recognised previously if the recoverable 
amount, calculated as its fair value less cost to sell or value in use, is greater than the carrying 
amount. Thus, if the impairment is reversed to reflect economic fundamentals, the reversal is 
predicted to be associated with future operating performance and current stock price 
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performance. The recoverable amount should be calculated, which is based either on the 
estimated future cash flows generated from the use of the assets or fair value less the cost to 
sell of the assets. The reversal is recognised if the recoverable amount is higher than the 
carrying amount of the assets. Thus, the recognition of reversal is associated with future firm 
performance if managers calculate the recoverable amount, as stipulated under FRS 136, 
Impairment of Assets.  
 
Aboody et al. (1999) find that the revaluation of fixed assets is associated with future firm 
performance, measured by operating income and cash flow from operations. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, an impairment loss is accounted for in a manner which in the opposite of upward 
revaluation. Then, the reversal of an impairment loss will be seen as an upward revaluation, 
and should be associated with future operating performance in the same manner as a 
revaluation. In particular, the determination of the recoverable amount for an impairment 
reversal can be based on the market value of assets, which is similar to revaluation. Due to 
these similarities between reversal of impairment and revaluation, a positive relationship 
between reversals and future firm performance is expected for the reversal firms. Following 
Aboody et al. (1999), with respect to the revaluation of fixed assets in the UK, Equations 3-1 
to 3-4 are estimated for 182 companies that reversed impairments. The control firms are not 
tested in these estimations, as those firms did not reverse the impairment charges.  
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Equations 3-1 to 3-4 are as follows: 
 
CFOt+1   = α +  β1REVt + β2CFOt + β3WCt  +  β4SIZEt + β5MTBt + εt                              (3-1) 
∆CFOt+1 = α + β1REVt + β2∆CFOt + β3∆WCt  +  β4SIZEt + β5MTBt + εt                  (3-2) 
OPIN*t+1   =  α + β1REVt + β2OPINt + β3SIZEt + β4MTBt +  εt                      (3-3) 
∆OPIN*t+1   =  α + β1REVt + β2∆OPINt + β3SIZEt + β4MTBt +  εt                      (3-4) 
 
Where: 
 
CFOt+1 = net cash flow from operations in year t+1 divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFOt+1 = change in net cash flow from operations, from year t to year t+1, CFOt+1 - CFOt, 
divided by total assets at end of year t; 
OPIN*t+1 = operating income before depreciation and amortisation expenses, reversal amount  
and AWCA in year t+1, divided by total assets at end of year t;  
∆OPIN*t+1 = change in operating income before depreciation and amortisation expenses, 
reversal amount  and AWCA, from year t to year t+1, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
REVt = reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CFOt = net cash flow from operations in year t, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFOt = change in net cash flow from operations from year t-1 to year t, divided by total 
assets at end of year t; 
OPINt= operating income before reversal in year t; 
∆OPINt = change in operating income before reversals from year t-1 to year t, divided by 
total assets at end of year t; 
WCt  = working capital in year t, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆WCt  = change in working capital from year t-1 to year t, divided by total assets at end of 
year t; 
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SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market-to-book ratio at end of year t. 
 
Future firm performance indicators are regressed on reversal of impairment loss, to test 
whether reversal reporting is associated with future firm performance. The four equations are 
constructed using four performance indicators. The first and second equations (Equation 3-1 
and Equation 3-2) estimate the relationship between the reversal of an impairment loss and 
one-year-ahead cash flow from operations, and the change in cash flow from operations, 
respectively. Coefficients on REV in Equations 3-1 and 3-2 represent the relationship 
between impairment reversals and subsequent one-year-ahead cash flow from operations and 
change in cash flow from operations, respectively. If reversal recognition by Malaysian firms 
reflects asset value changes, then it is expected that the coefficient on REV should be positive 
and significant. If reversal recognition does not explain future cash flow, then insignificant 
results will be observed.  
 
Following Aboody et al. (1999), operating cash flows, CFOt, and the change in cash flow 
from operations, ∆CFOt, in reversal year, is included in the model to control for the effect of 
the time series properties of earnings on future cash flows. Working capital is included in 
Equations 3-1 and 3-2, as this is variable, and cash flow from operations have a significant 
relationship (Dechow, 1994). Total sales are included in the models, to control for the 
potential effect of size. The market-to-book ratio, MTB, is incorporated in the estimation 
models, to control for potential effects of risk and growth (Fama & French, 1992; Aboody et 
al., 1999). 
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Finally, Equations 3-3 and 3-4 are used to estimate the relationship between reversal and one-
year-ahead operating income, and the change in operating income, respectively. Both 
equations use one-year-ahead operating income (OPIN*t+1) and change in operating income 
as dependent variables. OPIN*t+1 (∆OPIN*t+1) is calculated as the net operating income 
(change in operating income) in year t+1, before depreciation and amortisation expenses, 
reversal amount and AWCA. Operating income is income before interest and income tax. 
Following Aboody et al. (1999), interest and income tax are excluded in performance 
measures, because Equations 3-3 and 3-4 focus on operating performance. Depreciation and 
amortisation expenses are added back, as reversal recognition affects the determination of 
future depreciation. The higher the reversal amount, the bigger the new carrying amount of 
the asset, and the new depreciation expense will be calculated based on this new carrying 
amount. Aboody et al. argue that the exclusion of depreciation and amortisation in the 
determination of operating income eliminates any mechanical effects of reversal on the 
performance measure. Reversal in year t+1 is also excluded, as such a gain is not a 
performance effect derived from the recognition of reversal in year t. Lastly, abnormal 
working capital accruals are excluded to ensure that the performance measure is not 
contaminated with abnormal accruals. Operating income consists of cash flow from 
operations and total accruals. The abnormal accruals are excluded from the total accruals 
because they do not represent the economic effect of reversal recognition.  
 
Similar to Equations 3-1 and 3-2, Equations 3-3 and 3-4 predict that, if reversal recognition 
by Malaysian firms reflects asset value changes, the coefficients on REV in both equations 
are expected to be significantly positive. The expectations for all other variables’ coefficients 
are similar to Equations 3-1 and 3-2.   
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3.4.3 Multivariate analysis: Reversal of impairment losses and stock market returns 
 
This section examines the economic reality of reversal reporting, by focusing on the value 
relevance of such specific accruals. Specifically, this section examines whether managers use 
their discretion over impairment reversals to provide value-relevant signals to investors. This 
study assumes that the stock market is efficient in reflecting information, including financial 
statement information. The accepted view in an efficient market hypothesis is that, when 
publicly available information arises, the news spreads very quickly, and is incorporated in 
security prices without delay. Assuming market efficiency, only reversals that reflect the true 
asset performance will be reflected in the stock prices. 
 
This study defines value relevance as the association between accounting information and 
equity market value or stock returns (Francis & Schipper, 1999; Barth, Beaver, & Landsman, 
2001). The positive coefficient on the accounting information variable indicates that the 
information is value-relevant in setting a share price (Barth, 2002; Beaver, 2002). Consistent 
with this argument, if reversal information is value-relevant, the reversal recognition should 
be positively associated with stock valuation; whereas, if firms report reversals 
opportunistically, the information should be less value-relevant in determining the stock 
price.  
 
In implementing the test of value relevance, this study follows prior studies, and regresses the 
stock returns on reversals. As suggested by Kothari and Zimmerman (1995), this study uses 
return models to test the association between reversals with the change in stock value over a 
year, as these models have less serious econometric problems. Francis and Schipper (1999) 
express the value relevance measured using the long window approach as the ability of 
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financial statement information to capture or summarise information, regardless of the 
source, which effects share values. They claim that this interpretation does not require 
financial statements to be the earliest source of information. Consistent with this argument, 
reversal information used in this study is based solely on the financial statements reported in 
the annual reports of the firms as being the annual summary of financial information. 
Following Aboody et al. (1999) and Chen et al. (2009), this study regresses 12-month stock 
returns on reversals of impairment loss, expressed as follows: 
 
AbReturnt = γ0 + γ1REV’t + γ2NIt + γ3BTMt + ut                                (3-5) 
 
where, 
 
AbReturnt = control group-adjusted returns beginning eight months before the financial 
year-end, and ending four months after the financial year-end;  
REV’t = reversal amount scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1; 
NIt = net income before reversal in year t scaled by market value of equity at the end of year 
t-1; 
BTMt = the book-to-market value ratio at the end of year t-1. 
 
The annual control group-adjusted return in year t is defined as the 12-month return (with 
dividend) of reversal observations minus the control group return in reversal year. The 
sample size to test this model is reduced to 178 observations, as the stock market price of four 
observations are not available in Datastream. The coefficient on REV’ in Equation 3-5 
represents the relation between reversals and stock market return. A significantly positive β1 
suggests that reversal information is viewed as value-relevant by investors. Similarly to 
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Aboody et al. (1999) and prior studies (Easton & Harris, 1991; Easton & Harris, 1993; Rees 
et al., 1996), this study also predicts that β2 and β3 are positive. 
 
3.5  Reversal of impairment losses and reporting incentives 
 
This study further investigates whether the earnings management motive influences reversal 
reporting. According to FRS 136, reversal recognition should be reported in the income 
statement. Thus, the recognition directly increases the reported income. As the earnings 
component is an important performance measure of a firm, the earnings management motive 
may lead to opportunistic reversal reporting. Prior studies provide evidence on various 
contracting and market-based incentives for earnings management through asset impairment 
reversals (Duh et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2010). Thus, this study separates 
the reversal sample into those firms that are likely to be earnings managers and those that are 
not. In particular, this study separates the reversal firms based on abnormal working capital 
accruals (AWCA) measured using the DeFond and Park (2001) abnormal accrual model.   
 
3.5.1   Measure of abnormal working capital accruals 
 
Due to the limited number of studies examining opportunistic reporting using reversal of 
impairment loss, the evidence of the manipulation of earnings using this unrealised gain is 
inconclusive.
13
 This study relates the reversal recognition with a proxy for earnings 
management, in order to distinguish between reversal firms that report the impairment 
                                                 
13
 Based on the literature review, only three studies specifically examine the opportunistic behaviour of 
impairment reversal reporting. Duh et al. (2009) examine the use of reversal reporting to avoid earnings decline; 
Chen et al. (2007) examine economic and management factors associated with reversal of impairment loss 
recognition; and Zhang et al. (2010) examine how Chinese public firms react to the prohibition of long-lived 
asset impairment reversals. 
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reversal opportunistically and the firms that recognise the gain as reflected by current 
economic situation.  
 
A measure of earnings management using the Jones (1991) model, or its variations, has been 
used widely in previous research. However, it has been criticised, because the Jones (1991) 
model parameter estimates are biased, and measurement errors associated therewith could 
potentially induce erroneous conclusions regarding the existence of earnings management 
(Bemard & Skinner 1996; Healy, 1996). The model also requires a large time series of data 
and a large number of industry-specific observations, for the estimation of discretionary 
accruals (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994). Due to the small sample size, this study considers an 
alternative proxy for opportunistic earnings management that is independent from potential 
measurement errors associated with the Jones model parameters. In particular, a variable of 
abnormal working capital accruals (AWCA) is estimated using the DeFond and Park (2001) 
model. They define abnormal accruals as the difference between the current year's realised 
working capital accruals and the expected level of working capital accruals, where the 
historical relation of working capital to sales captures the expected working capital. DeFond 
and Park view the difference as the portion of working capital accruals that are unlikely to be 
sustained and are expected to reverse against future earnings. The empirical model is as 
follows: 
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AWCAt = WCt – [(WCt-1/St-1) * St]    (2-4) 
 
where:  
 
AWCAt =  abnormal working capital accruals in year t; 
WCt  =  non-cash working capital in year t, defined as (current assets - cash and 
             cash equivalent) – (current liabilities – short-term debt); 
   WCt-1  = working capital in previous year; 
         St  = sales in year t;     
       St-1  = sales in previous year.                 
 
AWCA captures the deviation of the current year’s working capital accruals from the normal 
level of working capital accruals required to support current sales. Thus, high levels of 
AWCA are interpreted as an indication of opportunistic earnings management.  
 
Alternatively, the size of previously recognised impairment charges can be used to 
distinguish between opportunistic and true reporting. The over-stated impairment charges 
create a “cookie jar” reserve, to be reversed in future, to meet earnings targets. In addition, 
prior studies provide evidence that the impairment charges are associated with earnings 
management (Riedl, 2004; Zhang et al., 2010). However, based on performance analysis of 
the reversal firms with high accumulated impairment and those with moderate and low 
impairment, firms with high accumulated impairment are non-performing firms before the 
reversal year, and continue to underperform in the subsequent year. A comparison between 
reversal firms with high accumulated impairment and the reversal firms with moderate and 
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low accumulated impairment is presented in Appendices X and Y. The high accumulated 
impairment charges are more likely to reflect that the non-current assets are significantly 
impaired and unable to generate higher income in future. This argument is consistent with the 
findings of prior studies (Zucca and Campbell, 1992; Rees et al., 1996). They report that 
firms recording large impairment tend to exist in a period of declining financial performance, 
and become more apparent in the periods after the impairment year. Therefore, this study 
does not consider this alternative measure of earnings management, because the size of 
accumulated impairment is not a clear indicator for earnings management. 
 
3.5.2       Identification of potential earnings managers and non-managers of earnings 
 
Reversal firms are ranked according to the level of abnormal working capital accrual 
(DeFond & Park, 2001). The top 30% of reversal firms with positive abnormal working 
capital accruals are regarded as potential earnings managers. Such a grouping is constructed 
because reversal reporting may be associated with a manager’s intention to increase earnings 
(Duh et al., 2009; Moehrle, 2002), and firms with positive abnormal working capital accruals 
are firms managing earnings upward (DeFond & Park, 2001; Peasnell et al., 2005; Rangan, 
1998). The middle 40% of abnormal working capital accruals are regarded as non-managers 
of earnings, because these firms have the lowest absolute abnormal working capital accruals. 
This procedure yields 55 reversal observations in the top 30% of abnormal working capital 
accruals group and 73 reversal observations in the middle 40% of the abnormal working 
capital accruals group. The total sample size, including the control firms, is 256 observations. 
The remaining 30% are reversal firms with extreme negative abnormal accruals. These firms 
use abnormal accruals to reduce earnings; thus, it is not related to reversals which increase 
earnings. However, this group can also be regarded as potential non-managers of earnings. 
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The alternative measure used to define non-income-increasing earnings managers as the 
bottom 30% of AWCA is explained in Section 5.3: “Robustness checks”. The findings reaped 
using this alternative measure are also presented in Chapter 5. 
 
3.5.3        Difference in differences analysis 
 
The first analysis after partitioning the reversal firms is a difference in differences analysis. In 
this analysis, the reversal firms are differentiated between reversal efficient accrual choice 
groups and reversal earnings management groups, based on the level of abnormal working 
capital accruals (DeFond & Park, 2001). The difference in differences analysis is performed 
based on 128 reversal observations and 128 observations from the control group, relating to 
nine variables: the beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss (BACC); adjusted 
return on equity (ROEadj); cash flow from operations in the reversal year (CFOt); cash flow 
from operations one year ahead (CFOt+1); operating income in the reversal year (OPINt); 
adjusted operating income in the reversal year (OPIN*t); operating income one year ahead 
(OPINt+1); adjusted operating income one year ahead (OPIN*t+1); and stock returns (Return).  
 The difference in differences tests is performed to differentiate between reversal earnings 
managers and reversal non-managers of earnings relative to their respective control groups, in 
terms of firm performance and the level of abnormal accruals. If reversal earnings managers 
report the reversal opportunistically, there should be a significant difference between reversal 
earnings managers and reversal non-managers of earnings relative to their control groups. 
The difference in differences is calculated using the following steps: 
 
1. Rank all reversal firms according to their actual abnormal working capital accruals. 
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2. Group the top 30% of the sample as earnings managers, and the middle 40% of the sample 
as non-managers, of earnings. 
3. Calculate the difference in the tested variables between reversal firms and control firms for 
both earnings managers and non-managers of earnings groups. 
4. Test for the significance in the mean differences between the differences outlined in step 3. 
 
3.5.4     Multivariate analysis: reversal of impairment losses, future firm performance 
and incentives to manage earnings 
 
FRS 136, Impairment of Assets, allows firms to reverse the initial impairment recognised in 
previous years if indications of impairment no longer exist, or have decreased. However, the 
early version of the standard has been criticised as giving substantial flexibility to exercise 
judgments in determining and reporting an impairment loss (Titard & Pariser, 1996; Healy & 
Wahlen, 1999). A number of studies also find that the reversal of impairment loss is 
associated with opportunistic earnings recognition (Duh et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009; Zhang 
et al., 2010). Thus, Equations 3-1 to 3-4 are modified, and reversal firms are differentiated 
between earnings managers and non-managers of earnings. Consistent with the difference in 
differences test, earnings managers are reversal firms in the 30%, with respect to actual 
abnormal working capital accruals, and the middle 40% are classified as non-managers of 
earnings.  
 
In the following models, future firm performance indicators are regressed on reversal of 
impairment loss reported by earnings managers and non-managers of earnings. Equation 3-
1A and Equation 3-2A estimate the relationship between reversal of impairment loss and one-
97 
 
year-ahead future cash flow, and change in cash flow from operations by both groups, 
respectively, as outlined below: 
 
CFOt+1 = α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3CFOt + β4WCt + β5SIZEt + β6MTBt + εt       (3-1A) 
∆CFOt+1 = α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3∆CFOt + β4∆WCt + β5SIZEt + β6MTBt + εt    
(3-2A) 
where, 
 
CFOt+1= net cash flow from operations in year t+1, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFOt+1 = change in net cash flow from operations from year t to year t+1, divided by total 
assets at end of year t; 
D is equal to one for reversal firms in the middle 40% of abnormal working capital accruals, 
measured using DeFond and Park’s 2001 (non-managers of earnings) model; and is equal to 
zero for reversal firms in the top 30% of abnormal working capital accruals (earnings 
managers); 
REVt = reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CFOt = net cash flow from operations in year t, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFOt = change in net cash flow from operations, from year t-1 to year t, divided by total 
assets at end of year t; 
WCt  = working capital in year t, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆WCt  = change in working capital from year t-1 to year t, divided by total assets at end of 
year t; 
SIZEt =  log of  total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = market-to-book ratio at end of year t; 
D*REVt = interaction term of variables D and REV. 
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Equation 3-1A estimates the relationship between reversal recognition by earnings managers 
and non-managers of earnings, and the one-year-ahead cash flow from operations. From the 
model, the coefficient on REV represents the relationship between impairment reversals by 
earnings managers and the subsequent one-year cash flow from operations after reversal 
recognition, while the sum of β1 + β2 captures the relationship for non-managers of earnings. 
If reversal recognition by earnings managers reflects asset value changes, then it is expected 
that the coefficient on REV should be positive and significant. If reversal recognition by 
earnings managers does not explain future cash flow, then an insignificant result will be 
observed. The main focus of this model is the explanatory power of reversal recognition by 
non-managers of earnings. Non-managers of earnings are reversal firms without an incentive 
to manage earnings upward. Thus, if the reversals reported by non-managers of earnings 
reflect economic reality, it is expected that the relationship between reversal recognition by 
non-managers of earnings and one-year-ahead cash flow from operations is positive and 
significant, so the sum of   β1 + β2 should be significantly positive.   
 
β2 represents the effect of reversal recognition on future performance by non-managers of 
earnings, as compared to earnings managers. If β1 is positive, then it is expected that β2 is 
significantly greater than β1, indicating that reversal recognition by non-managers of earnings 
had greater association with future cash flows than earnings managers. If β1 is significantly 
negative, β2 is expected to be positive and significant, indicating different motives between 
both groups. While earnings managers opportunistically recognise reversal in their income 
statement, non-managers of earnings report the economic evidence of the recovery of their 
non-current assets. The expectations for all other coefficients are similar to Equation 3-1. 
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Equation 3-2A is similar to Equation 3-1A, except for the dependent variable. The focus of 
Equation 3-2A is the relationship between reversal recognition by earnings managers and 
non-managers of earnings, and changes in future operating cash flows. Change in cash flow 
from operations is the difference between the one-year-ahead operating cash flow and the 
cash flow in the reversal year. The recovery of non-current assets based on economic reality 
of non-managers of earnings is expected to be associated with positive change in operating 
cash flows. The expectations for all other variables’ coefficients are similar to Equation 3-2.   
 
Finally, Equations 3-3A and 3-4A are used to estimate the relationship between reversal and 
one-year-ahead operating incomes, and changes in operating incomes, reported by earnings 
managers and non-managers of earnings. The models are as follows: 
 
OPIN*t+1= α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3OPINt + β4SIZEt + β5MTBt + εt           (3-3A) 
 
∆OPIN*t+1   =  α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3∆OPINt + β4SIZEt + β5MTBt +  εt         (3-4A) 
 
Where, 
 
OPIN*t+1 = operating income before depreciation and amortisation expenses, reversal amount  
and AWCA in year t+1, divided by total assets at end of year t;  
∆OPIN*t+1 = change in operating income before depreciation and amortisation expenses, 
reversal amount  and AWCA from year t to year t+1, divided by total assets at end of year t;  
D is equal to one for reversal firms in the middle 40% of abnormal working capital accruals, 
measured using DeFond and Park’s 2001 (non-managers of earnings) model; and is equal to 
zero for reversal firms in the top 30% of abnormal working capital accruals (earnings 
managers); 
REVt = reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
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OPINt = operating income before reversal in year t; 
∆OPINt = change in operating income before reversal from year t-1 to year t; 
SIZEt = log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = market-to-book ratio at end of year t; 
D*REVt = interaction term of variables D and REV. 
 
The above models use the one-year-ahead operating income (OPIN*t+1) and the change in 
operating income as its dependent variables. Operating income in both models is adjusted for 
depreciation and amortisation expenses, the reversal amount and AWCA. Both models expect 
that, if reversal recognition by non-managers of earnings reflects asset value changes as 
compared to earnings managers, the coefficient on D*REV is expected to be significantly 
positive, indicating that non-managers of earnings recognise reversals as a result of the 
economic recovery of the assets. The expectations for the coefficients on all other variables 
are similar to Equations 3-1A and 3-2A. The sample size to test Equations 3-1A to 3-4A is 
128 reversal firms, comprising 55 earnings managers and 73 non-managers of earnings. 
 
3.5.5      Multivariate analysis: reversal of impairment losses, stock market returns and 
incentives to manage earnings 
 
This study further examines the value relevance of impairment reversals reported by earnings 
managers and non-managers of earnings. The following model estimates the association 
between reversals recognised by both subsamples. 
 
 
 
101 
 
 
   AbReturnt = γ0 + D + γ1REV’t + γ2D*REV’t + γ3NIt + γ4BTMt + ut               (3-5A) 
 
where, 
 
AbReturnt = control group adjusted returns beginning eight months before the financial 
year-end, and ending four months after the financial year-end;  
REV’t = reversal amount scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1; 
NIt = net income before reversal in year t, scaled by market value of equity at the end of year 
t-1; 
BTMt = book-to-market value of equity at the end of year t-1; 
D is equal to one for reversal firms in the middle 40% of abnormal working capital accruals, 
measured using DeFond and Park’s 2001 (non-managers of earnings) model; and is equal to 
zero for reversal firms at the top 30% of abnormal working capital accruals (earnings 
managers); 
D*REV’t = interaction term of variables D and REV’. 
 
Similar to Equation 3-5, the control group-adjusted return in year t is defined as the 12-month 
return (with dividend) of reversal observations, minus the control group return in the reversal 
year. To differentiate the value relevance of reversals recognised by firms that are less likely 
to manage earnings and their counterparts, similar to Equations 3-1A to 3-4A, a dummy 
variable, D, is incorporated into the estimation model, and the definition of the dummy 
variable is also similar to the previous equations. The sample size to test this model is 
reduced to 250 observations, as the stock market price of four reversal observations are not 
available in Datastream. 
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The coefficient on REV’ in Equation 3-5A represents the relationship between impairment 
reversals by earnings managers and abnormal return, while the sum of β1 + β2 captures the 
relationship for non-managers of earnings. If reversal recognition by earnings managers is 
value-relevant, then it is expected that the coefficient on REV’ should be positive and 
significant. This study expects that the reversals recognition by non-managers of earnings 
provides more timely value-relevant information to investors, as, compared to earnings 
managers, β2 is expected to be positive and significant. This prediction is consistent with the 
expectations of Equations 3-1A to 3-4A, in suggesting that non-managers of earnings 
recognise impairment reversal as reflected by the economic circumstances. Similar to 
Aboody et al. (1999) and prior studies (Easton & Harris, 1991; Rees et al., 1996), this study 
also predicts β3 and β4 to be positive. 
 
3.6  Reversal of impairment losses, earnings declines and corporate governance 
 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, prior research on earnings management provides evidence that 
firms manage earnings to avoid earnings decreases and losses (Burgstahler, 1997; Burgstahler 
& Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999). Moehrle (2002) finds evidence that US firms use 
restructuring charge reversals to avoid reporting losses. He also reports some evidence that 
firms record reversals to avoid earnings declines. Similarly, Duh et al. (1999) find that 
Taiwanese firms reverse previously recognised impairment losses to avoid earnings declines. 
To provide additional evidence that abnormal working capital accruals is a reliable measure 
in partitioning earning managers and non-managers of earnings, and that some firms record 
reversals opportunistically, this section presents research methods used to examine the 
potential link between the reversal of impairment losses and incentives to avoid earnings 
declines. In general, it is expected that firms which are classified as potential earnings 
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managers will manage earnings to avoid earnings declines, compared to non-managers of 
earnings. In addition, this section also examines the role of effective monitoring in mitigating 
opportunistic reporting behaviour; i.e. the influence of corporate governance in reversal 
reporting. Firstly, this section examines the differences in the frequency and the magnitude of 
pre-reversal earnings declines between reversal firms and control firms. The frequency and 
magnitude of the differences between earnings managers and non-managers of earnings are 
also examined. The next part presents the tests used to investigate whether firms record 
reversals to avoid earnings declines, in addition to the role of good corporate governance in 
reversal reporting. The regression analysis also relates the incentives to avoid earnings 
declines with AWCA, BACC, debt covenants and CEO change. 
 
 3.6.1  Univariate analysis: analysis of frequency and magnitude of pre-reversal 
earnings declines 
 
The first step undertaken to examine the incentives of reversal firms to avoid earnings 
declines is the comparison analysis of the frequency and magnitude of pre-reversal earnings 
declines between reversal firms and control firms. Following Moehrle (2002) and Duh et al. 
(2009), this study defines pre-reversal earnings declines as follows: 
 
Pre-reversal earnings declines = NIt – REVt – NIt-1 < 0 
 
Where: 
 
NIt = net income in year t, scaled by total assets at the end of year t; 
REVt = reversal amount in year t, scaled by total assets at the end of year t; 
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NIt-1 = net income in year t-1, scaled by total assets at the end of year t. 
 
Reversal firms recognise the reversal of impairment losses in their income statements because 
the performance of their non-current assets is improved, or partly improved, and hence 
contributes to income generation for the firms. On the other hand, the performance of 
impaired assets of non-reversal firms may be unchanged, or even worse, since the recognition 
of previous impairment. Accordingly, this study expects that the frequency and magnitude of 
the earnings declines of reversal firms are significantly lower than the control firms.  
 
This study also compares the frequency and magnitude of earnings declines between earnings 
managers and non-managers of earnings, as measured by AWCA (defined earlier). If reversal 
earnings managers report the reversals opportunistically, without a corresponding 
improvement of non-current assets in generating income, the frequency and magnitude of 
pre-reversal earnings declines are expected to be significantly higher for earnings managers, 
compared to the frequency and magnitude of pre-reversal earnings declines for non-managers 
of earnings. 
 
3.6.2 Multivariate analysis: reversal of impairment losses and incentives to avoid 
earnings declines 
 
To provide further evidence that some firms reverse the impairment charges to manage 
earnings, this study investigates the association between the reversal of impairment loss and 
incentives to avoid earnings decline. The estimation models used in this multivariate analysis 
are based on Duh et al.’s (2009) estimation model. Duh et al. examine whether firms reverse 
the previously recognised impairment loss to avoid earnings declines. This study extends the 
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model by interacting the earnings decline variable with AWCA. The multivariate analysis is 
divided into two subsections. The first section examines whether the association between the 
reversals and incentives to avoid earnings declines is influenced by the level of AWCA. The 
section also examines whether good corporate governance mitigates opportunistic reporting. 
The second section examines whether the size of BACC affects the relationship between 
reversals and incentives to avoid earnings declines, in addition to the influence of corporate 
governance. In addition to the above, the section further investigates whether debt covenants 
and CEO change are associated with the reversal of BACC to avoid earnings declines. 
 
3.6.2.1 Reversal of impairment losses, abnormal working capital accruals and incentives 
to avoid earnings declines 
 
This section examines whether reversal firms record the reversal of an impairment loss to 
avoid earnings declines. Specifically, the aim of this section is to test whether the reversal 
reported to avoid earnings declines is more pronounced among reversal firms with high 
AWCA. The estimation model to test the hypothesis is presented as follows: 
 
REVt  = α + β1(NIt - REVt - NIt-1) + β2AWCAt  + β3(NIt - REVt - NIt-1)*AWCAt  + β4SIZEt + 
β5MTBt + β6LEVt  + β7CEOt +  εt               
(3-6) 
where: 
 
 
REVt  = reversal amount, scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 = change in pre-reversal net income from year t-1 to year t, scaled by total 
assets at end of year t; 
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AWCAt = abnormal working capital accruals (DeFond and Park, 2001), deflated by total 
assets at end of year t; 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market-to-book ratio at end of year t; 
LEVt = total debts, scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CEOt is equal to one if the firm changes its chief executive officer/general manager in year t-
1 or t-2; and is equal to zero otherwise. 
 
Equation 3-6 estimates whether the relationship between reversal, REV and earnings decline 
is systematically associated with differences in the level of AWCA. Following Duh et al. 
(2009), reversal of impairment loss, REV, is used as a dependent variable. Since REV is a 
left-truncated variable – control firms that did not reverse the impairment loss have REV = 0, 
while reversal firms have a positive value of less than one – this study uses Tobit regression 
for the analysis (Kennedy, 2003), instead of OLS regression, because the latter may produce 
biased estimates of parameters.  
 
NIt – REVt – NIt-1 represents pre-reversal earnings changes relative to the prior year. Positive 
values indicate that the firm reports an earnings increase before the reversals are considered. 
If reversal firms report reversals for economic reasons, β1 will be positive, indicating that 
reversal firms reverse the impairment loss because the performance of non-current assets to 
generate income is improved, or partly improved. This study expects β2 to be positive, 
indicating that firms use AWCA, as well as REV, to manage earnings. Following prior 
research (Moehrle, 2002; Duh et al., 2009), this study uses the interaction term (NIt - REVt - 
NIt-1)*AWCA to examine opportunistic reporting. A negative sign of the interaction term 
indicates that reversal firms with high AWCA report reversal to avoid earnings declines. 
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Because this study expects that firms with high AWCA report reversals opportunistically, it is 
expected the coefficient on (NIt - REVt - NIt-1)*AWCA to be negative, suggesting that 
reversal firms with greater incentives to manage earnings (high AWCA firms) are more likely 
to reverse the impairment losses to avoid earnings declines.  
 
Following Duh et al. (2009), this study includes SIZE, MTB, LEV and CEO as control 
variables. Firm size, SIZE, is to control for potential effects of size. Market-to-book ratio, 
MTB, controls the effects of risk and growth. The leverage ratio, LEV, is included, as prior 
studies find that, the larger the debt ratio, the more likely are the managers to manage 
earnings. Prior studies also indicate that senior management is involved in determining and 
measuring asset write-down (Elliot & Shaw, 1988; Francis et al., 1996; Strong & Meyer, 
1987). Furthermore, it is documented that changes in top management are positively 
associated with asset write-down (Loh & Tan, 2002; Riedl, 2004). Therefore, this study 
expects changes in top management to be positively associated with reversals, and the 
coefficient on CEO to be positive. 
 
This study further examines the role of corporate governance in deterring opportunistic 
reversal reporting. Corporate governance is viewed as an important mechanism to safeguard 
the interests of shareholders. According to agency theory, the opportunistic behaviour of 
agents can be controlled through the adoption of proper monitoring mechanisms (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Previous studies also document that good corporate governance constrains 
the opportunistic behaviour of managers (Klien, 2002; Peasnell, 2005; Xie, 2003; Bradbury et 
al., 2006). Thus, this study investigates whether effective corporate governance mitigates 
opportunistic reversal reporting. Specifically, this study examines whether effective corporate 
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governance can mitigate managers’ actions from reversing the impairment loss to avoid 
earnings declines.  
 
A composite measure of corporate governance is constructed as an index (CG), to examine 
the influence of overall corporate governance mechanisms on the association between 
reversals and incentives to avoid earnings declines. The governance index is calculated as 
follows: 
 
CG = BSIZEx + ACINDx + BINDx 
 
where: 
 
BSIZEx is equal to one if the number of directors in the board is between 5 and 11; and equal 
to zero otherwise; 
ACINDx is equal to one if the audit committee is comprised solely of independent directors, 
at least one of whom has financial expertise; and zero otherwise; 
BINDx is equal to one if the proportion of independent non-executive directors in the board 
is more than 50%; and zero otherwise. 
 
CG is the sum of indicators of the board size, audit committee independence and board 
independence. A high value of CG indicates a more effective corporate governance 
mechanism. 
 
In this study, board size, audit committee independence and independent directors are used as 
an index for monitoring mechanisms. As defined in the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement 
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under Chapter 1 (updated 3 January 2012), an independent director is a director who is 
independent of the management and free from any business, or other, relationship which 
could interfere with the exercise of the independent judgment, or the ability to act in the best 
interests of the shareholders. Since the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance requires 
firms to disclose the details of board members in the annual reports, the data on monitoring 
mechanisms are manually collected from the reports. In addition, the Bursa Malaysia Listing 
Requirement (Chapter 15) specifies that the board of directors of public companies must 
prepare an audit committee report in the annual report. Amongst other elements, this must 
include the composition of the audit committee. 
 
To test the role of the monitoring mechanism in deterring earnings management, Equation 3-
6 is expanded to include the mechanism, and the model is expressed as Equation 3-7: 
  
REVt  = α + β1(NIt - REVt - NIt-1) + β2AWCAt   +   β3(NIt - REVt - NIt-1)*AWCAt  +  
β4(NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1)*CGt  +  β5AWCAt *CGt  + β6(NIt - REVt - NIt-1)*AWCAt *CGt  + β7CGt  
+ β8SIZEt + β9MTBt + + β10LEVt   +  β11CEOt  +  εt               
(3-7) 
Where: 
 
REVt  = reversal amount, scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 = change in pre-reversal net income from year t-1 to year t, scaled by total 
assets at end of year t; 
AWCAt = abnormal working capital accruals (DeFond and Park, 2001), deflated by total 
assets at end of year t; 
CGt = corporate governance index (see below for details of computation); 
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SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market-to-book ratio at end of year t; 
LEVt = total debts, scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CEOt is equal to one if the firm changes its chief executive officer/general manager in year t-
1 or t-2, and zero otherwise. 
 
In Equation 3-7, β6 refers to the association between reversals and incentives to avoid 
earnings declines by high AWCA firms with good corporate governance. As explained 
above, corporate governance is argued to be crucial in controlling the opportunistic behaviour 
of managers. This study predicts β6 to be positive. The expectations for all other variables are 
similar to Equation 3-6. 
 
3.6.2.2 Reversal of impairment losses, accumulated impairment and incentives to avoid 
earnings declines 
 
This section examines whether firms reverse the accumulated impairment losses to avoid 
earnings declines. The accumulated impairment losses refer to the beginning balance of 
accumulated impairment losses (BACC). The research model is as follows: 
 
REVt  = α + β1(NIt - REVt - NIt-1) + β2BACCt    +  β3(NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1)*BACCt  + β4SIZEt + 
β5MTBt + β6LEVt + β7CEOt  + εt               
(3-8) 
Where: 
 
REVt  = reversal amount, scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
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NIt - REVt - NIt-1 = change in pre-reversal net income from year t-1 to year t, scaled by total 
assets at end of year t; 
BACCt = beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss in year t, deflated by total assets 
at end of year t; 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market-to-book ratio at end of year t; 
LEVt = total debts scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CEOt is equal to one if the firm changes its chief executive officer/general manager in year t-
1 or t-2, and zero otherwise. 
 
This model is similar to the Duh et al. (2009) estimation model. However, this study uses the 
beginning balance of accumulated impairment (BACC), instead of previous-year impairment, 
as used in Duh et al. This is because the accumulated impairment (BACC) represents 
available impairment at the beginning of reversal year, to be reversed during the year. Similar 
to previous study, the coefficient on BACC is expected to be positively associated with 
reversals. Firms with larger BACC are expected to reverse more in the future. 
 
To examine the earnings management behaviour using reversals, this study examines the 
association between reversals and the interaction term of change in net income and BACC. 
This method is consistent with prior studies (Duh et al., 2009; Moehrle, 2002). If firms 
reverse the accumulated impairment to avoid earnings declines, the coefficient on the 
interaction term should be negative. That is, while firms with high BACC tend to reverse in 
the future, this association is more pronounced for firms with pre-reversal earnings declines. 
Since the control variables in this equation are identical to Equations 3-6 and 3-7, the 
expectations for all control variables are the same. 
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This study further examines the role of corporate governance in reducing the opportunistic 
behaviour of managers using impairment reversals. Similar to Equation 3-7, this study 
incorporates corporate governance (CG) in the analysis, and estimates the following 
regression model: 
 
REVt  = α + β1(NIt - REVt - NIt-1) + β2BACCt    +  β3(NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1)*BACCt  +  β4(NIt  - 
REVt  - NIt-1)*CGt  +  β5BACCt *CGt + β6(NIt - REVt - NIt-1)*BACCt *CGt + β7CGt  + β8SIZEt 
+ β9MTBt + β10LEVt + β11CEOt  + εt               
(3-9) 
Where: 
 
REVt  = reversal amount, scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 = change in pre-reversal net income from year t-1 to year t, scaled by total 
assets at end of year t; 
BACCt = beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss in year t, deflated by total assets 
at end of year t; 
CGt = corporate governance index, calculated as the board size (one point if the number of 
directors is between 5 and 11, or 0 otherwise) + audit committee independence (one point if 
the audit committee is comprised solely of independent outside directors, at least one of 
whom has financial expertise, or 0 otherwise) + board independence (one point if the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors is more than 50%, or 0 otherwise); 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market-to-book ratio at end of year t; 
LEVt = total debts scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CEOt is equal to one if the firm changes its chief executive officer/general manager in year t-
1 or t-2; and equal to zero otherwise. 
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Similar to the expectation in Equation 3-7, the coefficient on the interaction term of NIt - 
REVt - NIt-1, BACC and CG is expected to be positive, indicating that good governance 
mitigates the opportunistic behaviour of managers from reversing the accumulated 
impairment loss to avoid earnings declines. 
 
Prior studies document that earnings management is related to debt covenants (Sweeney, 
1994; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994). DeFond and Jiambalvo find that the violators of debt 
covenants, to some extent, engage in opportunistic accruals management. They report that 
violators accelerate earnings a year before the violation, and provide some evidence of 
earnings management close to their contract covenant violation. Similarly, Sweeney finds 
income-increasing accounting changes as the companies approach debt covenant violation 
point. Furthermore, high leverage is found to be associated with proximity to the violation of 
debt covenants (Press & Weintrop, 1990). Duh et al. (2009) and Zhang et al. (2010) also find 
that the reversal of impairment losses is associated with the debt-to-equity ratio. Therefore, 
this study predicts that firms with high leverage are more likely to reverse the accumulated 
impairment, to avoid earnings declines. The leverage ratio is incorporated into the estimation 
model, and is expressed as follows: 
 
REVt  = α + β1(NIt - REVt - NIt-1) + β2BACCt    +  β3(NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1)*BACCt  +  β4(NIt  - 
REVt  - NIt-1)*LEVt  +  β5BACCt *LEVt + β6(NIt - REVt - NIt-1)*BACCt *LEVt + β7SIZEt + 
β8MTBt + β9LEVt + β10CEOt  + εt               
(3-10) 
Where: 
 
REVt  = reversal amount, scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
114 
 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 = change in pre-reversal net income from year t-1 to year t, scaled by total 
assets at end of year t; 
BACCt = beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss in year t, deflated by total assets 
at end of year t; 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market-to-book ratio at end of year t; 
LEVt = total debts scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CEOt is equal to one if the firm changes its chief executive officer/general manager in year t-
1 or t-2; and equal to zero otherwise. 
 
The coefficient on the interaction term of NIt - REVt - NIt-1*BACC*LEV represents the 
association between reversal to avoid earnings declines and accumulated impairment 
moderated by the level of leverage ratio. If the debt covenant is a motive underlying why 
firms reverse accumulated impairment loss to avoid earnings declines, β6 is expected to be 
negative. Since the control variables are identical to Equations 3-6 to 3-9, the expectations for 
the control variables are expected to be the same. 
 
To provide additional insight in reversal reporting issue, this study further investigates 
whether the change in top management is associated with opportunistic reversals. Strong and 
Meyer (1997) find that the most important determinant of write-down decisions tends to be a 
change in senior management. Zhang et al. (2010) report that firms with senior management 
turnover reverse more long-lived asset impairments. Elliot and Shaw (1988) argue that a new 
management team may be recognising problems or opportunities ignored by its predecessors. 
Change in senior management may capture new managements’ incentives to take all potential 
charges, attribute them to the preceding management team and improve financial 
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performance going forward. For the same reason, new management may use reversals to 
increase reported earnings, to demonstrate its ability to improve the firm’s performance. 
Therefore, this study predicts that change in senior management is associated with firm 
incentives to avoid earnings declines through reversals of accumulated impairment. The 
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REVt  = α + β1(NIt - REVt - NIt-1) + β2BACCt    +  β3(NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1)*BACCt  +  β4(NIt  - 
REVt  - NIt-1)*CEOt  +  β5BACCt *CEOt + β6(NIt - REVt - NIt-1)*BACCt *CEOt + β7SIZEt + 
β8MTBt + β9LEVt + β10CEOt  + εt               
(3-11) 
Where: 
 
REVt  = reversal amount, scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 = change in pre-reversal net income from year t-1 to year t, scaled by total 
assets at end of year t; 
BACCt = beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss in year t, deflated by total assets 
at end of year t; 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market-to-book ratio at end of year t; 
LEVt = total debts, scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CEOt is equal to one if the firm changes its chief executive officer/general manager in year t-
1 or t-2; and equal to zero otherwise. 
 
Equation 3-11 examines the impact of CEO change on the relationship between reversals, to 
avoid earnings declines and accumulated impairment, represented by β6. Change in senior 
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management, CEO, is interacted with NIt - REVt - NIt-1 and BACC. Based on the above 
argument, this study expects that the reversal of accumulated impairment losses to avoid 
earnings declines is more likely to occur in firms which change their senior management. 
Thus, β6 is expected to be negative. The expectations of all other variables are similar to 
previous models. 
 
3.7  Summary 
 
This chapter presents the method to empirically examine the research questions pertaining to 
reversal reporting. Data on the reversal reporting are manually collected from the annual 
reports, using a keyword search. This procedure yields an initial sample of 242 firm-year 
reversals from 2006 to 2009, in four types of non-current assets; i.e. property plant and 
equipment, investment properties, other investment and investment in associates. Reversal 
firms are matched by industry and firm size with non-reversal firms, and 182 reversal 
observations are successfully matched. Thus, the final sample of this study consists of 182 
reversal observations and 182 control-firm observations. 
 
All tests undertaken in this study can be divided into three stages. In the first stage, univariate 
comparisons between reversal firms and non-reversal firms are performed to examine the 
differences between both samples. In multivariate analysis, Equations 3-1 to 3-4 are 
developed to investigate the relationship between reversal reporting and future firm 
performance, measured using one-year-ahead cash flow from operations, the change in one-
year-ahead cash flow from operations, the one-year-ahead operating income and the change 
in the one-year-ahead operating income. For market-based tests, Equation 3-5 is used to 
investigate the value relevance of reversal information. In general, the aim of estimating 
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Equations 3-1 to 3-5 is to establish whether the reversals from the full matched sample are 
associated with firm performance. Results for all tests in the first stage are presented in 
Chapter 4. 
 
In the second stage, reversal firms are differentiated between reversal earnings managers and 
reversal non-managers of earnings, according to the level of abnormal working capital 
accruals. Reversal firms in the top 30% of abnormal working capital accruals are regarded as 
earnings managers, and the middle 40% as non-managers of earnings. Then, a difference in 
differences analysis is undertaken, whereby the relative difference between reversals earnings 
managers and their control firms is compared to the relative difference between reversals 
non-managers of earnings and their respective control firms. Equations 3-1 to 3-5 are 
modified to include a dummy variable that differentiates between both subsamples. Equation 
3-1A estimates the relationship between reversal reporting and one-year ahead cash flow 
from operations moderated by the incentives to manage earnings. It is expected that reversal 
recognition by non-managers of earnings is positively associated with one-year-ahead cash 
flow from operations. This effect is expected to be significantly different than the association 
between one-year-ahead cash flow from operations and reversal recognition by earnings 
managers. Equations 3-2A to 3-4A are similar to Equation 3-1A, except for the dependent 
variables. Equation 3-2A examines the association between reversal recognition and one-
year-ahead change in cash flow from operations, while Equation 3-3A examines the 
association between reversal reporting and the subsequent one-year operating income. 
Equation 3-4A examines the relationship between reversal and change in the future operating 
income. The expectations for Equations 3-2A and 3-4A are similar to Equation 3-1A. The last 
equation, Equation 3-5A, examines the relationship between reversals and stock market 
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return in both subsamples. It is expected that reversals reported by non-managers of earnings 
are more value-relevant, as compared to the reversals reported by earnings managers. 
 
In the last stage, this study examines whether reversals are associated with another earnings 
management measure. In particular, an association between reversals and incentives to avoid 
earnings declines is examined. In the univariate analysis, a comparative analysis of the 
frequency and magnitude of pre-reversal earnings declines between reversal firms and control 
firms is undertaken. A similar comparison is also performed between earnings managers and 
non-managers of earnings, as defined in Chapter 3. It is expected that the frequency and 
magnitude of pre-reversal earnings declines are significantly larger for earnings managers, 
compared to the non-managers of earnings.  
 
In multivariate analysis, Equations 3-6 to 3-11 are developed to estimate the relationship 
between reversal reporting and incentives to avoid earnings declines. The regression analysis 
is tested using Tobit regression, as the test includes control firms which did not reverse the 
previously recognised impairment losses. In Equation 3-6, AWCA is interacted with the 
earnings declines variable, to establish whether the relationship between reversals and 
incentives to avoid earnings declines varies with the level of AWCA. As high-AWCA firms 
are more likely to manage earnings, this study expects that such firms report reversals to 
avoid earnings declines. Equation 3-7 examines the influence of monitoring mechanism on 
the association between reversal to avoid earnings declines and AWCA. As good corporate 
governance mitigates opportunistic reporting, it is expected that opportunistic reversal 
reporting to avoid earnings declines by firms with high AWCA is moderated by effective 
corporate governance.  
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Equation 3-8 tests whether firms reverse the accumulated impairment losses to avoid earnings 
declines. Similar to prior studies, this study predicts that the association between reversals 
and accumulated impairment is more pronounced for firms with incentives to avoid earnings 
declines. Equation 3-9 examines the role of corporate governance in reducing the 
opportunistic behaviour. As good corporate monitoring enhances transparency in financial 
reporting, this study predicts that the opportunistic reversal reporting by high AWCA firms is 
moderated by effective corporate governance. This study further examines whether the 
leverage ratio explains the reversal reporting, to avoid earnings declines. To test the 
hypothesis, Equation 3-10 is estimated by incorporating the leverage ratio into the estimation 
model. The last research model, Equation 3-11, tests whether CEO changes influence the 
relationship between reversals, to avoid earnings declines and accumulated impairment. As 
prior studies provide evidence that CEO change is associated with opportunistic financial 
reporting, this study predicts that firms that have experienced CEO change are more likely to 
reverse the accumulated impairment to avoid earnings declines. Results for all tests in the last 
stage are presented in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH FINDINGS ON REVERSAL OF IMPAIRMENT LOSSES 
AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the results of the data analysis based on the research methods explained 
in the previous chapter. Univariate and multivariate analyses are performed to empirically 
answer the research question:  Does the reversal of impairment loss reporting in Malaysia 
portray the reality of economic performance, or is it associated with opportunistic earnings 
management behaviour? This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 4.2 describes the 
full sample and the magnitude of impairment loss reversals. Section 4.3 provides descriptive 
statistics and univariate comparisons between a matched sample and a control sample. 
Section 4.4 presents the results of multivariate analyses. Specifically, this section presents the 
results on the relationship between impairment reversal and firm performance, measured by 
cash flow from operations and operating income. Section 4.5 presents the results of 
multivariate analysis, examining the association between reversals of impairment loss and 
stock market returns. Section 4.6 reports the robustness check for the findings detailed in this 
chapter. The last section summarises the chapter. 
 
4.2 Sample characteristics and the magnitude of impairment loss reversals 
 
As explained in Chapter 3, the full sample of this study comprises 182 firm-year reversals 
from 2006-2009. The 182 firm-year reversals are associated with 118 publicly listed 
companies in Malaysia. Some firms reversed in more than one accounting period during 
2006-2009. The reversals are related to non-current assets impairment losses recognised by 
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the Malaysian public companies following the mandatory adoption of FRS 136, Impairment 
of Assets. They are either one, or a combination, of the following types of non-current assets: 
property, plant and equipment; investment in associates; other investment; or investment 
property.  
 
Table 4.1 presents the frequency and the magnitude of total impairment reversals for the full 
sample. (A similar table is also prepared for the initial sample of 242 reversal firms, and 
presented in Appendix B.) In general, the impairment reversal data are skewed to the right. 
Details of reversals are presented in five categories. The first category is based on the reversal 
amount reported in the financial statements of firms’ annual reports, in millions. The second 
category is scaled by total assets, while the third category is scaled by the average value of 
specific assets. The fourth category is scaled by net income before reversal amount, and the 
last category is scaled by the beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss in the year 
of reversal. The first column refers to the number of reversal recognitions during 2006-2009. 
The reversals reported in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 are 31, 43, 39 and 69, respectively. The 
frequency of reversals is slightly higher in 2009. The next column illustrates the reversal 
amount, in millions, of Malaysian Ringgit. The means of reversals recognised are higher in 
2006 (3.91 million) and 2007 (4.38 million). They decrease in 2008 (1.77 million) and 2009 
(2.81 million). However, the medians of reversal recognition during 2006-2009 demonstrate 
an increasing pattern (except for 2008), from 0.39 to 0.95. The next column shows the 
percentage of reversals per total assets of the reversal firms. The means (medians) for 2006, 
2007, 2008 and 2009 are 0.56% (0.11%), 0.57% (0.14%), 0.18% (0.08) and 0.52% (0.16%), 
respectively. The mean increases slightly from 2006 to 2007, and drops dramatically in 2008. 
However, the percentage increases sharply in 2009.  
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Table 4.1: Frequency and Magnitude of Impairment Loss Reversal, 2006-2009 
  Million MYR % Total assets
a
 % Specific 
Assets
b
 
% Net Income
c
 % Accumulated 
Impairment
d
 
 Sample Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
e
 Median 
Panel A: Breakdown by year           
2006 31 3.91 0.39 0.56 0.11 7.19 2.03 18.67 3.13 34.14 20.86 
2007 43 4.38 0.58 0.57 0.14 16.02 5.16 7.79 3.22 40.95 33.23 
2008 39 1.77 0.52 0.18 0.08 7.19 2.02 3.17 1.04 37.43 29.82 
2009 69 2.81 0.95 0.52 0.16 13.13 3.55 21.25 4.39 40.44 27.92 
Total 182    3.14     0.63     0.47   0.12   11.51     2.45   13.75     3.13   38.88   28.21 
Panel B: Breakdown by type  
     of asset 
          
Property, plant and 
equipment 
66 2.31 0.70 0.49 0.15 2.85 0.67 14.02 2.87 41.45 37.88 
Investment in associates 19 5.10 4.06 0.72 0.45 13.50 5.37 20.13 5.93 34.50 18.42 
Other investments 78 3.44 0.38 0.45 0.09 20.06 8.46 11.72 2.82 39.36 28.11 
Investment properties 
Multiple 
11 
8 
1.12 
5.33 
0.03 
2.52 
0.11 
0.36 
0.01 
0.29 
5.22 
7.08 
2.06 
1.48 
2.31 
31.93 
0.12 
8.81 
37.44 
26.32 
24.52 
19.81 
Total 182 3.14 0.63 0.47 0.12 11.51 2.45 13.75 3.13 38.88 28.21 
 
a
 It is calculated as reversal amount divided by total assets at the end of year. 
b
 Percentage of specific assets are based on average of related assets category in the year of reversal. 
c
 It is based on the net income before reversal. The calculation of mean and median for percentage of specific assets in 2007 is based on 42 
reversals as specific asset of one reversal cannot be identified from the annual report. The mean and the median are based on the winsorized 
data at three standard deviation from the mean.  
d
 The determination of % of beginning balance of accumulated impairment is based on 155 observations as 27 reversal firms combined the 
accumulated impairment and accumulated depreciation in one account for Property, Plant and Equipment.  The percentage is calculated as 
reversal amount over beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss in the year of reversal.  
e
 The ANOVA test shows that there is no significant difference of the impairment reversals as a percentage of accumulated impairment across 
the four years. 
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The percentage of reversals per specific asset is calculated based on the ratio of reversals 
amount over the average book value of the individual assets. For example, if the reversal is 
recognised for property, plant and equipment, the percentage refers to the amount of reversal 
in property, plant and equipment over the average book value of the property, plant and 
equipment reported during the financial year. The calculation is based on the average value 
for two reasons. Some companies’ beginning balances of property, plant and equipment are 
lower than the reversal amounts; some companies dispose of a substantial amount of the 
assets during the accounting period. As a result, the ending balance of the net book value of 
the assets is lower than the reversals amount. As revealed in Table 4.1, Panel A, the reversal 
firms reverse the impairment loss per book value of specific assets, which are higher in 2007 
and 2009, with means (medians) of 16.02% (5.16%) and  13.13% (3.55%), respectively, 
compared to the reversals in 2006 and 2008, with means (medians) of 7.19% (2.03%) and  
7.19% (2.02%), respectively.  
 
The next column, in Panel A of Table 4.1, presents the proportion of the reversal of 
impairment loss in the net incomes of reversal firms. It is calculated as the reversal amount 
divided by net income before reversals, which illustrates how much the reported net income 
has been affected by this accounting adjustment. As depicted in the table, the amount of 
reversals of impairment loss is large in relation to the reported income. The mean and median 
for the 4 year periods is 13.75% and 3.13%, respectively. The table also indicates that the 
average recognition of reversals decreases from 2006 (18.67%) to 2008 (3.17%), and 
increases dramatically in 2009 (21.25%). 
 
The final column presents the reversal as a percentage of total accumulated impairment 
losses. Total accumulated impairment losses represent the total impairment loss recognised 
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throughout the life and use of the specific asset until the year of reversal. As such, the 
percentage of reversal over the total impairment captures the total available unrealised loss 
which has been reversed and increased the reported earnings. On average, the size of 
impairment loss reversal over the total accumulated impairment loss is 38.88%. This is higher 
than the figure documented in the study by Duh et al. (2009), 21.10%. The ratio of 
impairment reversal to total accumulated impairment loss is not consistent in relation to net 
income, as mentioned earlier, but it is consistent with the trend in Columns 1 to 3. The means 
(medians) are 34.14% (20.86%), 40.95% (33.23%), 37.43% (29.82%) and 40.44% (27.92%) 
for 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009, respectively.   
 
Panel B of Table 4.1 presents the frequency and magnitude of impairment loss reversals 
breakdown by type of fixed assets; i.e. property, plant and equipment, investment in 
associates, other investments, investment property and companies recognising more than one 
type of assets in one accounting period (i.e. multiple). As depicted in the table, the frequency 
of reversals is not evenly distributed across all types of non-current assets. Of 182 
observations, most Malaysian public companies recognised reversals of impairment loss in 
property, plant and equipment (66 observations) and other investments (78 observations), 
compared to the reversal recognition in investment in associates (19 observations) and 
investment properties (11 observations). Surprisingly, the amount of impairment loss 
reversal, in millions, of Malaysian Ringgits, and as a percentage of total assets for investment 
in associates’ accounts, are the highest (5.10 million and 0.72%, respectively), but they are 
associated with only 19 observations. As to the percentage of reversal over total specific 
assets, reversals in other investments represent the highest percentage (20.06%), while 
reversals in multiple non-current assets represent the highest (31.93%), in terms of the 
percentage of reversal in net income. The last column illustrates that, on average, Malaysian 
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public companies reverse more accumulated impairment loss recognised in property, plant 
and equipment (41.45%), followed by other investments (39.36%), investment properties 
(37.44%) and investment in associates (34.50%). 
 
4.3 Univariate comparisons between reversal firms and control firms 
 
This section provides findings based on a univariate comparison between reversal firms and 
control firms. The sample comprises 182 reversal firm-year observations and 182 control 
firm-year observations. The variables used in this analysis are total assets, reversal amount 
scaled by total assets, abnormal working capital accruals, total sales, the beginning balance of 
accumulated impairment loss scaled by total assets, return on equity and return on equity 
adjusted for reversal amount. Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics of the reversal firms and 
the control firms, together with the test of differences in means and medians for all 
continuous variables. The table provides the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum 
value, maximum value, skewness and kurtosis value of the seven variables explained above, 
for reversal firms and control firms. As illustrated in Table 4.2, the test sample and control 
sample are similar in size, measured in total assets, suggesting that the matching procedure is 
successful. The average and median of total assets for both the test sample and the control 
sample are similar. The means (medians) are 20.096 (20.029) for the test sample, and 20.054 
(19.985) for the control sample, while the p-value of the test of difference is 0.754 (0.640). 
The abnormal working capital accruals are also similar between the two groups. The average 
(median) of the variable is 0.0007 (-0.0009) for the test sample, and -0.0041 (0.0011) for the 
control sample, while the p-value of the test of difference is 0.639 (0.968), indicating that, in 
general, the reversal firms are not engaged in more earnings management measured by 
abnormal working capital accruals.  
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of reversal firm-years and control firms, 2006-2009. 
Variables Assets REV AWCA Sales BACC
a
 ROE ROEadj 
Test sample: Firm-years with impairment loss and reversals (n=182) 
Mean 20.096 0.0037 0.0007 19.594 0.0176 0.0822 0.0733 
Median 20.029 0.0012 -0.0009 19.406 0.0058 0.0866 0.0814 
SD 1.2746 0.0057 0.0933 1.4535 0.0274 0.1361 0.1386 
Min  17.268 0.0000 -0.2558 16.005 0.0000   -0.3481 -0.3540 
Max 24.286 0.0271 0.2667 24.250 0.0981 0.5376 0.5232 
Skew 0.5642 2.7461 0.2538 0.4396 2.0583 0.0911 0.1040 
Kurtos 3.5439 7.8388 4.4581 3.2466 6.0890 6.4979 6.1498 
Control  sample :Firm-years with impairment, without reversal (n=182) 
Mean 20.054 0 -0.0041 19.301 0.0087 0.0166 0.0166 
Median 19.985 0 0.0011 19.299 0.0011 0.0540 0.0540 
SD 1.2628 0 0.1022 1.5934 0.0157 0.2358 0.2358 
Min  17.543 0 -0.2768 9.3056 0.0000 -0.8454 -0.8454 
Max 24.091 0 0.2553 23.284 0.0845 0.8743 0.8743 
Skew 0.6189 . -0.4363 -1.1461 2.1752 -1.5068 -1.5068 
Kurtos 3.5941 . 4.5302 10.627 6.7934 8.5524 8.5524 
Diff in means 
(p-value) 
0.0418 
(0.754) 
0.0037 
(0.000) 
0.0048 
(0.639) 
0.2930 
(0.068) 
0.0089 
(0.001) 
0.0656 
(0.001) 
0.0567 
(0.005) 
Diff in medians 
(p-value) 
0.0440 
(0.640) 
0.0012 
(0.000) 
-0.0020 
(0.968) 
0.1070 
(0.091) 
0.0047 
(0.000) 
0.0326 
(0.003) 
0.0274 
(0.017) 
The difference (diff) in means and medians between reversal firms and control firms are tested using two-tailed 
t-tests and Mann Whitney tests, respectively.  
a
The sample size is 155 reversal observations. The difference (27 observations) is not traceable, as the firms 
combined accumulated depreciation and accumulated impairment in one account.  
All data (except for assets and sales) are winsorised at three standard deviation from the mean. 
 
Variable definitions: 
Assets = natural logarithm of total assets at end of year t; 
REV= amount of impairment loss reversal, deflated by total assets at end of year t; 
AWCA = actual value of abnormal working capital accruals (DeFond and Park, 2001), 
deflated by total assets at end of year t; 
Sales = natural logarithm of total sales at end of year t; 
BACC= beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss in year t, deflated by total assets 
at end of year t; 
ROE= return on equity, calculated as net income in year t divided by total equity at end of 
year t; 
ROEadj = return on equity (adjusted), calculated as net income minus impairment reversal in 
year t, divided by total equity at end of year t. 
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Interestingly, a number of indicators demonstrate that reversal firms perform better than non-
reversal firms. The average (median) total sales (measured by the natural log of total sales) 
generated by reversal firms and control firms are 19.594 (19.406) and 19.301 (19.299), 
respectively. The differences in mean and median for the variable are significant at the 10% 
level. In addition, reversal firms report higher return on equity than non-reversal firms. The 
mean (median) for reversal firms and control firms are 0.0822 (0.0866) and 0.0166 (0.0540), 
respectively, and the differences in mean and median are significant at the 1% level. 
However, the higher return on equity may result from the recognition of the higher reversal of 
impairment loss, which increases the reported net income, compared to non-reversal firms. 
As such, the reversal of impairment loss is excluded in the determination of net income, in 
the year of reversal. Thus, the return on equity for reversal firms reflects only the profitability 
of reversal firms without the reversal amount. This method is similar to the approach 
followed by Duh et al. (2009). They deduct the reversal amount in the calculation of earnings 
change. In Table 4.2, ROEadj represents return on equity before reversal. After the exclusion 
of the reversal, ROEadj is still significantly higher for reversal firms than non-reversal firms. 
The mean (median) of the ROEadj for reversal firms is 0.0733 (0.0814), and, for non-reversal 
firms, is 0.0166 (0.0540). The differences in mean and median are significant at the 1% and 
5% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 4.2 also demonstrates that the beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss for 
reversal firms is significantly larger than non-reversal firms, suggesting that there may exist a 
conservative reporting policy adopted by reversal firms during the previous period of 
recognition of initial impairment loss. The mean (median) of the beginning balance of 
accumulated impairment loss is 1.76% (0.58%) of total assets for reversal firms, and 0.87% 
(0.11%) for non-reversal firms. The mean and median differences are significant at the 1% 
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level. This is consistent with Duh et al. (2009), who report that the impairment loss 
recognised by reversal firms is higher than non-reversal firms.
14
 
 
In summary, Table 4.2 demonstrates that reversal firms are more profitable, as measured by 
return on equity, and generate more sales than the firms in the same industry classification 
which did not reverse the impairment charges. The table also reports that both groups 
(reversal and non-reversal firms) have similar abnormal working capital accruals. On 
average, the results show that reversal firms are not associated with earnings management, to 
a greater extent, than non-reversal firms. This is further supported by performance measures 
(return on equity). Further investigation is required.  
 
 
4.4  Multivariate analysis: reversal of impairment losses and future firm 
performance 
 
To provide additional evidence pertaining to the results in Section 4.3, Equations 3-1 to 3-4 
are estimated for 182 reversal firms, to establish if their reversals are related to future 
operating   performance,   measured  using  four  accounting   performance  measures; i.e. one 
year-ahead cash flow from operations, one-year-ahead change in cash flow from operations, 
one-year-ahead operating income and one-year-ahead change in operating income. The 
descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of all regression variables are presented in Table 
4.3.  
 
 
                                                 
14
 High BACC could reduce the denominator of ROE and push the ratio up for test samples relative to the 
control firms. Thus, BACC is added back to the denominator of ROE to control for the size of BACC. The 
untabulated findings indicate that the significance of the ROE difference between the test sample and the control 
sample is similar to those tabulated in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for regression variables 
(Equations 3-1 to 3-4), n = 182. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics      
Variables Mean Median SD Min Max Skew Kurtos 
Dependent variables      
CFOt+1 0.0657 0.0535 0.0788 -0.1379 0.2736 0.2830 3.4732 
∆CFOt+1 0.0040 0.0093 0.0792 -0.1879 0.1890 -0.3913 3.1741 
OPIN*t+1 0.0807 0.0714 0.1428 -0.2911 0.4472 -0.1704 3.8012 
∆OPIN*t+1 0.0065 0.0042 0.0465 -0.1084 0.1188 0.0168 3.6534 
Independent variables      
REV 0.0037 0.0012 0.0057 0.0000 0.0271 2.7461 7.8388 
CFOt 0.0638 0.0575 0.0729 -0.1165 0.2509 0.4267 3.4326 
∆CFOt  0.0154 0.0158 0.0822 -0.2039 0.2443 0.3567 4.0553 
OPINt 0.0395 0.0375 0.0762 -0.1730 0.26215 -0.0290 4.6022 
∆OPINt 0.0084 0.0082 0.0473 -0.1123 0.1272 -0.1663 3.9225 
WC 0.2052 0.2035 0.1954 -0.2169 0.6191 -0.0792 2.6802 
∆WC 0.0191 0.0229 0.0939 -0.1937 0.2320 0.0089 3.4259 
SIZE 19.617 19.406 1.4799 16.005 24.251 0.4136 3.1211 
MTB 0.9728 0.7400 0.6965 0.1900 2.8700 1.3167 3.9299 
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
 REV CFOt ∆CFOt OPINt ∆OPINt WC ∆WC SIZE MTB 
REV 1.0000 
 
        
CFOt -0.112 
0.137 
1.0000 
 
       
∆CFOt -0.056 0.527 1.0000       
 
OPINt 
0.459 
-0.207 
0.006 
0.000 
0.542 
0.000 
 
0.037 
0.619 
 
1.0000 
 
     
∆OPINt -0.155 
0.039 
0.409 
0.000 
-0.036 
0.640 
0.556 
0.000 
1.0000 
 
    
WC -0.252 
0.007 
0.146 
0.051 
0.086 
0.253 
0.251 
0.001 
0.099 
0.191 
1.0000 
 
   
∆WC 0.019 
0.802 
-0.101 
0.178 
-0.036 
0.629 
0.026 
0.727 
-0.102 
0.175 
0.395 
0.003 
1.0000 
 
  
SIZE -0.193 
0.009 
0.245 
0.001 
-0.022 
0.774 
0.455 
0.060 
0.343 
0.005 
-0.088 
0.242 
-0.079 
0.292 
1.0000 
 
 
MTB 0.089 
0.239 
0.327 
0.000 
0.041 
0.580 
0.426 
0.064 
0.317 
0.007 
-0.134 
0.073 
-0.018 
0.08 
0.290 
0.002 
1.0000 
 
All data are winsorised at three standard deviations from the mean. 
 
Variable definitions:  
CFOt+1 = net cash flow from operations in year t+1, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFOt+1 = change in net cash flow from operations from year t to year t+1, CFOt+1 - CFOt, divided by total 
assets at end of year t; 
OPIN*t+1 = operating income before depreciation and amortisation expenses, reversal amount and AWCA in 
year t+1, divided by total assets at end of year t;  
∆OPIN*t+1 = change in operating income before depreciation and amortisation expenses, reversal amount and 
AWCA from year t to year t+1, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
REVt  = reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CFOt  = net cash flow from operations in year t, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFOt  = change in net cash flow of operations from year t-1 to year t, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
OPINt = operating income before reversals in year t, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆OPINt = change in operating income before reversals from year t-1 to year t, divided by total assets at end of 
year t; 
WCt  = working capital in year t, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆WCt  = change in working capital from year t-1 to year t, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market-to-book ratio at end of year t. 
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Table 4.4: Relationship between impairment loss reversals and future firm 
performance, n=182 
CFOt+1   = α +  β1REVt + β2CFOt + β3WC + β4 SIZEt + β5MTBt + εt                              (3-1) 
∆CFOt+1 = α + β1REVt + β2∆CFOt + β3∆WC + β4SIZEt + β5MTBt + εt                   (3-2) 
OPIN*t+1   =  α + β1REVt + β2OPINt + β3SIZEt + β4MTBt +  εt                       (3-3) 
∆OPIN*t+1   =  α + β1REVt + β2∆OPINt + β3SIZEt + β4MTBt +  εt                      (3-4) 
Variable 
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
-0.2168 
(0.015) 
-0.0946 
(0.151) 
-0.0744 
(0.621) 
-0.5211 
(0.069) 
REV 
-0.5695 
(0.527) 
-0.5865 
(0.382) 
-0.9594 
(0.402) 
-0.8561 
(0.621) 
CFO 
0.3562 
(0.000)   
 
∆CFO 
 
-0.6269 
(0.000)  
 
OPIN 
  
0.8819 
(0.000) 
 
∆OPIN 
   
-0.5213 
(0.000) 
WC 
0.0296 
(0.353)   
 
∆WC 
 
0.0395 
(0.383)  
 
SIZE 
0.0128 
(0.005) 
0.0058 
(0.091) 
0.0056 
(0.481) 
0.0253 
(0.061) 
MTB 
0.0050 
(0.629) 
-0.0042 
(0.570) 
0.0155 
(0.265) 
0.0621 
(0.091) 
 
N 182 182 182 
 
182 
 
R
2 0.2406 0.4448 0.3237 
 
0.3011 
 
Variable definitions:  
CFOt+1 = net cash flow from operations in year t+1, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFOt+1 = change in net cash flow of operations from year t to year t+1, CFOt+1 - CFOt, divided by 
total assets at end of year t; 
OPIN*t+1 = operating income before depreciation and amortisation expenses, reversal amount and 
AWCA in year t+1, divided by total assets at end of year t;  
∆OPIN*t+1 = change in operating income before depreciation and amortisation expenses, reversal 
amount and AWCA from year t to year t+1, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
REVt = reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CFOt = net cash flow from operations in year t, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFOt = change in net cash flow from operations from year t-1 to year t, CFOt – CFOt-1, divided by 
total assets at end of year t; 
OPINt = operating income before reversals in year t; 
∆OPINt = change in operating income before reversals from year t-1 to year t, divided by total assets 
at end of year t; 
WCt  = working capital in year t, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆WCt  = change in working capital from year t-1 to year t, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
SIZEt = log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = market-to-book ratio at end of year t. 
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The regression results are outlined in Table 4.4. In all four separate regressions, reversal of 
impairment losses are insignificantly associated with future firm performance indicators, 
suggesting that the reversals reported by Malaysian firms do not explain future firm 
performance. Cash flow from operations (change in cash flow from operations) and operating 
income (change in operating income) in the reversal year are positively (negatively) and 
significantly associated with the performance in the next year. The other control variable, 
SIZE, is positively associated with all performance indicators in the next year (except for the 
result estimating Equation 3-3), indicating that larger firms tend to perform better in future.  
 
The above findings are contradictory to the results reported by Aboody et al. (1999). One 
possible explanation for these contradictory results is that the revaluation (the main focus in 
Aboody et al. (1999) study) is reported directly on the balance sheet; thus, it provides a less 
attractive opportunity to manage earnings. While reversals are reported directly via income 
statement, reporting incentives may influence the reporting. However, Section 4.3 provides 
evidence that reversal firms have superior current performance relative to the control firms. 
These two contradictory arguments and findings require further investigation.  
 
4.5  Multivariate analysis: reversal of impairment losses and stock market returns 
 
Equation 3-5 estimates the value relevance of impairment reversals to investors using 178 
reversal observations. The sample size is reduced, as market data relating to four observations 
are not available via Datastream. Table 4.5 presents descriptive statistics and a correlation 
matrix of regression variables, to test the value relevance of reversals.  
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Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for regression variables 
(Equation 3-5), n=182. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics     
Variables Mean Median SD Min Max Skew Kurtos 
Dependent variable      
AbReturnt
a
 0.0524 0.0178 0.6197 -1.3895 1.5129 0.2714 0.2951 
Independent variables      
REV’ 0.0037 0.0013 0.0059 0.0000 0.0273 2.7104 10.509 
NI 0.0778 0.0844 0.1946 -0.4539 0.4835 -0.8682 4.5200 
BTM 1.4255 1.2500 0.9035 0.1368 3.5714 0.9228 3.2019 
Panel B: Correlation matrix     
 REV’ NI BTM     
REV’ 
 
NI 
 
BTM 
1.0000 
 
-0.2326 
(0.0018) 
0.1901 
(0.0111) 
 
 
1.0000 
 
0.1411 
(0.0603) 
 
 
 
 
1.0000 
    
a
The sample size is 178 reversal observations, as the data on the share price for four reversal 
observations are not available in Datastream.  
All data are winsorised at three standard deviations from the mean. 
 
Variable definitions:  
AbReturnt = control group-adjusted returns beginning eight months before the financial 
year-end, and ending four months after the financial year-end;  
REV’t  = reversal amount, scaled by the market value of equity at the end of year t-1; 
NIt = net income before reversal in year t, scaled by market value of equity at the end of year 
t-1; 
BTMt = the book-to-market value ratio at the end of year t-1. 
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Table 4.6 reports the results from the estimation, and indicates a different explanation of the 
informativeness of reversals. Contrary to the results in Table 4.4, Table 4.6 illustrates that the 
impairment reversals are positively and significantly associated with contemporaneous 
abnormal returns, suggesting that the information provides a credible signal to investors 
about firm performance. As revealed in the table, the coefficient on REV’ is positive, and 
significant at the 10% level. Thus, the reversal information reported in the annual report is 
perceived by investors as value-relevant in their investment decision.  
 
The result is consistent with the findings in Aboody et al. (1999) and Chen et al. (2009). This 
evidence is consistent with the market attaches value to discretionary accounting choice. 
Consistent with expectations, net income before reversals, NI, is positively and significantly 
associated with abnormal returns. The other control variable, BTM, is insignificantly 
associated with the stock returns.  
 
 
In summary, the result in Table 4.6 provides evidence that the Malaysian market prices the 
private information (reversals) because it captures value-relevant information. The market 
believes that the impaired assets are recovered, and expected to perform better in future. 
Thus, it illustrates that managers use their discretion to improve the ability of reported 
earnings, to reflect the fundamental value of the firm (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; 
Holthausen, 1990). The results in univariate analysis also report that the current performance 
of reversal firms is superior, compared to the control group. Both results in Table 4.2 and 
Table 4.6 suggest that reversal firms report the reversals as a response to the economic 
reality. However, the result in Table 4.4 demonstrates that the reversal information does not 
predict the future profitability of the reversal firms. These inconsistent results require further 
investigation.  
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Table 4.6: Relationship between impairment loss reversals and stock market returns, 
n=178
a
 
 
AbReturnt = γ0 + γ1REV’t + γ2NIt + γ3BTMt + ut                                (3-5) 
 
 
Variable 
 
Predicted sign 
 
Coefficient 
 
t-Statistic 
 
(p-value) 
 
Intercept 
  
-0.0041 
 
0.64 
 
(0.959) 
 
REV’ 
 
+ 
 
2.8810 
 
1.77 
 
(0.079) 
 
NI 
 
+ 
 
0.9860 
 
3.70 
 
(0.001) 
 
BTM 
 
+ 
 
-0.0382 
 
-1.04 
 
(0.295) 
 
N 
  
178 
  
 
R
2
 
  
0.087 
  
 
F-statistic 
  
8.66 
  
 
p-value (F-statistic) 
  
0.000 
  
a
The sample size is reduced, as the market information for four observations are not available 
via Datastream. 
 
Variable definitions:  
AbReturn = control group-adjusted returns beginning eight months before the financial year-
end, and ending four months after the financial year-end;  
REV’= reversal amount, scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1; 
NI = net income before reversal in year t, scaled by market value of equity at the end of year 
t-1; 
BTM = book to market value of equity at the end of year t-1. 
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4.6  Robustness check 
 
4.6.1 Regression - clustered standard errors 
 
This study also provides a robustness check for the market-based findings presented in Table 
4.6. As explained in Chapter 3, the full sample of this study consists of 182 reversal firm-year 
observations from 2006 to 2009, associated with 118 firms. These different figures indicate 
that some reversal firms recognised reversals more than once during the period of this study. 
Multiple observations may affect the estimation results, as the observations may correlate 
with each other, creating the possibility of correlated residuals (Lang et al., 2006). Regression 
data in Table 4.6 include multiple observations. The total observations for the regression are 
178, and are related to 117 firms; thus, on average, there are 1.52 observations per firms. As a 
sensitivity analysis, all standard errors are clustered at the firm level in performing the 
regression of market-based test. The result of this analysis is presented in Appendix C, and 
indicates consistent results with those of the primary analysis. The re-estimated result for 
Equation 3-5 indicates that the coefficients, significant variables and the direction of sign for 
each variable are the same as the primary regression results presented in Table 4.6. The 
reversals recognised by Malaysian public listed firms are positively and significantly 
associated with abnormal stock returns. This sensitivity result demonstrates that the result 
presented in Table 4.6 is robust in relation to the possibility of correlated residuals in the 
regression analysis.  
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4.6.2 Considering the effect of the beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss 
(BACC) 
 
The descriptive statistics in Table 4.2 demonstrate that the beginning balance of accumulated 
impairment loss of the reversal firms is higher than the balance of the control firms. This 
difference may influence the result presented in Table 4.6. Thus, the variable BACC is 
incorporated in Equation 3-5, and the result is presented in Appendix D. As depicted in the 
appendix, the coefficients on REV’ and NI remain positive and significant, while the 
coefficient on BACC is not significant. Thus, the size of accumulated impairment does not 
affect the main result. 
 
4.7  Summary 
 
This chapter presents descriptive statistics, univariate comparisons between reversal firms 
and control firms, and regression results estimating the relationship between reversal and 
future firm performance. The data used for these analyses is comprised of 182 Malaysian 
public companies recognising impairment reversals during the years 2006 to 2009. In general, 
similarly to previous studies, the magnitude of the reversal of impairment loss is large, as 
illustrated in the percentage of reversals in net income and the beginning balance of the 
accumulated impairment loss. The statistics also indicate that Malaysian public companies 
reverse more in other investments and property, plant and equipment. A simple test of the 
difference between reversal firms and control firms demonstrates that reversal firms are more 
profitable, as, measured by return on equity, they generate more sales and have higher 
accumulated impairment balance than non-reversal firms. This finding suggests that reversal 
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firms perform better and, on average, do not engage in earnings management to as large an 
extent as non-reversal (control) firms. 
 
The analysis of the association between the impairment reversals and firm performance 
provides some evidence to support the view that reversals reflect the economic fundamental 
of the firms. In the market-based test, the present study finds that the market prices the 
reversal information as reflected by the positive association between reversals and 
contemporaneous stock returns. This finding suggests that the market believes that the 
reversals have incremental information content regarding the future profitability of the firm. 
However, in regression analysis between reversals and future profitability, measured by cash 
flow from operations and operating income, this study does not find evidence to support the 
information content hypothesis. The inconsistent findings between the market-based test and 
the accounting measure-based test require further analysis. As a robustness check for the 
market-based result, Equation 3-5 is re-estimated by clustering the standard errors at the firm 
level, and incorporating the BACC in the estimation model. The result shows qualitatively 
similar results as those reported in the primary test. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH FINDINGS ON THE REVERSAL OF IMPAIRMENT 
LOSSES, FIRM PERFORMANCE AND REPORTING INCENTIVES 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The evidence in the previous chapter indicates that the reversal firms outperform the control 
group in the reversal year. The chapter also provides evidence on the value relevance of 
reversal information. However, no association is found between reversals and future firm 
performance. This chapter presents the results of further analysis based on the research 
methods explained in Sections 3.5. Specifically, this chapter presents findings on the 
influences of reporting incentives in reversal reporting. Section 5.2 presents the results of 
univariate and multivariate analysis by distinguishing reversal firms into potential earnings 
managers and non-managers of earnings based on the level of abnormal working capital 
accruals. Section 5.3 reports the robustness check for findings in this chapter. The last section 
summarises the chapter. 
 
5.2  Reversal of impairment losses, firm performance and reporting incentives  
 
This study further examines whether reporting incentives influence reversal recognition. As 
explained in Chapter 3, this study uses abnormal working capital accruals (DeFond & Park, 
2001) to differentiate between efficient choice and the opportunistic behaviour of impairment 
reversals. Reversal firms are ranked according to the level of abnormal working capital 
accruals, and firms in the top 30% of positive abnormal working capital accruals are regarded 
as potential earnings managers, while those in the middle 40% of abnormal working capital 
accruals are regarded as non-managers of earnings. As explained in Chapter 3, this study does 
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not use the impairment charges to differentiate between firms that are likely to manage 
earnings and those that are not. Even though the previous studies document that the size of 
impairment charges is associated with earnings management, the descriptive statistics of the 
reversal firms do not demonstrate that the impairment charges are an indication of earnings 
management. The next three parts of this section present findings from differences in 
differences analysis, followed by multivariate analysis examining the association between 
reversals reported by 55 potential earnings managers and 73 non-managers of earnings, and 
future firm performance; lastly, findings from the market-based tests are presented.  
 
5.2.1  Difference in differences results 
 
Table 5.1 presents the result of difference in differences tests using 55 earnings managers and 
55 control firms, in addition to 73 non-managers of earnings and 73 control firms. These 
comparisons provide better insights into the attributes of earnings managers adopting 
opportunistic reversal reporting. The table provides the mean and median of difference 
between reversal earnings managers and their control firms, the mean and median of 
difference between reversal non-managers of earnings and their control firms, and a test of 
significance between the two differences, for nine variables. The variables are as follows: the 
beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss; return on equity adjusted for reversal 
amount; cash flow from operations in the reversal year; one-year-ahead cash flow from 
operations; operating income in the reversal year, adjusted operating income in the reversal 
year; operating income in the subsequent year; adjusted operating income in the subsequent 
year; and 12-month stock return. 
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Table 5.1: Difference in the differences analysis of reversal earnings managers, reversal 
non-managers of earnings and control firms, ranked by abnormal working capital 
accruals 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
Difference between 
reversal earnings 
managers and control 
firms (G1) 
Difference between 
reversal non-managers 
of earnings and control 
firms (G2) 
 
 
Difference 
 in 
differences 
 
 
 
 
p-value Mean 
(Median) 
n Mean 
(Median) 
 N 
BACC 
 
 
ROEadj 
 
 
CFOt 
 
 
CFOt+1 
 
 
OPINt 
 
 
OPIN*t 
 
 
OPINt+1 
 
 
OPIN*t+1 
 
 
Return 
 
0.0152 
(0.0041) 
 
0.0192 
(0.0231) 
 
-0.0219 
(-0.0278) 
 
-0.0041 
(0.0167) 
 
-0.0051 
(0.0008) 
 
-0.1450 
(-0.1162) 
 
0.0255 
(0.0192) 
 
0.0504 
(0.0410) 
 
0.0842 
(0.1375) 
47
a
 
 
 
55 
 
 
55 
 
 
55 
 
 
55 
 
 
55 
 
 
55 
 
 
55 
 
 
53
b
 
0.0022 
(0.0017) 
 
0.0741 
(0.0304) 
 
0.0142 
(0.0210) 
 
0.0222 
(0.0159) 
 
0.0352 
(0.0221) 
 
0.0252 
(0.0220) 
 
0.0561 
(0.0491) 
 
0.0625 
(0.0668) 
 
0.0179 
(0.0149) 
61
a
 
 
 
73 
 
 
73 
 
 
73 
 
 
73 
 
 
73 
 
 
73 
 
 
73 
 
 
72
b
 
0.0130 
(0.0024) 
 
-0.0549 
(-0.0073) 
 
-0.0361 
(-0.0488) 
 
-0.0263 
(0.0008) 
 
-0.0391 
(-0.0194) 
 
-0.1702 
(0.1382) 
 
-0.0306 
(-0.0299) 
 
-0.0121 
(-0.0258) 
 
0.0663 
(0.1226) 
0.028 
(0.098) 
 
0.176 
(0.376) 
 
0.059 
(0.013) 
 
0.131 
(0.209) 
 
0.071 
(0.138) 
 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
 
0.090 
(0.058) 
 
0.609 
(0.376) 
 
0.548 
(0.405) 
The differences in mean and median differences are tested using two-tailed t-test and Mann Whitney tests, 
respectively. 
a
The sample size is 47 reversal earnings managers firms (61 reversal non-managers of earnings firms) and 47 
control firms (61 control firms). The sample size is reduced, as 8 observations (12 observations) are not 
traceable, because the firms combine accumulated depreciation and accumulated impairment in one account.  
b
The sample size is 53 reversal earnings managers firms (72 reversal non-managers of earnings firms) and 53 
control firms (72 control firms). The sample size is reduced because the market data for 2 observations (1 
observation) are not available in Datastream. 
The operating income (OPIN) with * indicates the adjustment for depreciation and AWCA. 
 
Variable definitions: 
BACC = beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss in year t, deflated by total assets at end 
of year t; 
ROEadj = return on equity (adjusted), calculated as net income minus impairment reversal in year t, 
divided by total equity at end of year t; 
CFOt = net cash flow from operations in year t, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
CFOt+1 = net cash flow from operations in year t+1, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
OPINt = operating income before reversals in year t, divided by total assets at end of year t;  
OPINt+1 = operating income before reversals in year t+1, divided by total assets at end of year t;  
Return = stock returns beginning eight months before the financial year-end and ending four months 
after the financial year-end.  
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Table 5.1 presents the results of difference in differences tests of earnings managers and non-
managers of earnings. As illustrated in the table, non-managers of earnings report higher cash 
flow from operations, CFO, and operating income, OPIN, in the reversal year, relative to 
their control group, than do the earnings managers. The mean (median) difference of CFO for 
non-managers of earnings relative to the control group (G2) is 0.0142 (0.0210) and -0.0219 (-
0.0278), for the earnings managers group (G1). The difference in mean and median is 
significant at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. Interestingly, the difference in adjusted 
operating income in the reversal year between non-managers of earnings (G2) and earnings 
managers (G1) is significantly different (at the 1% level). The mean (median) difference of 
OPIN*t is 0.0252 (0.0220) for non-managers of the earnings group (G2), and -0.1450 (-
0.1162) for the earnings managers group (G1). The table also indicates that, relative to 
control firms, the operating income in year t+1 of non-managers of earnings is significantly 
higher than the operating income of the earnings managers. The mean (median) difference of 
OPINt+1 is 0.0561 (0.0491) for non-managers of the earnings group (G2), and 0.0255 
(0.0192) for the earnings managers group (G1). The differences in mean (-0.0306) and 
median (-0.0299) differences are significant at the 10% level.  
 
Table 5.1 also illustrates that the difference in size of accumulated impairment loss between 
non-managers of earnings and their control group is significantly smaller than that of the 
earnings managers. The difference in mean (median) differences is 0.0130 (0.0024), and this 
difference is significant at the 5% (10%) level. Lastly, the difference in differences test for 
other variables, ROEadj, CFOt+1, OPINt, OPIN*t+1 and Return, between both groups, do not 
display significant results. To sum up, the results in Table 5.1 reveal that non-managers of 
earnings outperform earnings managers in the reversal year and the subsequent year, 
indicating the recovery of their impaired operating fixed assets. Thus, reversal recognition by 
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non-earnings managers is more likely to have portrayed the underlying economic condition of 
the firms. 
 
5.2.2  Multivariate analysis: reversal of impairment losses, future firm performance 
and incentives to manage earnings 
 
This section provides further evidence of whether reversal recognition by non-managers of 
earnings portray the underlying economic condition of the firms. In particular, this section 
presents findings concerning the association between reversal recognition by reversal non-
managers of earnings and the future profitability of the firms, measured via cash flow from 
operations, the change in cash flow from operations, operating income and the change in 
operating income. Similarly to the sample used in the difference in differences test in Section 
5.2.1, the sample size for the estimations is 128 reversal observations; 55 observations of 
reversal earnings managers; and 73 observations of non-managers of earnings. The control 
firms are not included in the sample test, as these firms did not reverse the impairment 
charges. 
 
5.2.2.1  Future cash flow from operations  
 
This section examines the association between reversals reported by earnings managers and 
non-managers of earnings, and future firm performance, measured using cash flow from 
operations. Equation 3-1A (Equation 3-2A) hypothesises that the reversal of impairment loss 
recognised by non-managers of earnings is positively related to the one year-ahead cash flow 
from operations (change in cash flow from operations). Table 5.2 reports the results of the 
estimation from Equation 3-1A and Equation 3-2A. Panel A (Panel B) of Table 5.2 presents 
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the regression summary statistics, which relate reversals and one-year-ahead cash flow from 
operations (change in cash flow from operations). In Panel A, the coefficient on reversals, 
REV, is negative, and significant at the 1% level. This result indicates that, the higher the 
impairment loss being reversed by earnings managers, the lower the future cash flows, 
suggesting that reversals recognition by earnings managers does not reflect asset value 
changes, and, to some extent, is opportunistic. This finding is consistent with Duh et al. 
(2009) and Chen et al. (2009). In contrast, the sum of β1 + β2 is significantly positive at the 
1% level, suggesting that reversal recognition by non-managers of earnings predicts future 
cash flows. The higher the recognition of reversal by non-managers of earnings, the higher 
the future cash flows.  
 
In addition, the coefficient on D*REV, β2, is positive, and significant at the 1% level, 
indicating that the reversals reported by non-managers of earnings have a significantly 
different impact on future performance than the reversal reported by earnings managers. This 
finding provides strong evidence that the reversal reporting by reversal non-managers of 
earnings is an efficient choice of accruals recognition.  
 
Panel A also indicates that, as expected, the cash flow from operations in the reversal year is 
significantly and positively associated with future cash flows (significant at the 1% level). 
The other regressor, SIZE, measured as total sales, is also positively and significantly related 
with future cash flow from operations, while WC and MTB are insignificantly associated 
with future performance. 
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Table 5.2: Relationship between impairment loss reversals and future CFO, moderated 
by incentives to manage earnings using abnormal working capital accruals 
Panel A: Dependent variable is future cash flow from operations 
CFOt+1= α + D+ β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3CFOt + β4WCt + β5SIZEt + β6MTBt + εt          (3-1A) 
 Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
D 
REV 
D*REV 
CFOt 
WC 
SIZE 
MTB 
N 
R
2 
F-statistic 
p-value (F-statistic) 
β1 + β2  
 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
 
-0.2275 
-0.0181 
-1.2406 
 1.5664 
 0.3565 
 0.0401 
 0.0137 
0.0074 
128 
 0.2626 
10.54 
 0.0000 
 0.3258 
-2.61 
-1.35 
-4.00 
 2.81 
 3.59 
 1.32 
 3.07 
0.89 
0.010 
0.178 
0.000 
0.005 
0.000 
0.188 
0.002 
0.376 
 
 
 
 
0.006 
Panel B: Dependent variable is change in future cash flow from operations 
∆CFOt+1 = α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3∆CFOt + β4∆WCt + β5SIZEt +β6MTBt + εt   
(3-2A) 
 Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
D 
REV 
D*REV 
∆CFOt 
∆WC 
SIZE 
MTB 
N 
R
2 
F-statistic 
p-value (F-statistic) 
β1 + β2  
 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
? 
-0.1096 
-0.0158 
-1.1170 
-1.5459 
-0.6709 
-0.0406 
  0.0070 
-0.1096 
128 
-0.4684 
 12.26 
-0.0000 
  0.4289 
-1.58 
-1.27 
-3.22 
-2.89 
-9.53 
-0.91 
 1.90 
-1.58 
0.116 
0.206 
0.002 
0.004 
0.000 
0.367 
0.060 
0.116 
 
 
 
 
0.008 
 
Variable definitions: 
CFOt+1= net cash flow from operations in year t+1, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFOt+1= change in net cash flow from operations from year t to year t+1, divided by total assets at 
end of year t; 
D is equal to one for reversal firms in the middle 40% of abnormal working capital accruals measured 
using DeFond and Park’s 2001 (non-managers of earnings) model; and is equal to zero for reversal 
firms in the top 30% of abnormal working capital accruals (earnings managers); 
REV=  reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CFOt = net cash flow from operations in year t, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFOt = change in net cash flow from operations from year t-1 to year t, divided by total assets at 
end of year t; 
WC = working capital in year t, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆WC = change of working capital from year t-1 to year t, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
SIZE = log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTB = market-to-book ratio at end of year t. 
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Panel B of Table 5.2 provides regression results of the change in future cash flow from 
operations on reversals. Consistent with Panel A, reversal recognition by earnings managers, 
REV, is negatively associated with future changes in cash flows. β1 is negative and significant 
at the 1% level, suggesting that the reversal recognition by earnings managers does not reflect 
assets value changes, and, to some extent, is opportunistic.  
 
Conversely, the sum of β1 + β2 is significantly positive at the 1% level, indicating that the 
recovery of fixed asset impairment in reversal non-managers of earnings firms generates 
positive increments in cash flow from operations one year ahead. Furthermore, the coefficient 
on D*REV, β2, is also significantly positive. This finding indicates that the effect of reversals 
by non-managers of earnings on the future increase in cash flow is significantly different 
from earnings managers. While earnings managers recognise reversals opportunistically, non-
managers of earnings choose to report the reversal based on the recoverable amount, as 
reflected by the economic conditions. Regarding the control variables, changes in cash flows 
in the reversal year (∆CFO) are significantly and negatively associated with future changes in 
cash flows (at the 1% level), while SIZE is positively associated with change in future cash 
flow from operations. Change in working capital and MTB display insignificant associations.  
 
5.2.2.2  Future operating income 
 
The third measure of future profitability is net operating income, calculated as the net income 
reported in the income statement before depreciation and amortisation, reversal of 
impairment loss and abnormal working capital accruals (DeFond & Park, 2001). Similarly to 
Equation 3-1A and Equation 3-2A, Equations 3-3A and 3-4A estimate that the reversal of an 
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impairment loss by non-managers of earnings is positively associated with the one-year-
ahead operating income.  
 
Table 5.3 presents the results of the estimation. Consistent with Table 5.2, the coefficient on 
reversal, REV, in Panel A (Panel B) is negative and significant at the 1% (10%) level, 
indicating that earnings managers recognise reversals opportunistically. This result 
demonstrates that future operating income is reducing when the reversals recognised by 
earnings managers are increasing.  
 
Table 5.3 also provides evidence that the reversals recorded by non-managers of earnings 
explain future profitability measured as net operating income. The sum of β1 + β2 in Panel A 
(Panel B) is positive and significant at the 5% (10%) level. As predicted, the coefficient on 
the interaction between REV and dummy variables (D=1 for non-managers of earnings), β2, 
in both panels, are significantly positive. This suggests that the effect of reversals reported by 
non-managers of earnings on future operating income is significantly in the opposite 
direction, compared to the earnings managers. These findings corroborate those detailed in 
Table 5.2, indicating that reversal firms with lower abnormal working capital accruals report 
reversal recognition, as stipulated under FRS 136, Impairment of Assets. 
 
Regarding the control variables, as predicted, the operating income in Panel A and the change 
in operating income in Panel B, in the reversal year, are significantly associated with 
subsequent one-year operating income and the change in future operating income, 
respectively. The other regressors, SIZE and MTB, in Panel A and Panel B, are not 
significantly related to one-year-ahead operating income. 
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Table 5.3: Relationship between impairment loss reversals and future operating income, 
moderated by incentives to manage earnings using abnormal working capital accruals 
Panel A: Dependent variable is future operating income 
OPIN*t+1= α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3OPINt + β4SIZEt + β5MTBt +  εt            (3-3A) 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
D 
REV 
D*REV 
OPINt 
SIZE 
MTB 
N 
R
2 
F-statistic 
p-value (F-statistic) 
β1 + β2  
 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
-0.1034 
-0.0497 
-3.0601 
-3.9774 
-0.9065 
-0.0083 
-0.0164 
128 
0.3490 
30.21 
-0.0000 
0.9173 
          -0.70 
          -1.70 
          -3.54 
          -2.61 
    5.37 
          -1.07 
    1.22 
0.485 
0.098 
0.001 
0.010 
0.000 
0.287 
0.224 
 
 
 
 
0.010 
Panel B: Dependent variable is change in future operating income 
∆OPIN*t+1= α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3∆OPINt + β4SIZEt + β5MTBt +  εt          (3-4A) 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
D 
REV 
D*REV 
∆OPINt 
SIZE 
MTB 
N 
R
2 
F-statistic 
p-value (F-statistic) 
β1 + β2  
 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
-0.2548 
-0.1352 
-6.5221 
-7.1281 
-0.6582 
-0.0233 
-0.0415 
128 
-0.3021 
30.21 
-0.0000 
0.6060 
          -1.55 
          -2.02 
          -1.93 
          -1.92 
          -4.01 
          -1.71 
    2.59 
0.124 
0.045 
0.055 
0.057 
0.000 
0.090 
0.010 
 
 
 
 
0.064 
 
Variable definitions: 
OPIN*t+1= operating income before depreciation and amortisation expenses, reversal amount  
and AWCA in year t+1, divided by total assets at end of year t;  
∆OPIN*t+1= change in operating income before depreciation and amortisation expenses, 
reversal amount  and AWCA from year t to year t+1, divided by total assets at end of year t;  
D is equal to one for reversal firms in the middle 40% of abnormal working capital accruals 
measured using DeFond and Park’s 2001 (non-managers of earnings) model; and equal to 
zero for reversal firms in the top 30% of abnormal working capital accruals (earnings 
managers); 
REV= reversal amount, scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
OPINt= operating income before reversal in year t, divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆OPINt= change in operating income before reversal from year t-1 to year t, divided by total 
assets at end of year t; 
SIZE= log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTB= market-to-book ratio at end of year t. 
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To sum up, the association between the recognition of reversal gains and future profitability 
measured as one-year-ahead cash flow from operations and operating income is conditional 
on the level of abnormal accruals, measured using DeFond and Park’s model. Non-managers 
of earnings report reversals which explain future profitability, which is in contrast to the 
reversals of impairment recognised by earnings managers. Thus, the findings are consistent 
with the findings presented in Table 5.2, in terms of suggesting that reversal firms which are 
less likely to manage earnings report reversals in their financial statements that predict the 
future profitability of the firms. Thus, the findings provide additional evidence that the 
reversal information provided by non-managers of earnings reflects the underlying economic 
condition. 
 
In this study, reversal firms with extreme abnormal working capital accruals are regarded as 
earning managers. Abnormal working capital accruals are earnings management measures 
which attempt to capture the amount of working capital accruals that are unlikely to be 
sustained, and therefore are expected to reverse against future earnings. Thus, the income-
increasing effect of the abnormal accruals is later offset by the income-decreasing effect of 
the reversal. The results in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 reveal that the REV of earnings managers is 
negatively associated with future performance. That is, the higher the REV, the lower the 
future performance. Because abnormal accruals in the reversal year reverse in the subsequent 
year, and consequently reduce the reported earnings, the relationship between abnormal 
accruals in the reversal year and future performance is negative. If firms use abnormal 
working capital accruals to increase earnings, they may also use reversals which are also 
income-increasing accruals. Therefore, the negative relationship between REV and future 
performance observed in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 is justified. In addition, the unjustified increased 
REV will also artificially increase the total assets of the earnings managers, and will 
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consequently reduce the future performance, which is scaled by the artificially increased total 
assets. 
 
On the other hand, non-managers of earnings with average abnormal accruals, or the lowest 
in terms of absolute abnormal accruals, report the reversals because the performance of their 
assets is improved, and generate higher income in future. That is, the higher the REV (which 
means the greater the recovery to their assets), the higher the income generated from the use 
of the assets. Thus, the positive relationship between REV and the future performance of the 
non-managers of earnings is justified. 
 
5.2.3    Multivariate analysis: reversal of impairment losses, stock market returns and 
incentives to manage earnings 
 
This section reports the findings on the value relevance of reversal reporting for investors. 
Equation 3-5A is used to estimate the relationship between impairment reversals and 
contemporaneous control group-adjusted return measured for a 12-month period, beginning 8 
months before the financial year end and ending 4 months after the financial year. This model 
hypothesises that reversal recognition by firms that are less likely to manage earnings (non-
managers of earnings) is more value-relevant for investors in assessing the firm value than 
the reversals reported by firms with extreme abnormal working capital accruals. The 
regression is estimated by including the interaction term to differentiate between the value 
relevance of reversals reported by earnings managers and non-managers of earnings. The 
sample to test this estimation comprises 53 reversal earnings managers and 72 reversal non-
managers of earnings.
15
 
                                                 
15
 The sample selection for the estimation of Equation 3-5A is explained detail in Chapter 3. 
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Table 5.4: Abnormal stock returns, reversal of impairment losses and incentives to 
manage earnings using abnormal working capital accruals 
AbReturnt   =  γ0 + D + γ1REV’t + γ2D*REV’t + γ3NIt + γ4BTMt +  ut    (3-5A) 
Variables Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept  0.1929 1.54 0.126 
D ? -0.3438 -2.68 0.008 
REV’ + -0.6693 -0.30 0.763 
D*REV’ 
NI 
+ 
+ 
11.042 
1.3999 
4.04 
4.13 
0.000 
0.000 
BTM + -0.0604 -1.69 0.101 
R
2
  0.1796   
F-statistic  7.93   
p-value (F-statistic)  0.000   
N  250   
β1+ β2  10.372  0.000 
 
Variable definitions: 
AbReturnt = control group-adjusted returns beginning eight months before the financial 
year-end and ending four months after the financial year-end;  
REV’t= reversal amount, scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1; 
NIt = net income before reversal in year t, scaled by market value of equity at the end of year 
t-1; 
BTMt = book-to-market value of equity at the end of year t-1; 
D is equals to one for reversal firms in the middle 40% of abnormal working capital accruals, 
measured using DeFond and Park’s 2001 (non-managers of earnings) model; and equal to 
zero for reversal firms in the top 30% of abnormal working capital accruals (earnings 
managers); 
D*REV’ = interaction term of variables D and REV’. 
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Table 5.4 presents the results from the estimation of Equation 3-5A. As illustrated in the 
table, reversals reported by earnings managers are insignificantly associated with abnormal 
return, indicating that the reversal of impairment by earnings managers is irrelevant in stock 
valuation: the coefficient on REV’ is negative but insignificant. As predicted, the coefficient 
on D*REV’ is positive and significant at the 1% level. This result suggests that, compared to 
earnings managers, the reversals reported by non-managers of earnings have a stronger 
association with abnormal returns. In other words, reversals recognised by non-managers of 
earnings are more value-relevant to investors, compared to reversal information provided by 
earnings managers. Furthermore, the sum of the coefficients of REV’ and D*REV’ is 
significantly positive, indicating that the reversal information provided by non-managers of 
earnings is value-relevant to investors. As predicted, the coefficient on NI is significantly 
positive, indicating that net income before reversal is value-relevant in stock valuation. The 
other regressor, BTM, is insignificantly associated with stock return. 
 
To sum up, the result in Table 5.4 indicates that the association between reversals and stock 
returns is stronger for non-managers of earnings, which supports the hypothesis that reversals 
reported by firms with less incentives to manage earnings are informative. The market 
perceives that the reversal information is reliable, and signals the future performance of the 
firms. Thus, this finding provides further evidence to support the view that reversal firms 
with less incentive to manage earnings report the recovery of impaired non-current assets as a 
result of their improved economic circumstances.  
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5.3  Robustness checks 
 
5.3.1  Regression - clustered standard errors 
 
This study also assesses the sensitivity of the regression results presented in this chapter. 
Similarly to the robustness check in Chapter 4, one potential concern with the analysis is the 
multiple observations in the sample firms. To assess the potential of residuals autocorrelation, 
the regressions of Equations 3-1A to 3-5A are re-estimated by clustering the standard errors 
at the firm level. The results of this sensitivity test are reported in Appendices E to I. 
Qualitatively, the results of the sensitivity test for Equations 3-1A and 3-2A are similar to 
those reported in Table 5.2. The explanatory power of both models and the coefficients of all 
variables are similar to the primary results. REV is still negatively associated with one-year-
ahead cash flow from operations, while the interaction term, D*REV, is still positively 
associated with future cash flows for both models. Thus, the results in Table 5.2 hold, and are 
robust in relation to the multiple observations in the sample firms. 
 
The result of the sensitivity test for Equations 3-3A to 3-5A are reported in Appendices G to 
I. Qualitatively, the results are unchanged. The explanatory power of the model and the 
coefficients of all variables are similar to the primary results. For Equations 3-3A and 3-4A, 
REV is still negatively associated with one-year-ahead operating income, and the interaction 
term, D*REV, is still positively associated with future operating income. Interestingly, for 
Equation 3-3A, the significant level (p-value) of the relationship between D*REV and future 
operating income increases from 5% to 1% (0.010 to 0.008). Thus, the result in Table 5.3 is 
robust in relation to the multiple observations in the sample firms. Similarly, for Equation 3-
5A, the result holds after clustering the standard errors at the firm level. Overall, all the 
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results from the estimations of Equations 3-1A to 3-5A are robust in relation to the multiple 
observations in the reversals sample. 
 
5.3.2  Considering the effect of the beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss 
(BACC) 
 
Equations 3-1A to 3-5A are constructed without considering the effects of previous 
impairment recognition. Differences in differences analysis demonstrates that the relative 
beginning balance of accumulated impairment losses is higher among reversal earnings 
managers’ firms. This study conducts additional tests regarding the relationship between 
impairment reversals and future performance by controlling the effect of the beginning 
balance of accumulated impairment losses, BACC. The number of observations in the sample 
is reduced to 108 (107 for Equation 3-5A), as the amounts of the beginning balance of 
accumulated impairment losses in relation to 20 reversals are not available in the annual 
reports. The result is presented in Appendix J. 
 
As demonstrated in Appendix J, BACC does not affect the relationship between reversals and 
future performance. The size of the beginning balance of accumulated impairment losses 
does not explain future performance either. The coefficients on reversals, REV, in relation to 
four operating performance measures, are significantly negative. Similar to the main results, 
the coefficients on D*REV are positive and significant. The results in relation to all other 
variables, CFO, ∆CFO, OPIN, ∆OPIN, SIZE and MTB, are unchanged.  
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5.3.3 Alternative definition for non-managers of earnings 
 
In this chapter, the first measure to differentiate between reversal firms that are likely to 
manage earnings and those that are not is abnormal working capital accruals. All reversal 
firms in the top 30% of AWCA are regarded as potential earnings managers, and those in the 
middle 40% of AWCA as non-managers of earnings. As an alternative definition/measure for 
non-managers of earnings, all reversal firms in the bottom 30% of AWCA are regarded as 
potential non-managers of earnings. The reason underlying this measure is that the firms in 
the bottom 30% of AWCA are reversal firms that are managing earnings downward, while 
reversal recognition is an accounting recognition that increases earnings. Thus, reversal 
recognition is not related to the earnings management used to reduce earnings.  
 
The difference in the differences test between reversal earnings managers, reversal non-
managers of earnings and their respective control firms is repeated by redefining the non-
managers of earnings as those reversal firms in the bottom 30% of AWCA. The sample size 
is reduced to 110 (94 for BACC, and 106 for AbReturn). The results of the test are presented 
in Appendix K. Qualitatively, the comparison between earnings managers and non-managers 
of earnings shows similar results, where non-managers of earnings outperform the earnings 
managers. The results show that, relative to control firms, the adjusted ROE and current CFO 
of non-managers of earnings are higher than those reported by earnings managers. However, 
as compared to the primary measure of non-managers of earnings, BACC and OPIN do 
demonstrate significant differences between both subsamples. Regressions of Equations 3-1A 
to 3-5A are also repeated using the alternative measure for non-managers of earnings, and the 
results are reported in Appendices L to N. The results are qualitatively similar to those 
reported using the primary measure for non-managers of earnings. In summary, the 
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combination of results from the main test and robustness test suggests that the reversal firms 
with extreme abnormal working capital accruals are more likely to report the reversals 
opportunistically, and that the others report the reversals that reflect the underlying economic 
transactions. 
 
5.4  Summary 
 
This chapter provided additional findings to answer the research question: Does the reversal 
of impairment loss reporting in Malaysia portray the reality of economic performance, or is it 
associated with opportunistic earnings management behaviour?  
 
In Chapter 4, the univariate and multivariate analyses were performed using the full matched 
sample and the control sample. In univariate analysis, the results demonstrate that reversal 
firms outperform the control group. In this chapter, after separating reversal firms into two 
subsamples (i.e. earnings managers and non-managers of earnings, defined based on the level 
of abnormal working capital accruals), the difference in differences analysis illustrates that, 
relative to the control group, non-managers of earnings perform much better, and generate 
higher operating cash flows and operating income compared to reversal earnings managers. 
 
In multivariate analysis, the results in Chapter 4 reveal that, in general, the reversals are 
priced by the Malaysian market, but no association is found between reversals and future firm 
performance. To explore this inconsistency, all models in Chapter 4 are re-estimated by 
differentiating the reversals reported by earnings managers and non-managers of earnings. 
Based on those estimations, this chapter presents interesting findings to answer the research 
question. 
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Equations 3-1A to 3-4A, which predict the relationship between reversal and future 
performance, provide evidence that reversal recognition by firms without incentives to 
manage earnings upward (as indicated by lower absolute value of abnormal working capital 
accruals) is significantly and positively associated with future profitability, measured by one-
year-ahead cash flow from operations, one-year ahead change in cash flow from operations, 
one-year-ahead operating income and one-year-ahead change in operating income. This result 
provides strong evidence that reversal recognition by reversal non-managers of earnings 
reflects changes in asset value that are realised in the subsequent financial year. In contrast, 
reversal recognition by firms with higher abnormal working capital accruals is significantly 
and negatively associated with future performance, indicating that the accrual reporting is, to 
some extent, opportunistic.  
 
In the market-based test, Equation 3-5A estimates the relationship between reversals and 12-
month stock returns, where reversals, REV, interact with the dummy variable to differentiate 
between true reporting and opportunistic reporting. The regression result provides further 
supporting evidence. In particular, the finding demonstrates that the reversals reported by 
earnings managers are not value-relevant. In contrast, the reversals reported by non-managers 
of earnings are positively associated with stock returns, and this association is stronger 
compared to the association for earnings managers. This finding corroborates those findings 
in accounting performance tests, suggesting that firms have lesser tendency to manage 
earnings report reversals as stipulated under FRS 136.  
 
Before the final section, the robustness tests are also performed for all results presented in 
this chapter, and the results are qualitatively unchanged. 
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CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH FINDINGS ON THE REVERSAL OF IMPAIRMENT 
LOSSES, EARNINGS DECLINES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 present findings from analysing the associations between reversals, firm 
performance and incentives to manage earnings. Chapter 4 provides evidence that, in general, 
the reversals reported by Malaysian firms reflect the economic reality of the firms. In further 
analysis, detailed in Chapter 5, this study finds that the reporting incentives influence the 
association between reversals and firm performance. The reversals reported by firms with 
relatively low abnormal working capital accruals are associated with firm performance. In 
contrast, the association between reversals reported by firms with high abnormal working 
capital accruals and future firm performance is negative, and no association is found in 
market-based tests.  
 
To provide further evidence that the level of abnormal working capital accruals influences the 
reversals reporting, this section presents findings regarding the association between reversals, 
abnormal working capital accruals and another earnings management indicator; i.e. incentives 
to avoid earnings declines. This chapter also provides evidence related to the influence of 
corporate governance on reversal reporting. The data analyses are based on the research 
method explained in Section 3.6. Section 6.2 presents the descriptive statistics and univariate 
analysis. Section 6.3 illustrates and discusses the findings from the regression analysis. The 
last section summarises the chapter. 
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6.2 Univariate analysis: frequency and magnitude analysis of pre-reversal earnings 
declines  
 
As explained in Chapter 3, this study examines whether reversals are associated with other 
earnings management indicators; i.e. incentives to avoid earnings declines. This chapter 
presents empirical evidence regarding the association between reversals and incentives to 
avoid earnings declines. The relationship between reversals to avoid earnings declines and 
AWCA is also examined. The first step is to analyse the frequency and magnitude of pre-
reversal earnings declines. 
 
The results of the univariate analysis of pre-reversal earnings declines reported by reversal 
firms and control firms appear in Table 6.1. As explained in Chapter 3, pre-reversal earnings 
declines occur when NIt - REV - NIt-1 is less than zero. Panel A presents the frequency of pre-
reversal earnings declines of reversal firms and control firms. Table 6.1, Panel A, illustrates 
that 63 (34.6%) reversal observations report pre-reversal earnings declines, and 78 (42.9%) 
non-reversal observations report the declines. However, the difference is not significant.  
 
Panel B of Table 6.1 presents the magnitude analysis of pre-reversal earnings declines 
between reversal firms and control firms. NIt-REV-NIt-1 refers to the earnings change relative 
to the prior year. The difference in NIt-REV-NIt-1 between reversal firms and control firms 
indicates which group performs better in the reversal year. NIt-REV-NIt-1 < 0 is the earnings 
declines measure. The comparison is made to establish which group reports greater earnings 
declines. Both measures are constructed to examine the performance of both groups (reversal 
firms and control firms) without reversals.  
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Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics: Reversal firms and pre-reversal earnings declines 
 
 
Reversal firms Control firms p-value 
Panel A:Frequency analysis of earnings declines  
 Number % Number % Diff in 
proportion 
Number of firm-years examined 182 100.0 182 100.0  
Numbers and percentage of 
firm-years in which a pre-
reversal earnings decline occurs 
63 34.6 78 42.9 0.12 
Number and percentage of firm-
years with a post-reversal 
earnings decline 
59 32.4 NA NA  
Panel B:Magnitude of earnings declines  
 Mean 
(Median) 
Mean 
(Median) 
Diff in mean 
(Diff in 
median) 
NIt-REV-NIt-1 0.0148 
(0.0128) 
-0.0027 
(0.0052) 
0.011 
(0.024) 
NIt-REV-NIt-1 < 0 -0.0396 
(-0.0258) 
-0.0564 
(-0.0432) 
0.047 
(0.075) 
Differences (diff) in proportions, means and medians are tested using a two-tailed proportion 
test, a t-test and a Mann Whitney test, respectively.  
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As illustrated in the table, pre-reversal earnings changes relative to the prior year, NIt-REV-
NIt-1, of the reversal firms are significantly higher than the earnings change of the control 
firms. The mean (median) of the pre-reversal earnings changes for reversal firms is 0.0148 
(0.0128), and -0.0027 (0.0052) for the control firms. Both differences in means and medians 
are significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, pre-reversal earnings declines, NIt-REV-NIt-1 < 
0, reported by the reversal firms, are significantly smaller than reported by the control firms. 
The mean (median) of pre-reversals earnings declines is -0.0396 (-0.0258) for reversal firms, 
and -0.0564 (-0.0432) for control firms. The differences in mean and median are significant 
at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Overall, the frequency and magnitude analysis in Table 6.1 provides evidence that reversal 
firms perform better than the control firms. The magnitude of pre-reversal earnings change 
and pre-reversal net income are significantly larger for reversal firms, while their magnitude 
of pre-reversal earnings declines is significantly smaller than the control firms. 
 
These findings indicate that reversal firms report the reversals for economic reasons. The 
reported income and income change before reversals are higher for reversal firms, indicating 
that reversal firms outperform the control firms. The positive income and income changes 
indicate that the value of operating assets has increased from the previous impairment. In 
contrast, the control firms continue to record lower income compared to reversal firms, 
because such recovery did not occur in their firms. The results are also consistent with the 
findings in Chapter 4, in terms of suggesting that Malaysian firms, in general, report the 
reversals to portray the reality of economic situations of the firms. In Chapter 4, it is revealed 
that the performance in the reversal year of reversal firms is better than that of control firms, 
and it is supported by positive market reaction to the reversal information. This chapter 
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provides additional supporting evidence that reversal firms report higher pre-reversal 
earnings change, compared to the control firms. 
 
This study further investigates the difference of frequency and magnitude of earnings 
declines between firms that are likely to manage earnings (namely earnings managers) and 
their counterparts (namely non-managers of earnings), as defined and analysed in Chapter 5. 
The chapter provides empirical evidence that the earnings managers report the reversals 
opportunistically. To provide additional evidence that reversals reported by earnings 
managers are not realistic, this section compares the performance (earnings changes) between 
both subsamples. Table 6.2 presents findings regarding the frequency and magnitude analysis 
of pre-reversal earnings declines reported by earnings managers and non-managers of 
earnings. The definitions of earnings managers and non-managers of earnings are as defined 
in Chapter 3 (i.e. reversal earnings managers are those reversal firms in the top 30% of 
AWCA, while the middle 40% are non-managers of earnings).  
 
Panel A, Table 6.2, demonstrates that a greater proportion of reversals earnings managers 
have pre-reversal earnings declines than those reversal non-managers of earnings. 43.7% of 
reversal earnings managers report pre-reversal earnings declines, and only 26% of non-
managers of earnings report the declines. The difference is significant at the 5% level. This 
result suggests that earnings management to avoid earnings declines is a motivation for some 
reversal firms. The comparison of the difference in magnitude of pre-reversal earnings 
declines between both groups in Panel B of Table 6.2 is also significant at the 10% level. The 
magnitude of pre-reversal earnings declines of earnings managers (-0.0489) is significantly 
larger than the declines reported by non-managers of earnings (-0.0275).  
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Table 6.2: Reversal earnings managers
a
, reversal non-managers of earnings
b
 and 
earnings declines 
 Reversal earnings 
managers 
Reversal non-
managers of 
earnings p-value 
Panel A: Frequency analysis of earnings declines  
 Number % Number % Diff in 
proportion 
 
Number of firm-years examined 55 100.0 73 100.0  
Numbers and percentage of 
firm-years in which a pre-
reversal earnings decline occurs 
26 47.3 19 26.0 0.012 
Number and percentage of firm-
years with post-reversal 
earnings decline 
24 43.7 18 24.6 0.023 
Panel B: Magnitude of earnings declines  
 Mean 
(Median) 
Mean 
(Median) 
Diff in mean 
(Diff in 
median) 
NIt-REV-NIt-1 < 0 -0.0489 
(-0.0303) 
-0.0275 
(-0.0185) 
0.06 
(0.09) 
Differences (diff) in proportion, mean and median are tested using a two-tailed proportion 
test, a t-test and a Mann Whitney test, respectively. 
a
Reversal earnings managers are reversal firms in the top 30%, in terms of AWCA. 
b
Reversal non-managers of earnings are reversal firms in the middle 40%, in terms of 
AWCA. 
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In summary, the findings from the frequency and magnitude analysis of earnings declines 
between earnings managers and non-managers of earnings provide evidence that earnings 
managers measured using AWCA perform worse compared to non-managers of earnings. 
The number of firms with pre-reversal earnings decline is significantly larger for earnings 
managers than non-managers of earnings. The magnitude of pre-reversal earnings declines of 
the earnings managers is also significantly larger than non-managers of earnings. These 
findings show that earnings managers are more likely to use reversals to avoid earnings 
declines. This finding corroborates the findings in Chapter 5, that earnings managers 
measured based on the level of AWCA report the reversals opportunistically.   
 
6.3 Multivariate analysis: reversal of impairment losses and incentives to avoid 
earnings declines 
 
This section presents findings concerning the association between reversals and incentives to 
avoid earnings declines. Chapter 5 provides evidence that some reversal firms reverse the 
accumulated impairment loss opportunistically. These firms are firms with high positive 
AWCA in reversal year. This chapter links reversal with other earnings management 
measures, to ensure the reliability of AWCA in measuring earnings management. In addition, 
this test also provides additional evidence that there are some firms which reverse the 
reversals for economic reasons, and that others record the reversals to manage earnings. To 
test the relationship, Equations 3-6 to 3-11 are developed. The impact of corporate 
governance, accumulated impairment, leverage and CEO change on reversal reporting are 
examined. Table 6.3, Panel A, presents the descriptive statistics, while Panel B presents the 
correlation matrix of all regression variables related to Equations 3-6 to 3-11.  
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Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for regression variables, n=364. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Median SD Min Max Skew Kurtos 
Dependent variables     
REV 0.0037 0.0012 0.0057 0.0000 0.0271 2.7461 7.8388 
Independent variables     
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 
AWCA 
BACC
a 
CG 
0.0059 
-0.0011 
0.0196 
1.7127 
0.0067 
0.0002 
0.0059 
2.0000 
0.0653 
0.0969 
0.0299 
0.8223 
-0.1844 
-0.2660 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1988 
0.2616 
0.1066 
3.0000 
-0.0867 
-0.1055 
1.9203 
0.3355 
2.3290 
1.5585 
5.4382 
-1.0319 
SIZE 19.4604 19.342 1.3951 16.372 22.545 0.1781 -0.3543 
MTB 0.9680 0.6800 0.9503 0.1100 5.8900 3.1793 12.329 
LEV 0.4403 0.4510 0.1835 0.0656 0.8186 0.0365 -0.6950 
CEO 0.1823 0.0000 0.3866 0.0000 1.0000 1.6524 0.7345 
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
 NIt - REVt 
- NIt-1 
 
AWCA SIZE MTB LEV CEO CG BACC 
NIt - REVt - 
NIt-1 
 
1.0000        
AWCA 0.0541 
(0.3046) 
1.0000       
SIZE -0.0811 
(0.1237) 
-0.0652 
(0.2161) 
1.0000      
MTB 0.1034 
(0.0493) 
0.0521 
(0.3224) 
0.2450 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
LEV -0.0423 
(0.4229) 
0.0847 
(0.1074) 
0.0965 
(0.0667) 
0.1601 
(0.0022) 
1.0000    
CEO 0.0317 
(0.5481) 
0.0588 
(0.2648) 
-0.0235 
(0.6564) 
0.0887 
(0.0919) 
-0.0483 
(0.3598) 
1.0000   
CG -0.0464 
(0.3787) 
-0.0119 
(0.8214) 
0.0243 
(0.6445) 
-0.0229 
(0.6639) 
0.0462 
(0.3807) 
0.0432 
(0.4122) 
1.0000  
BACC 0.2107 
(0.002) 
0.0930 
(0.1005) 
-0.1545 
(0.0062) 
0.0595 
(0.2936) 
0.0616 
(0.2775) 
0.1706 
(0.0025) 
0.0248 
(0.6624) 
1.0000 
a
The sample size is 155 reversal observations and 155 control firms. The difference (54 reversal observations) is 
not traceable, as the firms combined accumulated impairment and accumulated depreciation into one account. 
All data are winsorised at three standard deviations from the mean. 
 
Variable definitions:  
REVt  = reversal amount, scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 = change in pre-reversal net income from year t-1 to year t, scaled by total assets at 
end of year t; 
AWCAt = abnormal working capital accruals (DeFond and Park, 2001) deflated by total assets at end 
of year t; 
BACCt = beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss in year t, deflated by total assets at end 
of year t; 
CGt = corporate governance index calculated as the board size (one point if the number of directors is 
between 5 and 11, and 0 otherwise) + audit committee independence (one point if the audit committee 
is comprised solely of independent outside directors, at least one of whom has financial expertise, and 
0 otherwise) + board independence (one point if the proportion of independent non-executive 
directors is more than 50%, and 0 otherwise); 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market-to-book ratio at end of year t; 
LEVt = total debts, scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CEOt is equal to 1 if firms change their chief executive officer/managing director in year t-1 or t-2. 
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6.3.1 Reversal of impairment losses, abnormal working capital accruals and incentives 
to avoid earnings declines 
 
This section further examines whether reversals are related to incentives, to avoid earnings 
declines. The analysis also examines the effects of AWCA on the relationship between 
reversals and earnings declines. The findings regarding the impact of effective corporate 
governance on the opportunistic reversal, to avoid earnings declines, are also presented. The 
sample size for the estimations is 182 reversal firms and 182 control firms.  
 
6.3.1.1   Abnormal working capital accruals and incentives to avoid earnings declines 
 
Equation 3-6 hypothesises that reversal firms with high AWCA are more likely to reverse the 
impairment losses to avoid earnings declines. Table 6.4 presents the Tobit regression results 
from the estimation of Equation 3-6. The table indicates that the coefficient on NIt-REVt-NIt-1 
is positive and significant at the 1% level. This result indicates that the positive change in net 
income relative to the prior year is positively associated with REV, suggesting that, overall, 
the reversals are reported for economic reasons. The positive increase in net income 
demonstrates that the operating assets are improved in generating profits to the firms. 
Therefore, the firms reverse the accumulated impairment. This result supports the result 
found in Chapter 4, suggesting that, in general, the reversals are recognised, as managers 
respond to the changes in economics condition of the firms.  
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Table 6.4: Tobit regression testing the relationship between impairment loss reversal, 
AWCA and incentives to avoid earnings declines  
 
REVt  = α + β1(NIt - REVt - NIt-1) + β2AWCAt  + β3(NIt - REVt - NIt-1)*AWCAt  + β4SIZEt + 
β5MTBt + β6LEVt  + β7CEOt +  εt               
(3-6) 
 
 Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 
AWCA 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 *AWCA 
SIZE 
MTB 
LEV 
CEO 
N 
Likelihood  Ratio 
p-value (Likelihood Ratio) 
 
+ 
+ 
- 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-0.0018 
0.0287 
0.0103 
-0.1080 
-0.0002 
0.0003 
0.0022 
0.0044 
364 
52.33 
0.000 
-0.21 
3.53 
1.81 
-4.43 
-0.39 
0.72 
0.60 
2.57 
0.838 
0.000 
0.071 
0.000 
0.689 
0.471 
0.551 
0.010 
 
 
 
Variable definitions:  
REVt  = reversal amount, scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 = change in pre-reversal net income from year t-1 to year t, scaled by total 
assets at end of year t; 
AWCAt = abnormal working capital accruals (DeFond and Park, 2001), deflated by total 
assets at end of year t; 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market-to-book ratio at end of year t; 
LEVt = total debts, scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CEOt is equal to one if the firm changes its chief executive officer/general manager in year t-
1 or t-2, and is equal to zero otherwise. 
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As expected, the coefficient on AWCA is positive and significant (at the 10% level). This 
result indicates that firms use AWCA, in addition to reversals, to manage earnings. The table 
also reveals that, as hypothesised, the coefficient on the interaction term, (NIt - REVt - NIt-
1)*AWCA, is negative and significant (at the 1% level). This finding indicates that firms with 
high AWCA are more likely to report the reversals to avoid earnings declines. Of the control 
variables, only change in senior management, CEO, is positively associated with REV, 
indicating that firms that have changed their senior management are more likely to report the 
reversals.  
 
The above findings are consistent with the predictions in Chapter 3. In general, this study 
finds that positive change in net income relative to the prior year is positively associated with 
reversals. This result suggests that, in general, the reversals reported portray the economic 
reality of the firms. Firms reverse the previously recognised impairment, as the operating 
assets are recovered or partly recovered. The recovery in operating assets results in the 
positive improvement of the operating assets in generating profits. The above findings also 
reveal that the reversals are related to abnormal accruals; that is, the specific accruals 
pertaining to the reversals of impairment losses is related to an aggregate measure of earnings 
management. As such, reversals may also be associated with earnings management. 
Reversals are positively associated with firm performance, in addition to earnings 
management. These results are consistent with the findings in Chapter 5, suggesting that 
some firms reverse the impairment for good reasons, and the others for earnings 
management. 
 
The main focus of this chapter is the association between reversals and incentives to avoid 
earnings declines. As predicted, this study finds that firms with high AWCA are associated 
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with opportunistic reversals reporting to avoid earnings declines. In other words, firms that 
are likely to manage earnings are more likely to reverse the impairment, to avoid earnings 
declines. This finding corroborates the findings in Chapter 5, suggesting that firms that are 
more likely to be earnings managers report reversals for private benefits. Consistent with 
Zhang et al. (2010), this study also reports that CEO change is associated with reversals 
reporting. Firms that change their CEO/general managers in the one or two years prior to the 
reversal year are more likely to reverse the impairment losses, probably to indicate that the 
successor is able to improve the firm performance. This association may also highlight that 
CEO change is associated with earnings management. Further examination is essential. 
 
6.3.1.2   Abnormal working capital accruals, incentives to avoid earnings declines and 
corporate governance 
 
The results from estimating Equation 3-6 indicate that reversal firms with high AWCA are 
more likely to reverse the impairment to avoid earnings declines. Equation 3-7 further 
examines whether such opportunistic behaviour among managers can be constrained by 
effective corporate governance practices. Table 6.5 reports the Tobit regression results after 
incorporating the corporate governance variable. Consistent with the results in Table 6.4, the 
coefficient on NIt - REVt - NIt-1*AWCA is negative and significant (at the 1% level), 
supporting the argument that high AWCA firms report the reversals to avoid earnings 
declines.  
 
 
 
 
169 
 
Table 6.5: Tobit regression testing the relationship between impairment loss reversal, 
AWCA, incentives to avoid earnings declines and corporate governance 
 
REVt  = α + β1(NIt - REVt - NIt-1) + β2AWCAt   +   β3(NIt - REVt - NIt-1)*AWCAt  +  
β4(NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1)*CGt  +  β5AWCAt *CGt  + β6(NIt - REVt - NIt-1)*AWCAt *CGt  + β7CGt  
+ β8SIZEt + β9MTBt + + β10LEVt   +  β11CEOt  +  εt               
(3-7) 
 
 Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 
AWCA 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 *AWCA 
NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1*CG 
AWCA*CG   
NIt - REVt - NIt-1*AWCA *CG   
CG 
SIZE 
MTB 
LEV 
CEO 
N 
Likelihood  Ratio 
p-value (Likelihood Ratio) 
 
+ 
+ 
- 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0.0006 
0.0088 
0.0077 
-0.2629 
0.0070 
0.0033 
0.4428 
0.0008 
-0.0003 
0.0005 
-0.0001 
0.0041 
364 
71.43 
0.000 
0.07 
0.39 
0.51 
-3.67 
0.58 
0.46 
4.73 
0.98 
-0.72 
1.12 
-0.02 
2.49 
0.944 
0.696 
0.608 
0.000 
0.561 
0.644 
0.000 
0.325 
0.472 
0.263 
0.985 
0.013 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable definitions:  
REVt  = reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 = change in pre-reversal net income from year t-1 to year t, scaled by total 
assets at end of year t; 
AWCAt = abnormal working capital accruals (DeFond and Park, 2001), deflated by total 
assets at end of year t; 
CGt = corporate governance index calculated as the board size (one point if the number of 
directors is between 5 and 11, and 0 otherwise) + audit committee independence (one point if 
the audit committee is comprised solely of independent outside directors, at least one of 
whom has financial expertise, and 0 otherwise) + board independence (one point if the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors is more than 50%, and 0 otherwise); 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market-to-book ratio at end of year t; 
LEVt = total debts, scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CEOt is equal to one if the firm changes its chief executive officer/general manager in year t-
1 or t-2, and zero otherwise. 
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As expected, the coefficient on the interaction term of NIt - REVt - NIt-1, AWCA and CG is 
positive and significant (at the 1% level). This result indicates that, while firms with high 
AWCA reverse the impairment to avoid earnings declines, such an association is weaker for 
firms with a strong governance mechanism. As such, consistent with the prediction, an 
effective corporate governance system helps in reducing opportunistic reversal recognition. 
Overall, the results show that effective monitoring mechanisms are crucial in deterring 
opportunistic reversal reporting. Again, consistent with the previous result, CEO change is 
positively associated with reversals. 
 
6.3.2 Reversal of impairment losses, accumulated impairment and incentives to avoid 
earnings declines 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, this study further examines whether reversal firms use 
accumulated impairment to manage earnings. This section provides the findings of the 
analysis. The evidence of the impact of corporate governance, debt level and CEO change are 
also presented. The sample size to test the hypothesis is 155 reversal firms and 155 control 
firms, and is again tested using Tobit regression analysis. 
 
6.3.2.1     Accumulated impairment and incentives to avoid earnings declines 
 
This section examines the association between reversals, incentives to avoid earnings 
declines and BACC, to establish whether reversal firms reverse the previously recognised 
impairment charges to avoid earnings declines. BACC is accumulated impairment since the 
acquisition of the assets, and represents available impairment at the beginning of the reversal 
year to be reversed by firms. The size of BACC may influence the decision of managers to 
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recognise the reversals. Furthermore, results in Chapter 4 also show that the BACC of 
reversal firms is significantly larger than the BACC of the control firms. Equation 3-8 
hypothesises that, while firms with a high BACC tend to reverse more than those with low 
BACC, this association is more pronounced for firms with pre-reversal earnings declines.  
 
Table 6.6 presents the results of the estimation of Equation 3-8. Consistent with the results of 
the estimation of Equation 3-6, the coefficient on NIt - REVt - NIt-1 is again positive and 
significant at the 5% level. As expected, the size of accumulated impairment is positively 
associated with reversals, indicating that, the larger the accumulated impairment losses, the 
greater the impairment subsequently reversed. Consistent with Duh et al. (2009), the 
coefficient on the interaction term of NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1 and BACC  is negative and significant 
at the 5% level. This result indicates that, while firms with larger accumulated impairment 
tend to reverse subsequently, this tendency is more pronounced for firms with a negative pre-
reversal earnings change. This finding provides strong evidence of the use of accumulated 
impairment losses to avoid earnings declines through reversals. The result may also suggest 
that the discretion provided under FRS 136 provides managers with an opportunity to manage 
earnings. 
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Table 6.6: Tobit regression testing the relationship between impairment loss reversal, 
BACC and incentives to avoid earnings declines  
 
REVt  = α + β1(NIt - REVt - NIt-1) + β2BACCt    +  β3(NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1)*BACCt  + β4SIZEt + 
β5MTBt + β6LEVt + β7CEOt  + εt               
(3-8) 
 
 Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 
BACC 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 *BACC 
SIZE 
MTB 
LEV 
CEO 
N 
Likelihood  Ratio 
p-value (Likelihood Ratio) 
 
+ 
+ 
- 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-0.0130 
0.0360 
0.1682 
-0.1721 
0.0004 
0.0001 
-0.0038 
0.0038 
310 
72.21 
0.000 
-1.33 
2.59 
6.99 
-2.57 
0.81 
0.24 
-0.93 
2.10 
0.183 
0.010 
0.000 
0.010 
0.418 
0.809 
0.353 
0.045 
 
 
 
 
Variable definitions:  
REVt  = reversal amount, scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 = change in pre-reversal net income from year t-1 to year t, scaled by total 
assets at end of year t; 
BACCt = beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss in year t, deflated by total assets 
at end of year t; 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market-to-book ratio at end of year t; 
LEVt = total debts, scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CEOt is equals to one if the firm changes its chief executive officer/general manager in year 
t-1 or t-2; and equal to zero otherwise. 
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6.3.2.2   Accumulated impairment, incentives to avoid earnings declines and corporate 
governance 
 
As corporate governance is viewed as being effective in curtailing the opportunistic 
behaviour of managers, this study further examines whether good corporate governance 
mitigates opportunistic reversal reporting, as reported in Table 6.6. The table shows that the 
tendency to reverse the BACC is more pronounced for firms with pre-reversal earnings 
declines. This section tests whether good monitoring practice could mitigate such 
opportunistic behaviour. Furthermore, Table 6.5 also illustrates that good governance helps to 
reduce the opportunistic behaviour of high AWCA firms to record the reversals in such a way 
as to avoid earnings declines. Therefore, Equation 3-9 is proposed to examine whether 
effective corporate governance constrains the reversal of BACC to avoid earnings declines.  
 
Table 6.7 reports the Tobit regression results regarding the influence of good governance on 
the incentives to avoid earnings declines through the reversal of accumulated impairment. 
The coefficient on the interaction term, NIt - REVt - NIt-1*BACC, is negative and significant 
(at the 1% level). The result confirms the finding in Table 6.6, suggesting that reversal firms 
reverse the accumulated impairment to avoid earnings declines. NIt - REVt - NIt-1*CG is 
positively associated with REV, indicating that the positive association between positive 
earnings change and reversals is stronger in firms with good corporate governance. That is, 
firms with good corporate governance report the reversals for economic reasons. This finding 
indicates that corporate governance encourages true reversal reporting. The table also shows 
that the positive association between REV and BACC is likely to occur in firms with good 
governance.  
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Table 6.7: Tobit regression testing the relationship between impairment loss reversal, 
BACC, incentives to avoid earnings declines and corporate governance 
 
REVt  = α + β1(NIt - REVt - NIt-1) + β2BACCt    +  β3(NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1)*BACCt  +  β4(NIt  - 
REVt  - NIt-1)*CGt  +  β5BACCt *CGt + β6(NIt - REVt - NIt-1)*BACCt *CGt + β7CGt  + β8SIZEt 
+ β9MTBt + β10LEVt + β11CEOt  + εt               
(3-9) 
 
 Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 
BACC 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 *BACC 
NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1*CG 
BACC*CG   
NIt - REVt - NIt-1*BACC *CG   
CG 
SIZE 
MTB 
LEV 
CEO 
N 
Likelihood  Ratio 
p-value (Likelihood Ratio) 
 
+ 
+ 
- 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-0.0136 
-0.0519 
-0.0325 
-1.4583 
0.0480 
0.0975 
2.4241 
-0.0007 
0.0005 
0.0001 
-0.0020 
0.0047 
310 
97.84 
0.000 
-1.46 
-1.58 
-0.51 
-4.50 
2.84 
3.22 
4.05 
-0.82 
1.04 
0.02 
-0.52 
2.62 
0.145 
0.115 
0.609 
0.000 
0.005 
0.001 
0.000 
0.412 
0.297 
0.980 
0.604 
0.009 
 
 
 
 
Variable definitions:  
REVt  = reversal amount, scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 = change in pre-reversal net income from year t-1 to year t, scaled by total 
assets at end of year t; 
BACCt = beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss in year t, deflated by total assets 
at end of year t; 
CGt = corporate governance index calculated as the board size (one point if the number of 
directors is between 5 and 11, and 0 otherwise) + audit committee independence (one point if 
the audit committee is comprised solely of independent outside directors, at least one of 
whom has financial expertise, and 0 otherwise) + board independence (one point if the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors is more than 50%, and 0 otherwise); 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market-to-book ratio at end of year t; 
LEVt = total debts, scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CEOt is equal to one if the firm changes its chief executive officer/general manager in year t-
1 or t-2, and zero otherwise. 
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Consistent with the results presented in Table 6.5, this study finds that the tendency of 
reversal firms to reverse the accumulated impairment to avoid earnings declines is moderated 
by corporate governance. As revealed in Table 6.7, the interaction term, NIt - REVt - NIt-
1*BACC*CG, is positively associated with REV, and the association is significant at the 1% 
level. This indicates that good governance plays role in curtailing earnings management using 
reversals. In other words, this finding suggests that, while managers reverse the accumulated 
impairment to avoid earnings declines, effective monitoring mechanisms will mitigate such 
behaviour.  
 
Overall, the findings are consistent with prior studies suggesting that effective corporate 
monitoring mitigates the opportunistic behaviour of managers. This study finds that reversal 
firms reverse the accumulated impairment to avoid earnings declines. However, when the 
corporate governance mechanism is tested in the relationship, this study finds that the 
relationship is moderated by effective corporate governance. Again, change in senior 
management, CEO, is positively associated with reversals. 
 
6.3.2.3 Accumulated impairment, incentives to avoid earnings declines and debt 
covenant 
 
As explained in Chapter 3, Equation 3-10 is developed to test whether a debt covenant is a 
potential motive for firms to reverse the BACC. The model examines whether firms with a 
high leverage ratio tend to reverse the BACC to avoid earnings declines. Firms with a high 
leverage ratio have the tendency to increase earnings when companies approach debt 
covenant violation point (Sweeney, 1994).  
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Table 6.8: Tobit regression testing the relationship between impairment loss reversal, 
BACC, incentives to avoid earnings declines and debt covenant 
 
REVt  = α + β1(NIt - REVt - NIt-1) + β2BACCt    +  β3(NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1)*BACCt  +  β4(NIt  - 
REVt  - NIt-1)*LEVt  +  β5BACCt *LEVt + β6(NIt - REVt - NIt-1)*BACCt *LEVt + β7SIZEt + 
β8MTBt + β9LEVt + β10CEOt  + εt               
(3-10) 
 
 Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 
BACC 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 *BACC 
NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1*LEV 
BACC*LEV   
NIt - REVt - NIt-1*BACC *LEV  
SIZE 
MTB 
LEV 
CEO 
N 
Likelihood  Ratio 
p-value (Likelihood Ratio) 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
- 
? 
- 
+ 
+ 
 
-0.0123 
0.0262 
0.3237 
4.7096 
0.0095 
-0.3338 
-2.4668 
0.0004 
0.0001 
-0.0026 
0.0036 
310 
105.85 
0.000 
-1.35 
0.84 
4.43 
4.06 
0.15 
-2.36 
-4.38 
0.82 
0.21 
-0.61 
2.15 
 
0.177 
0.404 
0.000 
0.000 
0.883 
0.019 
0.000 
0.412 
0.832 
0.544 
0.032 
 
 
 
Variable definitions:  
REVt  = reversal amount, scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 = change in pre-reversal net income from year t-1 to year t, scaled by total 
assets at end of year t; 
BACCt = beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss in year t, deflated by total assets 
at end of year t; 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market-to-book ratio at end of year t; 
LEVt = total debts, scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CEOt is equal to one if the firm changes its chief executive officer/general manager in year t-
1 or t-2; and equal to zero otherwise. 
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Table 6.8 reports the Tobit regression results analysing the impact of the leverage ratio on the 
relationship between reversal to avoid earnings declines and accumulated impairment. BACC 
and interaction term of BACC and NIt-REVt-NIt-1 are, again, positively associated with REV.  
 
Consistent with the literature suggesting that high debt ratio is associated with earnings 
management (Sweeney, 1994; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994), this study finds that firms with 
high debt ratios are more likely to reverse the accumulated impairment to avoid earnings 
declines. As revealed in the table, the coefficient on the interaction term of NIt - REVt - NIt-1, 
BACC and LEV is negative and significant at the 1% level. This result indicates that, while 
reversal firms reverse the accumulated impairment to avoid earnings declines, this association 
is more pronounced for firms with high leverage ratios. In other words, high leverage reversal 
firms are more likely to reverse the accumulated impairment to avoid earnings declines, 
perhaps because of debt covenants. That is, managers use reversal of impairment losses to 
increase earnings when firms approach debt-covenant constraints. In the regression results, 
this study again reports that the CEO is positively associated with REV. Overall, the finding 
from the estimation of Equation 3-10 provides evidence consistent with the proposition that 
firms with a high leverage ratio use earnings management to avoid violating debt-covenant 
constraints. 
 
6.3.2.4    Accumulated impairment, incentives to avoid earnings declines and CEO 
change 
 
The findings from the estimation of Equations 3-6 to 3-10 report that change in senior 
management, CEO, is consistently and positively associated with reversals. That is, firms that 
change their senior management are more likely to report the reversals in their financial 
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statements in subsequent years. This result highlights that firms that change their 
management one or two years prior to the reversal year are engaged in opportunistic reversal 
recognition. Accordingly, Equation 3-11 is estimated to examine whether firms that change 
their CEO or managing director before the reversal year have a tendency to reverse the 
BACC to avoid earnings declines. This test provides direct evidence that the recently 
appointed management may engage in earnings management.  
 
The findings from the estimation of Equation 3-11 are presented in Table 6.9. The table 
presents the Tobit regression results of estimating the relationship between reversals to avoid 
earnings declines, BACC and CEO change. As revealed in the table, change in net income 
relative to the prior year, NIt - REVt - NIt-1, is positively associated with REV, suggesting 
that, in general, REV is reported to reflect the current economic condition of the firms. This 
finding is similar to those in Tables 6.4 and 6.9. Similarly, consistent with the results in 
Tables 6.6 and 6.8, BACC is positively related to REV. As depicted in Table 6.9, the 
coefficient on the interaction term of BACC and CEO is positive and significant (at the 1% 
level). This result indicates that firms which had changed their management one or two years 
previously tend to reverse BACC. Thus, while firms which had previously recognised the 
impairment charges tend to reverse subsequently, this tendency is more pronounced for firms 
which had recently change their CEO or managing director. 
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Table 6.9: Tobit regression testing the relationship between impairment loss reversal, 
BACC, incentives to avoid earnings declines and CEO change 
 
REVt  = α + β1(NIt - REVt - NIt-1) + β2BACCt    +  β3(NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1)*BACCt  +  β4(NIt  - 
REVt  - NIt-1)*CEOt  +  β5BACCt *CEOt + β6(NIt - REVt - NIt-1)*BACCt *CEOt + β7SIZEt + 
β8MTBt + β9LEVt + β10CEOt  + εt               
(3-11) 
 
 Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 
BACC 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 *BACC 
NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1*CEO 
BACC*CEO   
NIt - REVt - NIt-1*BACC *CEO  
SIZE 
MTB 
LEV 
CEO 
N 
Likelihood  Ratio 
p-value (Likelihood Ratio) 
 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
? 
- 
? 
- 
+ 
+ 
 
-0.0105 
0.0314 
0.1477 
0.0859 
0.0250 
0.1880 
-1.7273 
0.0003 
0.0001 
-0.0033 
0.0017 
310 
83.20 
0.000 
-1.11 
2.02 
5.83 
0.34 
0.82 
2.81 
-2.95 
0.61 
0.11 
-0.84 
0.79 
 
0.268 
0.044 
0.000 
0.737 
0.415 
0.005 
0.003 
0.545 
0.914 
0.401 
0.430 
 
 
 
 
Variable definitions:  
REVt  = reversal amount, scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 = change in pre-reversal net income from year t-1 to year t, scaled by total 
assets at end of year t; 
BACCt = beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss in year t, deflated by total assets 
at end of year t; 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market-to-book ratio at end of year t; 
LEVt = total debts, scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CEOt is equal to one if the firm changes its chief executive officer/general manager in year t-
1 or t-2; and equal to zero otherwise. 
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Next, consistent with prediction, the coefficient on the interaction terms of NIt - REVt - NIt-1, 
BACC and CEO is negative and significant at the 1% level. This result suggests that, while 
firms tend to reverse the accumulated impairment to avoid earnings declines, this tendency is 
more pronounced for firms with recent changes in their senior management. In other words, 
managers who created a “cookie jar” are more likely to reverse the accumulated impairment 
to avoid earnings declines, perhaps to show their ability to make profitable changes in firm 
performance. Thus, this finding provides additional supporting evidence that changes in 
senior management suggest that the firms may engage in earnings managements. 
 
In Table 6.9, the coefficient on BACC*CEO is positive, while the coefficient on (NIt - REVt - 
NIt-1)*BACC*CEO is negative. Collectively, both results can be interpreted as follows: 
Firstly, new managers, during the year of their appointment, revalue assets and record 
impairment charges. Prior studies also demonstrate that new management tend to recognise 
impairment loss in the year of their appointment (Strong & Meyer, 1997; Elliot & Shaw, 
1988). Impairment recognition is also found to be associated with big bath reporting (Zucca 
& Campbell, 1992). In addition, the new CEOs have incentives to reduce earnings at the 
beginning of their terms, in order to make advances in company performance more 
achievable (Pourciau, 1993). These findings provide evidence that new management reports 
the impairment to manage the earnings downward, and attributes them to the previous 
management. Consistent with these findings, the correlation matrix in Panel B of Table 6.3 
indicates a high correlation between BACC and CEO, suggesting that the size of impairment 
is related to the change in management. This may suggest that the new management 
recognises higher impairment charges during the year of their appointment.  
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Then, the high BACC, which has been recognised by firms that had recently changed their 
senior management, is reversed to avoid earnings declines. They reverse the BACC to 
improve the firm performance and display to the market that previous problems have been 
settled, and slowly recovered. Overall, the results support the hypothesis that new CEOs 
report the impairment charges in the year of their appointment because blame can be placed 
on prior management, and then they reverse the charges to improve future profits.  
 
6.4 Robustness checks 
 
6.4.1 Replacing AWCA with a dummy variable 
 
The sensitivity of the regression results presented in this chapter is also tested. For the results 
presented in Tables 6.4 and 6.5, the AWCA variable is replaced with a dummy variable, as 
defined in Chapter 5, where firms in the top 30%, in terms of AWCA, are regarded as 
potential earnings managers, and firms in the middle 40% as non-managers of earnings. 
Based on this procedure, 109 firms are classified as earnings managers, and 146 firms are 
classified as non-managers of earnings. The result of this test is presented in Appendix P. 
 
As indicated in the table, the coefficient on NIt - REVt - NIt-1 is not related to REV. This 
result indicates that the earnings change of earnings managers does not explain the reversal 
recognition. In other words, the reversals reported by earnings managers do not reflect the 
improved performance of the assets. In contrast, the coefficient on the interaction term, NIt - 
REVt - NIt-1*D, is positive and significant (at the 10% level). This result indicates that the 
positive earnings change of non-earnings mangers has a stronger association with REV, 
compared to the earnings managers. In addition, the sum of β1 and β2 is positive and 
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significant (at the 1% level), indicating that the positive earnings change of non-managers of 
earnings is positively associated with REV. Overall, the results are consistent with the 
findings in Chapter 5, suggesting that reversal firms with a greater likelihood to manage 
earnings report reversals opportunistically, while the reversals reported by firms which are 
less likely to manage earnings reflect the economic condition of the firms. Thus, this test not 
only provides the robustness test for this chapter, but also for the findings in Chapter 5. 
 
Appendix Q presents the sensitivity test for the results presented in Table 6.5. In general, the 
overall results are consistent with the results in Table 6.5. NIt - REVt - NIt-1 is negatively 
associated with REV, indicating that earnings managers report the reversals to avoid earning 
declines. The coefficient on NIt - REVt - NIt-1 *D is positive, suggesting that non-managers of 
earnings report the reversals for economic reasons. The coefficient on NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1*CG 
is also positive, indicating that the positive relationship between earnings change and REV is 
more pronounced in firms with good corporate governance practices. Lastly, consistent with 
the result in Table 6.5, the coefficient on NIt - REVt - NIt-1*D *CG is positive. Thus, the 
results are robust, in relation to the measurement of earnings management. 
 
6.4.2 Dichotomising the NIt - REVt - NIt-1 variable 
 
In this chapter, incentives to avoid earnings declines variables are the focus of the empirical 
analyses. Thus, this study examines the robustness of the measurement of the incentives to 
avoid the earnings declines variable NIt - REVt - NIt-1. Following Duh et al. (2009), the 
continuous measure of pre-reversal earnings change is replaced with a dummy variable, 
which is equal to zero if NIt - REVt - NIt-1 < 0, and zero otherwise. The regressions of 
Equations 3-6 to 3-11 are re-estimated by replacing the continuous variables of change in net 
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income with the dummy variable. The results of this sensitivity test are reported in 
Appendices R to W.  
 
Qualitatively, the results of the sensitivity test for Equations 3-6 and 3-7 are similar to those 
reported in Tables 6.4 and 6.5. The coefficients on NIt - REVt - NIt-1 and AWCA are positive, 
while NIt - REVt - NIt-1 *AWCA is still negative. Similarly, the coefficient on the interaction 
term NIt - REVt - NIt-1*AWCA *CG is still positive. Thus, the results in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 
hold and are robust, in relation to the measurement of NIt - REVt - NIt-1.  
 
The results of the sensitivity test for Equations 3-8 to 3-11, qualitatively, are also unchanged. 
The coefficients of all variables are similar to the primary results. The coefficient on the 
interaction term, NIt - REVt - NIt-1 *BACC, is still negative, and, for NIt - REVt - NIt-1*BACC 
*CG, remains positive. Similarly, the coefficients on NIt - REVt - NIt-1*BACC *LEV and NIt 
- REVt - NIt-1*BACC *CEO remain negative. Overall, all the results from estimating 
Equations 3-8 to 3-11 are robust, in relation to the measurement of changes in net income. 
 
6.5 Summary 
 
This chapter presents further findings to answer the research questions: Is the reversal 
reporting associated with other manifestations of earnings management? What is the 
influence of corporate governance in reversal reporting? 
 
The findings in Chapter 4 document that, in the reversal year, firms that reverse impairment 
charges perform better than their matched firms. Furthermore, the Malaysian market also 
positively values the reversals. However, the reversals are not related to future firm 
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performance measured using accounting performance measures. Thus, in general, the 
reversals reported by Malaysian firms reflect the economic changes of the value of their non-
current assets. An insignificant relationship between reversals and future firm performance 
may indicate that some firms report the reversals for earnings management. As expected, the 
findings in Chapter 5 reveal that there are two motivations related to impairment reversals. 
Firstly, reversal firms with high AWCA report the reversals opportunistically. Their reversals 
are negatively associated with future performance, and are not associated with stock returns. 
Secondly, reversal firms with insignificant AWCA report reversals that are positively 
associated with future firm performance and stock market returns. Chapter 5 concludes that 
the information content of the reversal of impairment charges is conditional on the existence 
of earnings management in the firm. 
 
This chapter provides additional findings to support the above findings. In particular, this 
chapter presents findings regarding the relationship between reversals and other earnings 
management indicators, namely incentives to avoid earnings declines. The chapter also 
presents the findings on the relationship between reversals, incentives to avoid earnings 
declines and AWCA. The estimation of Equation 3-6 provides some supportive results. The 
change in net income relative to the prior year is positively associated with reversals, 
indicating that reversals are reported after the firms report positive net income changes. 
Hence, reversals are reported as the impaired non-current assets of the firms, are partly 
recovered and contribute to the income generation. The findings support the results in 
Chapter 4, suggesting that, overall, Malaysian firms report the reversals for economic 
reasons. As expected, AWCA is also positively associated with reversals, suggesting that the 
reversals reported may be associated with earnings management. Consistent with the general 
findings in Chapter 5, that high AWCA is associated with earnings management, the results 
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from estimating Equation 3-6 provide evidence that reversal firms with high AWCA are more 
likely to report reversals to avoid earnings declines. Incorporating corporate governance in 
the estimation model provides interesting results. Consistent with the argument that effective 
corporate governance mitigates earnings management, the results from estimating Equation 
3-7 show that the reversal reporting by firms with high AWCA to avoid earnings declines is 
less likely to occur in firms with effective corporate governance. 
 
Incorporating BACC in the estimation model also provides supporting results. Equation 3-8 
estimates the relationship between reversals and BACC. Consistent with prior studies, this 
study finds that, the more the firms recognised the impairment charges in the prior year, the 
larger the impairment is reversed. The results of estimating Equation 3-9 indicate that the 
reversal firms also reverse the accumulated impairment to avoid earnings declines. Such 
behaviour is more pronounced for firms with a high leverage ratio and firms that recently 
change their senior management. The latter two findings are related to an estimation of 
Equations 3-10 to 3-11. Incorporating the corporate governance variable in the model, 
Equation 3-9, also provides consistent findings that corporate governance is essential in 
monitoring corporate decisions. The analysis reveals that the reversal of accumulated 
impairment to avoid earnings declines is less likely to occur in firms with good corporate 
governance. 
 
Similarly to Chapters 4 and 5, the robustness tests are also performed for all results presented 
in this chapter, and, qualitatively, the results are unchanged. 
 
 
 
186 
 
CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Overall view of the study 
 
There is an increasing trend in many jurisdictions across the world to move from historical 
cost accounting to fair value accounting in the preparation of financial statements. Capital 
market regulators and standard setters believe that fair value provides a more relevant 
measure of assets, liabilities and earnings than historical cost. They also believe that the 
measure appears to meet the conceptual framework of financial reporting better than other 
measurements (Whittington, 2008). Accounting standard setters around the world have issued 
standards requiring the recognition of assets and liabilities at fair value and changes in their 
fair value in income statements. In the US, the FASB has issued several standards that require 
the measurement and disclosure of accounting amounts using fair values. Among the most 
significant are those standards related to the financial instruments. Outside the US, 
accounting standards issued by the IASB are accepted and adopted in many countries. The 
IASB has issued IFRSs, and, similarly to the accounting standard in US, the IASB issued two 
key fair value standards that related to accounting for financial instruments. In 2011, the 
IASB issued IFRS 13, Fair Value Measurement, which establishes a single framework for the 
measurement of fair value. Besides that, the IASB also allows the use of the fair value 
measurement in the application of other standards, such as in impairment testing, revaluation 
of non-current assets and accounting for retirement benefits plan. 
 
The move to fair value accounting does suggest the possible enhancement of corporate 
financial reporting, because fair value accounting provides current financial information to 
users with three qualitative characteristics: relevance, comparability and timeliness. These 
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characteristics favour fair value measurement over historical cost in the valuation of assets 
and liabilities. Thus, financial information with these three characteristics is important and 
useful to users who do not have privileged access to the entity’s internal information. Its 
usefulness in executing decisions is also the main characteristic of financial information, as 
stressed in the IASB’s conceptual framework. The measure also provides users with 
predictive value that enables them to increase the likelihood of correctly forecasting the 
performance of their investments. Several papers provide evidence that reporting an asset at 
fair value is value-relevant to users (Aboody et al., 1999; Barth & Clinch, 1998). It provides 
information regarding future firm performance which is relevant to users in establishing an 
investment decision. On the other hand, historical cost accounting provides “book value” 
information to users, which is argued as less relevant in decision-making. It stresses cost 
allocation, rather than providing the current value of the assets. 
 
Despite the presumed beneﬁts associated with fair value accounting, it is argued that the 
measurement at fair value reduces the reliability of financial information relative to historical 
cost, because it involves estimates, especially to the assets that are not actively traded in the 
market. Although the absence of active markets is a major problem for non-financial assets, 
the problem is no less obvious for financial assets, particularly for compound instrument 
(Landsman, 2007). Estimates in projecting future cash flows may provide managers with a 
wide degree of discretion regarding the choice of which rules, and when to apply them. As 
documented in the earnings management literature, the discretionary element in accounting 
standards may be exploited, since it provides both the opportunity and incentives for them to 
decide when to inflate the assets value and/or earnings, for their private benefit.  
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Earnings management, even if conducted without violating the requirements of the 
accounting standards, may reduce the quality of earnings. Inaccurate information which does 
not portray the true performance of the firm may lessen the ability of shareholders and other 
users of financial statements to make informed decisions. To resolve the agency conflict 
between managers and shareholders, a monitoring mechanism is required to protect the rights 
of the shareholders. Hence, effective corporate governance is required in the public 
companies to monitor and influence the managers’ decisions.  
 
This study investigates whether the application of fair value and value in use measures in 
FRS 136, Impairment of Assets, allow managers to communicate their private knowledge 
regarding future firm performance, or to opportunistically exploit the latitude allowed by the 
standard. The standard requires the recognition of impairment losses when the fair values or 
value in use of non-current assets are lower than the carrying value. Reversal of the 
impairment charges is also allowed when the fair value or value in use increases. The fair 
value increases because the impaired asset is recovered, or partly recovered, and is expected 
to improve the firm’s operations. Specifically, this study investigates the information content 
hypothesis and opportunistic reporting hypothesis of impairment reversals recorded by 
Malaysian public listed companies from 2006 to 2009. The data are analysed to answer the 
following research questions: 
 
Does the reversal of impairment loss reporting portray the reality of economic 
performance, or is associated with opportunistic earnings management behaviour?  
Is the reversal reporting associated with other manifestations of earnings management?  
What is the influence of corporate governance in reversal reporting? 
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The reversal of impairment losses is an accounting treatment described under FRS 136, 
Impairment of Assets, with an objective to ensure that non-current assets are not reported as 
greater than their fair value. An impairment loss should be recognised when the fair value or 
value in use is lower than the carrying amount. The impairment charges can be reversed in 
future if the opposite situation occurs. Reporting the non-current assets at fair value is 
important to ensure that the information provided to users is relevant in decision-making. 
This is because it reflects the most current economic value of the assets. The current value of 
the assets also helps users of financial statement to predict the future profitability of the firms, 
because it reflects current information about future cash flows. Thus, if the reversals are 
reported based on the current condition of the assets, such reversals should be associated with 
firm performance. 
 
Prior studies provide little evidence of opportunistic reversal reporting, as the issue of 
reversal reporting is rarely explored. They largely focus on the opportunistic reporting of 
impairment reversals (Duh et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2010). Taking a 
broader perspective on earnings management, this study examines whether reversal 
information communicates managers’ private knowledge regarding future firm performance, 
or whether it is recognised for earnings management. Thus, it is unique, compared to prior 
studies on impairment reversal. It does not focus only on the reporting incentives, but also 
relates the reversals to other measures of earnings management. If firms use items other than 
reversal accruals to manipulate earnings, they may also use reversals for the same purpose. 
 
In earnings management research, aggregate accruals models have been used extensively in 
detecting earnings manipulation. However, some authors argue that the aggregate model may 
lead to misleading inferences, due to the difficulty in separating discretionary and 
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nondiscretionary accruals. An alternative method used to detect earnings manipulation is to 
examine specific accruals as reported by firms. Potentially, a more powerful method to detect 
earnings manipulation can be developed by exploiting information concerning specific 
accruals (Beneish, 1997; Dechow et al., 2012). A study detailing specific accruals allows 
researchers to investigate the direct relationship between the specific accruals and their 
determinants (McNichols, 2000). Thus, this study aims to contribute to the literature on 
earnings management using specific accruals. 
  
7.2 Summary of research methodology 
 
Univariate and multivariate analyses are performed on a sample of Malaysian public 
companies that recognised the reversal of impairment losses during 2006 to 2009. Reversal 
firms are identified through a keyword search, using reversal-related phrases in 3,577 annual 
reports of Malaysian public companies during the period of study. Using this procedure, 242 
reversal firm-years are identified and matched to control firms which are impaired non-
reversal firms, on the basis of size and industry type. 182 firms are successfully matched to 
control firms, and the total sample for this study is 364 firm-years.  
 
Univariate tests include a comparative analysis between reversal firms and their control 
firms, and a difference in differences analysis between potential earnings managers and non-
managers of earnings relative to their corresponding control firms. In multivariate analysis, 
four accounting measure-based models and one market measure-based model are constructed 
to estimate the relationship between reversals and firm performance. In further analyses, the 
regression analyses are performed by differentiating between potential earnings managers and 
non-managers of earnings, classified based on the level of abnormal accruals, measured using 
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the DeFond and Park (2001) model. This study also examines whether the accumulated 
impairment is associated with earnings management. As prior studies document that larger 
impairment is related to “big bath” reporting, this study examines whether the size of the 
beginning balance of accumulated impairment is associated with opportunistic reversal 
reporting. In the last part of the analysis, this study links the reversals to another reporting 
incentive; i.e. incentives to avoid earnings declines. The association between the reporting 
incentives and the reversals is examined. The impact of the level of abnormal accruals and 
the accumulated impairment on the association is also examined.  
 
7.3 Summary of the research results 
 
This study has documented three empirical investigations concerning reversal reporting 
among Malaysian public listed companies. The findings of each investigation are summarised 
in this section. 
 
7.3.1 Reversal of impairment loss reporting and firm performance 
 
In general, similar to previous studies, this study finds that the magnitude of reversal of 
impairment loss is large, as illustrated by the percentage of reversals in net income and the 
beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss. The statistics also indicate that Malaysian 
public companies reverse more in other investment and property, plant and equipment. In 
univariate analysis, the test of differences between reversal firms and control firms illustrates 
that, in the reversal year, firms that reverse the impairment charges are more profitable, as 
measured by the return on equity. This result holds true after adjusting earnings for reversals. 
The reversal firms also generate more sales. Thus, the reversals reported by reversal firms are 
192 
 
associated with enhanced firm performance. This finding suggests that non-current assets of 
reversal firms are recovered, or partly recovered. The level of abnormal accruals of reversal 
firms and control firms is similar. Thus, on average, the reversal firms do not engage in 
earnings management more than the control firms. Overall, the descriptive statistics shows 
that Malaysian firms reverse the impairment charges as a response the economic changes in 
assets’ value.  
 
The analysis of the association between the impairment reversals and firm performance 
provides some evidence to support the view that reversal information reflects economic 
fundamental of the firms. In the market-based test, the present study finds that the market 
prices the reversal information as reflected by the positive association between reversals and 
contemporaneous stock returns. The finding is consistent with Aboody et al. (1999) and Chen 
et al. (2009), suggesting that reversal information possesses incremental information content 
regarding the future profitability of the firm. However, in regression analyses between 
reversals and future profitability, measured by cash flow from operations and operating 
income, this study does not find evidence to support the information content hypothesis. One 
possible explanation is that not all reversals are a result of managers appropriately responding 
to a recovery on the value of impaired assets, and some may be due to earnings management. 
In general, this study concludes that the reporting of impairment losses in Malaysia portrays 
the economic changes of the non-current assets’ value.  
 
7.3.2 Reversal of impairment losses, firm performance and reporting incentives 
 
In further analyses, this study finds that the level of abnormal accruals measured using the 
DeFond and Park (2001) model influence the reversal reporting. The analysis provides an 
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answer to the insignificant results of the association between reversals and accounting 
performance-based measures reported in Chapter 4. A comparison between reversal firms 
with high AWCA (also regarded as earnings managers) and reversal firms with the lowest 
absolute AWCA (also regarded as non-managers of earnings), relative to their control firms, 
provides evidence that the latter group outperforms the former group. The operating cash 
flows and operating income in the reversal year, and the subsequent year of the non-managers 
of earnings, are higher than those of the earnings managers. The result is consistent with the 
expectation that firms that are likely to manage earnings report the reversal opportunistically, 
while non-managers of earnings report the reversal with a subsequent improvement of assets 
in generating income and cash flows. 
 
The test of the association between firm performance and reversals reported by earnings 
managers and non-managers of earnings provides findings consistent with the expectations 
and the univariate test explained above. It is hypothesised that the reversals of non-managers 
of earnings are positively associated with firm performance. In accounting performance-
based measures, this study finds that reversals reported by non-managers of earnings explain 
firm performance in the subsequent year after reversals, measured by four performance 
measures: operating cash flows, change in operating cash flows, operating income and 
change in operating income. These results are supported by the positive market reaction to 
the reversals of non-managers of earnings. The results are consistent with prior studies 
pertaining to asset revaluation (Aboody et al., 1999). The market perceives that the reversals 
of non-managers of earnings are value-relevant. Conversely, the reversals reported by firms 
with high AWCA are negatively related to future firm performance, and not related to stock 
returns. Thus, the information content of reversal reporting in Malaysia is dependent on the 
existence of earnings management. The recovery of the impaired assets of firms with less 
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incentive to manage earnings is followed up by improved future firm performance, and 
positively valued by the market. The reversals reported by these firms communicate 
information regarding the future performance of the firms. Hence, the informative earnings 
management hypothesis is supported. On the other hand, reversals reported by firms with 
high AWCA are followed up by reducing cash flows and income. The high AWCA in the 
reversal year is reversed in the following year; hence, reducing the income. In summary, this 
study finds two groups of firms pertaining to reversal reporting; one group (non-managers of 
earnings) reports the reversals as a response to the economic reality of the firms, and the 
other group (earnings managers) reports the reversals opportunistically. 
 
7.3.3 Reversal of impairment losses, earnings declines and corporate governance 
 
To answer the second research question (i.e. is the reversal reporting associated with other 
manifestations of earnings management?), this study examines the relationship of reversals 
with incentives to avoid earnings declines. Since reversal recognition increases the reported 
earnings, it may be used to avoid earnings declines relative to the prior year. In the univariate 
analysis, as expected, the pre-reversal earnings change relative to the prior year, and the pre-
reversal income of the reversal firms is higher than the control firms. This difference 
illustrates that the reversal firms begin to recover from previous impairment, and that the 
recovery helps firms to improve the operating of the firms; hence, the reported income in the 
reversal year increases. The small magnitude of pre-reversal earnings declines and losses, 
compared to the control firms, indicate that the reversal firms gradually recover, and that the 
reported earnings begin to increase. The control firms continue to underperform, and report 
large earnings declines and/or losses compared to the reversal firms.  
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This study also provides new evidence that reversals are associated with an aggregate 
measure of earnings management. The result supports the argument that firms combine the 
use of specific accruals with other accruals to manage earnings. Firms with high abnormal 
accruals are regarded as firms with high incentives to manage earnings upward. The literature 
provides findings on the motives of firms managing earnings upward. This study finds that 
firms with high abnormal accruals manage earnings to avoid earnings declines relative to the 
prior year. However, good governance practices among the firms mitigate the firms from 
opportunistically report the reversals. Thus, this study provides findings consistent with 
corporate governance literature, indicating that the mechanism is important in public 
companies, to monitor the managers’ actions (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Dechow et al., 1996, 
Healy & Pelapu, 2001).  
 
The size of previously recognised impairment losses is also related to the reversals. This 
study provides findings consistent with literature, suggesting that firms reverse the 
accumulated impairment to avoid earnings declines (Duh et al., 2009). Extending the 
literature detailing corporate governance, the result provides evidence that effective corporate 
governance helps to curtail opportunistic reversals designed to avoid earnings declines. In 
addition, firms with high debt levels reverse the accumulated impairment to avoid earnings 
declines, perhaps to avoid debt covenant violation. The final examination in this study 
provides new insight into the effects of new management on impairment and reversal 
recognition. Consistent with the literature (Strong & Meyer, 1987; Elliot & Shaw, 1988), new 
management, in the year of their appointment, recognise higher impairment, and blame prior 
management for not recognising the impaired assets. This study provides evidence that, a few 
years after the appointment, the management reverse the accumulated impairment to avoid 
earnings declines. The findings of the study suggest that new management recognise large 
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impairment charges in the appointment year, and then reverse the impairment to manage 
earnings. The result is supported by the findings from earlier study (Zhang et al., 2010). 
 
7.4 Implications of the study 
 
As previously explained, reporting an asset at fair value or value in use improves the 
information usefulness to the users of the financial statements, because it signals information 
regarding expected future firm performance. However, the subjectivity involved in estimating 
the fair value or value in use, especially to non-financial assets with no active market, may be 
exploited by some firms, to manipulate earnings. The findings of this study support both 
views. In impairment testing, using a fair value measure in the determination of the 
recoverable amount of impaired assets allows managers to signal their information to users of 
the financial statements regarding future firm performance. The performance of reversal 
firms is improved, and the reversals reported signal the improved future firm performance in 
generating profits and cash flows. The market also perceives that the assets measured at fair 
value are value-relevant. This finding is consistent with prior studies regarding the value 
relevance of fair value measurement (Barth, 1994; Nelson, 1996; Venkatachalam, 1996; 
Barth & Clinch, 1998). The evidence of this study also supports the critics of fair value 
measurement. The discretion in estimating the fair value or value in use of the assets allows 
managers to opportunistically inflate earnings. The reversal of firms with incentives to 
manage earnings upward are not associated with future firm performance, and not related to 
stock market return. They also reverse the accumulated impairment to avoid earnings 
declines. Based on the analysis, the evidence reveals that the application of fair value 
measures in impairment testing is informative to users of the financial statements. Although 
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some firms apply the fair value measure opportunistically, the intention to signal information 
relevant to future profitability is the dominant motivation of reversal reporting in Malaysia. 
 
The findings of this study provide input to the debate regarding the recognition of the reversal 
of an impairment loss. IFRS allows firms to reverse the impairment charges, but US GAAP 
prohibits such reversals. The reason underlying why FASB prohibits the reversals is that an 
impairment loss should result in a new basis for the impaired assets. The evidence from this 
study reveals that the reversals reported by firms that are less likely to manage earnings are 
positively associated with future firm performance and current stock market returns, and this 
is the dominant motivation in Malaysia. The evidence provides useful information to the 
regulatory bodies, accounting bodies, academics and financial statement users, suggesting 
that recognising an asset at fair value is generally a reliable measure. It provides information 
regarding future firm performance. The findings support the argument of fair value 
accounting proponents, that the measurement provides useful information to users of 
financial statements. To some extent, the objective of a financial reporting framework to 
assist users by providing relevant information is achieved. Evidence in Aboody et al. (1999), 
and Barth and Clinch (1998), support the use of fair value accounting in the revaluation of 
fixed assets. This study provides supportive evidence that fair value measurement in an 
impairment standard is relevant to users, because it provides information about future firm 
performance. The findings are consistent with the notion that the discretionary element in 
accounting standards enables the earnings to communicate information regarding future firm 
performance.   
 
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance is introduced to enhance the monitoring 
mechanism in Malaysian public companies. The results of this study reveal that effective 
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corporate governance helps to curtail opportunistic reversals reporting in firms with a high 
likelihood to manage earnings. This implies that the recommendations in MCCG are 
significant, and must be followed, especially in the case of weak investor protection 
legislation, as in Malaysia. The findings support the initiatives by Malaysian regulatory body 
to continuously promote a good corporate governance culture in the Malaysian capital 
market.  
 
7.5  Limitations of the study, and areas for future research 
 
The results of this study are subject to the following limitations. Firstly, the study only 
examines the association between reversal and one-year-ahead firm performance. However, 
Aboody et al.’s (1999) study examines the association between revaluation and future firm 
performance over the subsequent one to three years. As the non-current assets are expected to 
be used for more than one year, their recovery may also be observed over several years. This 
study only uses the future performance over the subsequent year after reversals, due to the 
data unavailability at the time of this study. Because the performance of non-current assets is 
observed in more than one year, future research could extend the study to include more years 
of future performance, in order to better reflect the recovery of the impaired assets. 
 
Secondly, this study examines the reversals of four types of non-current assets in aggregate 
value. The four types of assets are property, plant and equipment, other investments, 
investment in associates and investment property. In general, all the non-current assets are 
acquired for long-term use, with different purposes. Future research could examine the effects 
of different assets on the relationship between reversals and future performance. For example, 
property, plant and equipment is an operating asset which is directly used to generate 
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operating income and operating cash flows. The reversal of this asset should have a stronger 
association with future performance and stock return. The incentives to manage earnings of 
each type of non-current asset could also be different. 
 
Thirdly, this study focuses on the reversals of impairment losses, and only examines some 
effects of the impairment. A further extension of this study might examine the reporting 
incentives during impairment recognition. If reversals reported by firms with high incentives 
to manage earnings are opportunistic, the same motive should underlie the impairment 
recognition. It is also interesting to investigate the future performance of the control firms. If 
the reversals reported for economic reasons are positively associated with future firm 
performance, the impairment of the control firms which are regarded as also for economic 
reasons should also be associated with reduced future firm performance. 
 
Fourthly, the results of this study are also subject to the reliability of the earnings 
management measures used to classify potential earnings managers and non-managers of 
earnings. There is a debate regarding the reliability of earnings management measures used in 
accounting research. This study relies on the abnormal accruals measured using DeFond and 
Park’s (2001) model to differentiate between opportunistic reversals and reversals reported 
for economic reasons. The short period of study also limits this study to employing other 
earnings management measures. 
 
7.6  Summary and conclusions 
 
The results of the study support the informative perspective of earnings management. 
Reversal reporting using FRS 136 is claimed to provide managers with substantial flexibility 
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in recognising accruals. Unlike prior studies detailing impairment reversals, the findings 
provide evidence that reversal firms, on average, recognise the unrealised gain that reflects 
the changes in non-current asset values. Thus, the discretionary element provided in FRS 136 
allows managers to communicate their expectations regarding current and future firm 
performance, and this is the dominant motivation for the reversal of impairment charges in 
Malaysia. 
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 APPENDIX A 
An example of impairment reversal disclosure in income statement and notes to the 
account. 
A. Disclosure of reversals in income statement of Berjaya Land Berhad in Annual Report 
2008 
Income Statement 
For the year ended 30 April 2008 
 
  Group 
 Note 2008 
RM’000 
2007 
RM’000 
Revenue 
Cost of sales 
31 1,516,088     
  (900,229) 
538,368 
(203,829) 
Gross profit 
 
Other income 
Administrative expenses 
Selling and marketing expenses 
 
 
32 
   615,859 
 
     32,193 
   (411,981) 
     (53,895) 
334,539 
 
  29,341 
(324,555) 
  (21,829) 
 
Investment related income 
 
33 
   182,176 
1,167,784 
  17,496 
  55,859 
 
 
B. Disclosure of reversals in notes to the accounts of Berjaya Land Berhad in Annual Report 
2008 
33  INVESTMENT RELATED INCOME 
 Group 
 2008 
RM’000 
2007 
RM’000 
Interest income: 
- Fixed and other deposits 
- Inter-company 
- penultimate holding company 
- subsidiary companies 
- related companies 
- others 
 
9,768 
 
2,733 
- 
11,552 
1,403 
 
4,577 
 
4,578 
- 
8,679 
441 
 
Dividend income (gross): 
- From other investments quoted 
- in Malaysia 
- outside Malaysia 
Gain on disposal of an associated company 
Gain on disposal of subsidiary companies 
Gain on disposal of other investments  
Gain on disposal of investment properties 
Gain on reissuance of ICULS 1999/2009 
Gain on disposal of unquoted investments 
Negative goodwill arising from business combination 
Reversal of impairment loss in other investments 
Reversal of impairment loss in investment in associates 
Write-back of amounts due from subsidiary companies 
Net reversal of impairment in value of property, plant  
    and equipment 
Reversal of allowance for doubtful debts of amount due 
    from subsidiary company 
Fair value adjustment 
25,456 
 
 
4,191 
134 
- 
19,227 
15,682 
88,647 
938,107 
76 
35,332 
- 
- 
- 
 
7,428 
 
- 
33,504 
18,275 
 
 
1,118 
62 
826 
- 
16,181 
- 
- 
- 
- 
3,297 
5,029 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
11,071 
 
3 PROPERTY, PLANT AND EQUIPMENT 
(a) During the current financial year, the Group effected a net reversal of impairment loss of RM7,428,000(2007:Nil) 
included in Note 33 to the financial statements in respect of certain assets owned by its subsidiary companies due 
to increase in their fair values. 
 
226 
 
APPENDIX B 
Frequency and magnitude of impairment loss reversal (Initial sample), 2006-2009 
  Million MYR % Total Assets
a
 % Specific 
Assets
b
 
% Net Income
c
 % Accumulated  
     Impairment
d
 
 Sample Mean Median  Mean   Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A: Breakdown by year           
2006 46 5.85 0.67 0.58 0.10 9.21 1.26 29.10 3.13 26.36 11.37 
2007 68 6.61 0.66 0.49 0.13 15.38 3.72 14.36 3.22 29.95 16.38 
2008 49 3.75 0.69 0.23 0.08 6.09 1.44 7.76 1.04 29.51 17.40 
2009 79 3.93 1.01 0.52 0.14 14.09 3.84 22.86 4.39 36.51 22.20 
Total 242    5.01     0.79    0.46      0.11   11.89     2.11   18.68     3.13   31.34   18.01 
Panel B: Breakdown by type  
     of asset 
          
Property, plant and 
equipment 
96 4.60 0.83 0.52 0.12 28.17 3.09 17.39 2.87 26.56 5.99 
Investment in associates 24 6.10 2.88 0.59 0.22 24.42 5.28 28.87 5.93 30.67 9.49 
Other investments 100 5.32 0.57 0.44 0.10 24.64 3.03 17.54 2.82 36.42 21.80 
Investment properties 
Multiple 
13 
9 
0.98 
8.95 
0.03 
5.40 
0.09 
0.32 
0.02 
0.22 
2.23 
25.06 
0.23 
11.65 
2.43 
38.60 
0.12 
8.86 
34.09 
16.46 
19.22 
6.30 
Total 242 5.01 0.79 0.46 0.11 11.89 2.11 18.68 3.13 31.34 18.01 
 
a
 It is calculated as reversal amount divided by total assets at the end of year. 
b
 Percentage of specific assets are based on average of related assets category for the year of reversal. 
c
 It is based on the net income before reversal. The calculation of mean and median for percentage of specific assets in 2007 is based on 67 
reversals as specific asset of one reversal cannot be identified from the annual report. The mean and the median are based on the 
winsorized data. Before winsorization, the data are highly skewed to the right with mean (median) of 24.83 (3.09). Data are then 
wonsorized so that the minimum and maximum values are less than three standard deviations from the mean.  
d
 The determination of % of beginning balance of accumulated impairment is based on 217 observations as 25 reversal firms combined the 
accumulated impairment and accumulated depreciation in one account for Property, Plant and Equipment.  It is calculated as reversal 
amount over beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss in the year of reversal. 
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APPENDIX C  
Sensitivity analysis for Equation 3-5: Relationship between impairment loss reversals 
and abnormal stock returns (clustered standard errors) 
 
AbReturnt = γ0 + γ1REV’t + γ2NIt + γ3BTMt + ut                                (3-5) 
 
Variables Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept  -0.0041 0.55 0.582 
REV’ + 2.8810 1.81 0.067 
NI + 0.9860 4.00 0.000 
BTM + -0.0382 -1.02 0.317 
N  178   
R
2
  0.087   
F-statistic  8.66   
p-value (F-statistic)  0.000   
 
Variable definitions: 
AbReturn =  control group adjusted returns beginning eight months before the financial 
year-end and ending four months after the financial year-end;  
REV’ = reversal amount scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1; 
NI = net income before reversal in year t scaled by market value of equity at the end of year 
t-1; 
BTM = book to market value of equity at the end of year t-1. 
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APPENDIX D 
Sensitivity analysis for Equation 3-5: Relationship between impairment loss reversals 
and abnormal stock returns (incorporating BACC variable) 
 
AbReturnt = γ0 + γ1REV’t + γ2NIt + γ3BTMt + γ4BACCt  +  ut                      (3-5) 
 
Variables Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept  0.0818 0.86 0.406 
REV’ + 2.9496 1.89 0.061 
NI + 0.8987 3.96 0.000 
BTM + -0.1414 -1.10 0.250 
BACC 
N 
 -0.3724 
155 
-0.22 0.825 
R
2
  0.085   
F-statistic  4.36   
p-value (F-statistic)  0.001   
 
Variable definitions: 
AbReturn =  control group adjusted returns beginning eight months before the financial 
year-end and ending four months after the financial year-end;  
REV’ = reversal amount scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1; 
NI = net income before reversal in year t scaled by market value of equity at the end of year 
t-1;  
BACCt = beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss in year t deflated by total assets 
at end of year t; 
BTM = book to market value of equity at the end of year t-1. 
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APPENDIX E 
Sensitivity analysis for Equation 3-1A: Relationship between impairment loss reversal 
and future CFO, moderated by incentive to manage earnings using abnormal working 
capital accruals (clustered standard errors) 
CFOt+1 =  α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3CFOt +  β4WCt  +  β5SIZEt + β6MTBt +  εt  (3-1A) 
 Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
D 
REV 
D*REV 
CFO 
WC 
SIZE 
MTB 
N 
Adjusted R
2 
F-statistic 
p-value (F-statistic) 
β1 +  β2 
 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
? 
-0.2275 
-0.0181 
-1.2406 
-1.5664 
-0.3565 
0.0401 
0.0137 
-0.0074 
128 
-0.2626 
10.54 
-0.0000 
0.3258 
-2.37 
-1.81 
-3.83 
-2.70 
-4.08 
1.27 
2.66 
-1.02 
0.019 
0.074 
0.000 
0.008 
0.000 
0.206 
0.009 
0.309 
 
 
 
 
0.0057 
 
Variable definitions: 
 
CFOt+1= net cash flow from operations in year t+1 divided by total assets at end of year t; 
D = equals to one for reversal firms at the middle 40% of abnormal working capital accruals 
measured using DeFond and Park, 2001 (non-managers of earnings) and equals to zero for 
reversal firms at the top 30% of abnormal working capital accruals (earnings managers); 
REV=  reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CFO = net cash flow from operations in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
WC = working capital in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
SIZE =  log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTB = market to book ratio at end of year t. 
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APPENDIX F 
Sensitivity analysis for Equation 3-2A: Relationship between impairment loss reversal 
and change in future CFO, moderated by incentive to manage earnings using abnormal 
working capital accruals (clustered standard errors) 
∆CFOt+1= α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3∆CFOt + β4∆WCt + β5SIZEt +β6MTBt + εt   
(3-2A) 
 Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
D 
REV 
D*REV 
∆CFO 
∆WC 
SIZE 
MTB 
N 
Adjusted R
2 
F-statistic 
p-value (F-statistic) 
β1 +  β2 
 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
? 
 
-0.1096 
-0.0158 
-1.1170 
-1.5459 
-0.6709 
0.0406 
0.0070 
-0.1096 
128 
-0.4684 
12.26 
-0.0000 
0.4289 
-1.19 
-2.36 
-3.02 
-2.40 
-5.91 
0.70 
1.60 
-0.76 
0.236 
0.020 
0.003 
0.018 
0.000 
0.485 
0.112 
0.448 
 
 
 
 
0.0184 
 
Variable definitions: 
 
∆CFOt+1= change in net cash flow from operations from year t to year t+1 divided by total 
assets at end of year t; 
D = equals to one for reversal firms at the middle 40% of abnormal working capital accruals 
measured using DeFond and Park, 2001 (non-managers of earnings) and equals to zero for 
reversal firms at the top 30% of abnormal working capital accruals (earnings managers); 
REV=  reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFO = change in net cash flow from operations from year t-1 to year t divided by total 
assets at end of year t; 
∆WC = change of working capital from year t-1 to year t divided by total assets at end of 
year t; 
SIZE =  log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTB = market to book ratio at end of year t. 
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APPENDIX G 
Sensitivity analysis for Equation 3-3A: Relationship between impairment loss reversal 
and future operating income, moderated by incentive to manage earnings using 
abnormal working capital accruals (clustered standard errors) 
OPIN*t+1= α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3OPINt + β4SIZEt + β5MTBt +  εt   (3-3A) 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
D 
REV 
D*REV 
OPIN 
SIZE 
MTB 
N 
Adjusted R
2 
F-statistic 
p-value (F-statistic) 
β1 +  β2 
 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
-0.1034 
-0.0497 
-3.0601 
-3.9774 
-0.9065 
-0.0083 
-0.0164 
128 
-0.3490 
30.21 
-0.0000 
0.9173 
          -0.92 
          -1.99 
          -2.86 
          -2.71 
          -6.52 
          -1.25 
     0.14 
0.358 
0.049 
0.005 
0.008 
0.000 
0.214 
0.885 
 
 
 
 
0.0097 
 
Variable definitions: 
 
OPIN*t+1=  operating income before depreciation and amortization expenses, reversal 
amount  and AWCA in year t+1 divided by total assets at end of year t;  
D = equals to one for reversal firms at the middle 40% of abnormal working capital accruals 
measured using DeFond and Park, 2001 (non-managers of earnings) and equals to zero for 
reversal firms at the top 30% of abnormal working capital accruals (earnings managers); 
REV= reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
OPIN= operating income in year t; 
SIZE=  log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTB= market to book ratio at end of year t. 
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APPENDIX H 
Sensitivity analysis for Equation 3-4A: Relationship between impairment loss reversal 
and change in future operating income, moderated by incentive to manage earnings 
using abnormal working capital accruals (clustered standard errors) 
∆OPIN*t+1= α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3∆OPINt + β4SIZEt + β5MTBt +  εt          (3-4A) 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
D 
REV 
D*REV 
∆OPINt 
SIZE 
MTB 
N 
R
2 
F-statistic 
p-value (F-statistic) 
β1 +  β2 
 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
-0.2548 
-0.1352 
-6.5221 
-7.1281 
-0.6582 
-0.0233 
-0.0415 
128 
-0.3021 
30.21 
-0.0000 
0.606 
          -1.33 
          -2.10 
          -1.81 
          -1.90 
          -4.48 
          -1.58 
    2.36 
0.183 
0.044 
0.071 
0.060 
0.000 
0.110 
0.017 
 
 
 
 
0.067 
 
 
Variable definitions: 
 
∆OPIN*t+1= change in operating income before depreciation and amortization expenses, 
reversal amount  and AWCA from year t to year t+1 divided by total assets at end of year t;  
D = equals to one for reversal firms at the middle 40% of abnormal working capital accruals 
measured using DeFond and Park, 2001 (non-managers of earnings) and equals to zero for 
reversal firms at the top 30% of abnormal working capital accruals (earnings managers); 
REV= reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
∆OPINt= change in operating income before reversal from year t-1 to year t divided by total 
assets at end of year t; 
SIZE=  log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTB= market to book ratio at end of year t. 
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APPENDIX I 
Sensitivity analysis for Equation 3-5A: Relationship between impairment loss reversal 
and abnormal stock returns, moderated by incentive to manage earnings using 
abnormal working capital accruals (clustered standard errors) 
AbReturnt   =  γ0 + D + γ1REV’t + γ2D*REV’t + γ3NIt + γ4BTMt +  ut    (3-5A) 
Variables Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept  0.1929 1.66 0.101 
D  -0.3438 -2.46 0.016 
REV’ ? -0.6693 -0.52 0.606 
D*REV’ + 11.042 3.62 0.000 
NI + 1.3999 3.95 0.000 
BTM + -0.0604 -1.23 0.142 
N  250   
R
2
  0.1796   
F-statistic  7.93   
p-value (F-
statistic) 
 0.000   
γ1   +  γ2  10.3727  0.000 
 
Variable definitions: 
AbReturn =  control group adjusted returns beginning eight months before the financial 
year-end and ending four months after the financial year-end;  
REV’= reversal amount scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1; 
NI = net income before reversal in year t scaled by market value of equity at the end of year 
t-1; 
BTM = book to market value of equity at the end of year t-1; 
D = equals to one for reversal firms at the middle 40% of abnormal working capital accruals 
measured using DeFond and Park, 2001 (non-managers of earnings) and equals to zero for 
reversal firms at the top 30% of abnormal working capital accruals (earnings managers); 
D*REV’ = interaction term of variables D and BTM. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
234 
 
 
APPENDIX J 
Relationship between impairment loss reversals, firm performance, and incentives to 
manage earnings incorporating accumulated impairment loss 
CFOt+1 = α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3CFOt + β4WCt + β5SIZEt + β6MTBt  + β7BACCt 
+εt           (3-1B) 
∆CFOt+1 =  α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3∆CFOt  + β4∆WCt  + β5SIZEt +  β6MTBt + 
β7BACCt +εt      (3-2B) 
OPIN*t+1= α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3OPINt + β4SIZEt + β5MTBt + β6BACCt + εt                   
(3-3B) 
∆OPIN*t+1   =  α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3∆OPINt + β4SIZEt + β5MTBt + β6BACCt +  
εt              (3-4B) 
AbReturnt   =  α + D + β1REV’t + β2D*REV’t + β3NIt + β4BTMt +  β5BACC’t  +   εt                                       
(3-5B) 
 
Variable 
Equation 3-1B Equation 3-2B Equation 3-3B Equation 3-4B Equation 3-5B 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
D 
 
REV 
 
D*REV 
 
REV’ 
 
D*REV’ 
 
CFO 
 
∆CFO 
 
OPIN 
 
∆OPIN 
 
NI 
 
WC 
 
∆WC 
 
SIZE 
 
-0.0086 
(0.575) 
-1.2268 
(0.001) 
1.4287 
(0.029) 
 
 
 
 
0.3068 
(0.004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0531 
(0.161) 
 
 
0.0121 
(0.013) 
-0.0077 
(0.588) 
-1.5608 
(0.000) 
1.4357 
(0.016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.6302 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0872 
(0.101) 
0.0058 
(0.167) 
-0.0403 
(0.116) 
-2.7483 
(0.009) 
4.4099 
(0.013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.9230 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0108 
(0.280) 
-0.1852 
(0.081) 
-6.2561 
(0.063) 
7.8246 
(0.068) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.6059 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0825 
(0.082) 
-0.2696 
(0.034) 
 
 
 
 
1.4483 
(0.632) 
9.0618 
(0.001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3757 
(0.000) 
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MTB 
 
BTM 
 
BACC 
 
BACC’ 
 
Intercept 
 
N 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
 
0.0102 
(0.269) 
 
 
0.0119 
(0.819) 
 
 
-0.2080 
(0.031) 
108 
0.2371 
 
0.0048 
(0.467) 
 
 
0.0560 
(0.233) 
 
 
-0.1025 
(0.194) 
108 
0.4714 
 
0.0156 
(0.289) 
 
 
-0.0138 
(0.942) 
 
 
-0.1639 
(0.388) 
108 
0.3124 
 
0.1523 
(0.075) 
 
 
-0.0362 
(0.781) 
 
 
-0.2311 
(0.157) 
108 
0.2652 
 
 
 
-0.1516 
(0.002) 
 
 
-1.0931 
(0.701) 
0.2400 
(0.041) 
107 
0.1889 
 
Variable definitions:  
CFOt+1 = net cash flow from operations in year t+1 divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFOt+1 = change in net cash flow from operations from year t to year t+1, CFOt+1 - CFOt, 
divided by total assets at end of year t; 
OPIN*t+1 = operating income before depreciation and amortization expenses, reversal 
amount  and AWCA in year t+1 divided by total asset at end of year t;  
∆OPIN*t+1 = change in operating income before depreciation and amortization expenses, 
reversal amount  and AWCA from year t to year t+1 divided by total asset at end of year t; 
AbReturn t = control group-adjusted returns beginning eight months before the financial 
year-end and ending four months after the financial year-end;  
REVt  = reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
REV’t  = reversal amount scaled by the market value of equity at the end of year t-1; 
CFOt  = net cash flow from operations in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFOt  = change in net cash flow from operations from year t-1 to year t divided by total 
assets at end of year t; 
OPINt = operating income before reversals in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆OPINt = change in operating income before reversals from year t-1 to year t divided by 
total assets at end of year t; 
NIt = net income before reversal in year t scaled by market value of equity at the end of year 
t-1; 
WCt  = working capital in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆WCt  = change in working capital from year t-1 to year t divided by total assets at end of 
year t; 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market to book ratio at end of year t; 
BTMt = the book to market value ratio at the end of year t-1; 
BACCt = beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss scaled by total assets at end of 
year t; 
BACC’t = beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss scaled by market value of 
equity at the end of year t-1; 
D = 1 if the firm is a non-earning manager, i.e. its AWCA lies in the range between 31
st
 and 
70
th
 percentile among reversal firms. It takes the value 0 if the firm is an earning manager, i.e. 
its AWCA is above 70
th
 percentile. 
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APPENDIX K 
Difference in differences analysis of reversal earnings managers, reversal non-managers 
of earnings and control firms ranked by abnormal working capital accruals using 
alternative measure for non-managers of earnings 
Variables 
Difference between 
reversal earnings 
managers and control 
firms  
Difference between 
reversal non-managers 
of earnings and control 
firms  
 
 
Difference 
in 
differences 
 
 
 
 
p-value Mean 
(Median) 
n Mean 
(Median) 
 n 
BACC 
 
ROEadj 
 
CFOt 
 
CFOt+1 
 
OPINt 
 
OPIN*t 
 
OPINt+1 
 
OPIN*t+1 
 
Return 
 
0.0152 
(0.0044) 
0.0192 
(0.0231) 
-0.0219 
(-0.0278) 
-0.0041 
(0.0167) 
-0.0051 
(0.0008) 
-0.1450 
(-0.1162) 
0.0255 
(0.0192) 
0.0504 
(0.0410) 
0.0842 
(0.1375) 
47
a
 
 
55 
 
55 
 
55 
 
55 
 
55 
 
55 
 
55 
 
53
b
 
0.0129 
(0.0017) 
0.1017 
(0.0453) 
0.0349 
(0.0225) 
0.0108 
(0.0104) 
0.0048 
(-0.0085) 
0.1053 
0.1041 
0.0424 
0.0418 
0.0650 
0.0729 
0.0341 
0.0291 
47
a
 
 
55 
 
55 
 
55 
 
55 
 
55 
 
55 
 
55 
 
53
b
 
0.0023 
0.0027 
-0.0825 
-0.0222 
-0.0568 
-0.0503 
-0.0149 
0.0063 
-0.0099 
0.0077 
-0.2503 
-0.2203 
-0.0169 
-0.0226 
-0.0146 
-0.0319 
0.0501 
0.1084 
      0.420 
     0.171 
     0.082 
     0.210 
     0.042 
     0.070 
     0.561 
     0.786 
     0.806 
     0.460 
     0.000 
     0.000 
     0.330 
     0.160 
     0.634 
     0.310 
     0.426 
     0.304 
The differences in mean and median differences are tested using two-tailed t-tests and Mann Whitney test, 
respectively. 
a
The sample size is 47 reversal earnings managers firms and 47 control firms. The sample size is reduced as 8 
observations are not traceable as the firms combine accumulated depreciation and accumulated impairment in 
one account. 
b
The sample size is 53 reversal earnings managers firms and 53 control firms. The sample size is reduced 
because the market data for 2 observations are not available in Datastream. 
The operating income with * indicates the adjustment for depreciation and AWCA. 
 
Variable definitions: 
 
BACC = beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss in year t deflated by total assets 
at end of year t; 
ROEadj = return on equity (adjusted), calculated as net income minus impairment reversal in 
year t divided by total equity at end of year t; 
CFOt = net cash flow from operations in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
CFOt+1= net cash flow from operations in year t+1 divided by total assets at end of year t; 
OPINt = operating income before reversals in year t divided by total assets at end of year t;  
OPINt+1 = operating income before reversals in year t+1 divided by total assets at end of year 
t;  
Return = stock returns beginning eight months before the financial year-end and ending four 
months after the financial year-end. 
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APPENDIX L 
Relationship between impairment loss reversal and future CFO, moderated by incentive 
to manage earnings using alternative definition for non-managers of earnings (clustered 
standard errors) 
Panel A: Dependent variable is future cash flow from operations 
CFOt+1 =  α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3CFOt +  β4WCt  +  β5SIZEt + β6MTBt +  εt  (3-1A) 
 Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
D 
REV 
D*REV 
CFO 
WC 
SIZE 
MTB 
N 
R
2 
F-statistic 
p-value (F-statistic) 
β1 +  β2 
 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
? 
 
-0.2199 
-0.0408 
-1.3906 
1.7964 
0.4184 
0.0561 
0.0137 
0.0133 
110 
0.2923 
11.04 
0.0000 
0.4058 
-2.23 
-3.12 
-3.69 
3.30 
4.13 
1.02 
2.68 
1.16 
0.027 
0.002 
0.000 
0.001 
0.000 
0.309 
0.008 
0.247 
 
 
 
 
0.0012 
Panel B: Dependent variable is change in future cash flow from operations 
∆CFOt+1= α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3∆CFOt + β4∆WCt + β5SIZEt +β6MTBt + εt   
(3-2A) 
 Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
D 
REV 
D*REV 
∆CFO 
∆WC 
SIZE 
MTB 
N 
R
2 
F-statistic 
p-value (F-statistic) 
β1 +  β2 
 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
? 
 
-0.0860 
-0.0329 
-1.0581 
1.4999 
-0.5052 
0.4048 
0.0060 
-0.0021 
110 
0.4256 
11.68 
0.0000 
0.4418 
-1.01 
-2.61 
-3.05 
3.30 
-5.82 
0.76 
1.35 
-0.32 
0.316 
0.010 
0.003 
0.001 
0.000 
0.448 
0.178 
0.748 
 
 
 
 
0.0012 
 
Variable definitions: 
CFOt+1= net cash flow from operations in year t+1 divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFOt+1=change in net cash flow from operations in year t+1 divided by total assets at end of year t; 
D = equals to one for reversal firms at the bottom 30% of abnormal working capital accruals 
measured using DeFond and Park, 2001 (non-managers of earnings) and equals to zero for reversal 
firms at the top 30% of abnormal working capital accruals (earnings managers); 
REV=  reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CFO= net cash flow from operations in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆CFO= change in net cash flow from operations in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
WC = working capital in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
∆WC = change in working capital from year t-1 to year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
SIZE=  log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTB= market to book ratio at end of year t. 
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APPENDIX M 
Relationship between impairment loss reversal and future operating income, moderated 
by incentive to manage earnings using alternative definition for non-managers of 
earnings (clustered standard errors) 
 
OPIN*t+1   =  α + D + β1REVt + β2D*REVt + β3OPINt + β4SIZEt + β5MTBt +  εt    (3-3A) 
 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
D 
REV 
D*REV 
OPIN 
SIZE 
MTB 
N 
R
2 
F-statistic 
p-value (F-statistic) 
β1 +  β2 
 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
-0.1652 
-0.0686 
-2.4385 
5.1915 
0.9617 
0.0118 
0.0055 
110 
0.3581 
20.19 
0.0000 
2.7530 
-0.92 
-2.95 
-2.77 
4.00 
5.71 
1.26 
0.29 
0.359 
0.004 
0.006 
0.000 
0.000 
0.210 
0.771 
 
 
 
 
0.000 
 
 
Variable definitions: 
 
OPIN*t+1=  operating income before depreciation and amortization expenses, reversal 
amount  and AWCA in year t+1 divided by total assets at end of year t;  
D = equals to one for reversal firms at the bottom 30% of abnormal working capital accruals 
measured using DeFond and Park, 2001 (non-managers of earnings) and equals to zero for 
reversal firms at the top 30% of abnormal working capital accruals (earnings managers); 
REV= reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
OPIN= operating income in year t; 
SIZE=  log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTB= market to book ratio at end of year t. 
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APPENDIX N 
Relationship between impairment loss reversals and abnormal stock returns, 
moderated by incentive to manage earnings using alternative definition for non-
managers of earnings (clustered standard errors) 
AbReturnt   =  γ0 + D+ γ1REV’t + γ2D*REV’t + γ3NIt + γ4BTMt +  ut                (3-5A) 
Variables Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept  0.0493 
-0.0455 
0.2279 
5.6990 
1.1614 
-0.0701 
0.1808 
5.99 
0.000 
212 
5.4711 
0.41 0.685 
D  -0.40 0.689 
REV’ ? 0.94 0.348 
D*REV’ + 2.14 0.035 
NI + 3.48 0.001 
BTM + -1.42 0.159 
R
2
    
F-statistic    
p-value (F-statistic)    
N 
γ 1 +  γ 2 
 
 
 
0.000 
 
Variable definitions: 
AbReturn =  control group adjusted returns beginning eight months before the financial 
year-end and ending four months after the financial year-end;  
REV’= reversal amount scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1; 
NI = net income before reversal in year t scaled by market value of equity at the end of year 
t-1; 
BTM = book to market value of equity at the end of year t-1; 
D = equals to one for reversal firms at the bottom 30% of abnormal working capital accruals 
measured using DeFond and Park, 2001 (non-managers of earnings) and equals to zero for 
reversal firms at the top 30% of abnormal working capital accruals (earnings managers); 
D*REV’ = interaction term of variables D and BTM. 
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APPENDIX P 
Tobit regression testing the relationship between impairment loss reversal, AWCA and 
incentives to avoid earnings declines (dummy variable for AWCA) 
REVt  = α + D +  β1(NIt - REVt - NIt-1) + β2(NIt - REVt - NIt-1)*D + β3SIZEt + β4MTBt + 
β5LEVt  + β6CEOt +  εt               
 Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 
D 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 *D 
SIZE 
MTB 
LEV 
CEO 
N 
Likelihood  Ratio 
p-value (Likelihood Ratio) 
β1  +    β2 
 
? 
+ 
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-0.0043 
0.0182 
0.0004 
0.0308 
-0.0001 
0.0003 
0.0045 
0.0047 
255 
26.25 
0.000 
0.049 
-0.46 
1.37 
0.24 
1.72 
-0.20 
0.68 
1.15 
2.56 
0.647 
0.171 
0.809 
0.086 
0.842 
0.500 
0.251 
0.011 
 
 
 
0.000 
 
Variable definitions:  
REVt  = reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 = change in pre-reversal net income from year t-1 to year t scaled by total 
assets at end of year t; 
D = equals to one for firms at the middle 40% of abnormal working capital accruals measured 
using DeFond and Park, 2001 (non-managers of earnings) and equals to zero for firms at the 
top 30% of abnormal working capital accruals (earnings managers); 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market to book ratio at end of year t; 
LEVt = total debts scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CEOt = equals to one if firm changes its chief executive officer/general manager in year t-1 
or t-2, and zero otherwise. 
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APPENDIX Q 
Tobit regression testing the relationship between impairment loss reversal, AWCA, 
incentives to avoid earnings declines and corporate governance (dummy variable for 
AWCA) 
REVt  = α + D + β1(NIt - REVt - NIt-1) + β2(NIt - REVt - NIt-1)*D + β3(NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1)*CGt  
+  β4D*CGt  + β5(NIt - REVt - NIt-1)*D*CGt  + β6CGt  + β7SIZEt + β8MTBt + β9LEVt   +  
β10CEOt  +  εt               
 Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 
D 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 *D 
NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1*CG 
D*CG   
NIt - REVt - NIt-1*D *CG   
CG 
SIZE 
MTB 
LEV 
CEO 
N 
Likelihood  Ratio 
p-value (Likelihood Ratio) 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-0.0012 
-0.0567 
0.0003 
0.1889 
0.0431 
0.0004 
0.0956 
0.0012 
-0.0003 
0.0003 
0.0024 
0.0042 
255 
42.67 
0.000 
-0.12 
-1.67 
0.09 
4.05 
2.43 
0.25 
3.77 
0.87 
-0.66 
0.74 
0.62 
2.32 
0.902 
0.095 
0.928 
0.000 
0.016 
0.803 
0.000 
0.388 
0.508 
0.463 
0.538 
0.021 
 
 
 
 
Variable definitions:  
REVt  = reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 = change in pre-reversal net income from year t-1 to year t scaled by total 
assets at end of year t; 
D = equals to one for firms at the middle 40% of abnormal working capital accruals measured 
using DeFond and Park, 2001 (non-managers of earnings) and equals to zero for firms at the 
top 30% of abnormal working capital accruals (earnings managers); 
CGt = corporate governance index calculated as the board size (one point if number of 
directors is between 5 and 11, and 0 otherwise) + audit committee independence (one point if 
the audit committee comprises solely of independent outside director and at least one of 
whom has financial expertise, and 0 otherwise) + board independence (one point if the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors is more than 50%, and 0 otherwise); 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market to book ratio at end of year t; 
LEVt = total debts scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CEOt = equals to one if firm changes its chief executive officer/general manager in year t-1 
or t-2, and zero otherwise. 
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APPENDIX R 
Tobit regression testing the relationship between impairment loss reversal, AWCA and 
incentives to avoid earnings declines (dummy variable for change in net income) 
REVt  = α + β1(NIt - REVt - NIt-1) + β2AWCAt  + β3(NIt - REVt - NIt-1)*AWCAt  + β4SIZEt + 
β5MTBt + β6LEVt  + β7CEOt +  εt               
 Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 
AWCA 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 *AWCA 
SIZE 
MTB 
LEV 
CEO 
N 
Likelihood  Ratio 
p-value (Likelihood Ratio) 
 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-0.0018 
0.0027 
0.0025 
-0.0293 
-0.0002 
0.0003 
0.0024 
0.0045 
364 
30.33 
0.000 
-0.20 
1.80 
1.78 
-2.41 
-0.54 
0.73 
0.61 
2.48 
0.843 
0.073 
0.075 
0.017 
0.589 
0.464 
0.545 
0.014 
 
 
 
Variable definitions:  
REVt  = reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 = equal to zero if change in pre-reversal net income from year t-1 to year t 
is less than zero, and one otherwise; 
AWCAt = abnormal working capital accrual (DeFond and Park, 2001) deflated by total 
assets at end of year t; 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market to book ratio at end of year t; 
LEVt = total debts scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CEOt = equals to one if firm changes its chief executive officer/general manager in year t-1 
or t-2, and zero otherwise. 
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APPENDIX S 
Tobit regression testing the relationship between impairment loss reversal, AWCA, 
incentives to avoid earnings declines and corporate governance (dummy variable for 
change in net income) 
REVt  = α + β1(NIt - REVt - NIt-1) + β2AWCAt   +   β3(NIt - REVt - NIt-1)*AWCAt  +  
β4(NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1)*CGt  +  β5AWCAt *CGt  + β6(NIt - REVt - NIt-1)*AWCAt *CGt  + β7CGt  
+ β8SIZEt + β9MTBt + + β10LEVt   +  β11CEOt  +  εt               
 
 Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 
AWCA 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 *AWCA 
NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1*CG 
AWCA*CG   
NIt - REVt - NIt-1*AWCA *CG   
CG 
SIZE 
MTB 
LEV 
CEO 
N 
Likelihood  Ratio 
p-value (Likelihood Ratio) 
 
+ 
+ 
- 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0.0002 
0.0009 
0.0061 
-0.0921 
0.0008 
0.0042 
0.0381 
0.0003 
-0.0003 
0.0005 
-0.0009 
0.0044 
364 
45.17 
0.000 
0.02 
0.28 
0.24 
-3.01 
0.44 
0.35 
2.55 
0.24 
-0.70 
1.02 
-0.22 
2.50 
0.985 
0.781 
0.812 
0.003 
0.664 
0.725 
0.011 
0.813 
0.481 
0.308 
0.824 
0.013 
 
 
 
 
Variable definitions:  
REVt  = reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 = equal to zero if change in pre-reversal net income from year t-1 to year t 
is less than zero, and one otherwise; 
AWCAt = abnormal working capital accrual (DeFond and Park, 2001) deflated by total 
assets at end of year t; 
CGt = corporate governance index calculated as the board size (one point if number of 
directors is between 5 and 11, and 0 otherwise) + audit committee independence (one point if 
the audit committee comprises solely of independent outside director and at least one of 
whom has financial expertise, and 0 otherwise) + board independence (one point if the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors is more than 50%, and 0 otherwise); 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market to book ratio at end of year t; 
LEVt = total debts scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CEOt = equals to one if firm changes its chief executive officer/general manager in year t-1 
or t-2, and zero otherwise. 
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APPENDIX T 
Tobit regression testing the relationship between impairment loss reversal, BACC and 
incentives to avoid earnings declines (dummy variable for change in net income) 
REVt  = α + β1(NIt - REVt - NIt-1) + β2BACCt    +  β3(NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1)*BACCt  + β4SIZEt + 
β5MTBt + β6LEVt + β7CEOt  + εt               
 Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 
BACC 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 *BACC 
SIZE 
MTB 
LEV 
CEO 
N 
Likelihood  Ratio 
p-value (Likelihood Ratio) 
 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-0.0126 
0.0026 
0.2263 
-0.0684 
0.0003 
0.0002 
-0.0038 
0.0038 
310 
66.31 
0.000 
-1.28 
1.51 
4.92 
-2.16 
0.60 
0.49 
-0.93 
2.02 
0.202 
0.132 
0.000 
0.031 
0.552 
0.626 
0.353 
0.044 
 
 
 
 
Variable definitions:  
REVt  = reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 = equal to zero if change in pre-reversal net income from year t-1 to year t 
is less than zero, and one otherwise; 
BACCt = beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss in year t deflated by total assets 
at end of year t; 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market to book ratio at end of year t; 
LEVt = total debts scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CEOt = equals to one if firm changes its chief executive officer/general manager in year t-1 
or t-2, and zero otherwise. 
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APPENDIX U 
Tobit regression testing the relationship between impairment loss reversal, BACC, 
incentives to avoid earnings declines and corporate governance (dummy variable for 
change in net income) 
REVt  = α + β1(NIt - REVt - NIt-1) + β2BACCt    +  β3(NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1)*BACCt  +  β4(NIt  - 
REVt  - NIt-1)*CGt  +  β5BACCt *CGt + β6(NIt - REVt - NIt-1)*BACCt *CGt + β7CGt  + β8SIZEt 
+ β9MTBt + β10LEVt + β11CEOt  + εt               
 
 Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 
BACC 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 *BACC 
NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1*CG 
BACC*CG   
NIt - REVt - NIt-1*BACC *CG   
CG 
SIZE 
MTB 
LEV 
CEO 
N 
Likelihood  Ratio 
p-value (Likelihood Ratio) 
 
+ 
+ 
- 
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-0.0081 
-0.0049 
-0.2408 
-0.4496 
0.0040 
0.2272 
0.2594 
-0.0028 
0.0003 
0.0002 
-0.0019 
0.0038 
310 
87.61 
0.000 
-0.86 
-1.37 
-2.03 
-3.35 
2.14 
4.41 
4.16 
-1.96 
0.68 
0.44 
-0.49 
2.14 
0.389 
0.172 
0.043 
0.001 
0.033 
0.000 
0.000 
0.051 
0.495 
0.663 
0.626 
0.033 
 
 
 
 
Variable definitions:  
REVt  = reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 = equal to zero if change in pre-reversal net income from year t-1 to year t 
is less than zero, and one otherwise; 
BACCt = beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss in year t deflated by total assets 
at end of year t; 
CGt = corporate governance index calculated as the board size (one point if number of 
directors is between 5 and 11, and 0 otherwise) + audit committee independence (one point if 
the audit committee comprises solely of independent outside director and at least one of 
whom has financial expertise, and 0 otherwise) + board independence (one point if the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors is more than 50%, and 0 otherwise); 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market to book ratio at end of year t; 
LEVt = total debts scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CEOt = equals to one if firm changes its chief executive officer/general manager in year t-1 
or t-2, and zero otherwise. 
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APPENDIX V 
Tobit regression testing the relationship between impairment loss reversal, BACC, 
incentives to avoid earnings declines and debt covenant (dummy variable for change in 
net income) 
REVt  = α + β1(NIt - REVt - NIt-1) + β2BACCt    +  β3(NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1)*BACCt  +  β4(NIt  - 
REVt  - NIt-1)*LEVt  +  β5BACCt *LEVt + β6(NIt - REVt - NIt-1)*BACCt *LEVt + β7SIZEt + 
β8MTBt + β9LEVt + β10CEOt  + εt               
 
 Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 
BACC 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 *BACC 
NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1*LEV 
BACC*LEV   
NIt - REVt - NIt-1*BACC *LEV  
SIZE 
MTB 
LEV 
CEO 
N 
Likelihood  Ratio 
p-value (Likelihood Ratio) 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
- 
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
 
-0.0115 
0.0064 
0.6775 
0.6881 
0.0083 
-0.9524 
-1.2546 
0.0001 
0.0003 
0.0016 
0.0040 
310 
82.75 
0.000 
-1.17 
1.54 
4.62 
4.19 
0.91 
-3.17 
-3.82 
0.29 
0.54 
0.22 
2.24 
 
0.244 
0.125 
0.000 
0.000 
0.363 
0.002 
0.000 
0.776 
0.592 
0.822 
0.026 
 
 
 
 
Variable definitions:  
REVt  = reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 = equal to zero if change in pre-reversal net income from year t-1 to year t 
is less than zero, and one otherwise; 
BACCt = beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss in year t deflated by total assets 
at end of year t; 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market to book ratio at end of year t; 
LEVt = total debts scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CEOt = equals to one if firm changes its chief executive officer/general manager in year t-1 
or t-2, and zero otherwise. 
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APPENDIX W 
Tobit regression testing the relationship between impairment loss reversal, BACC, 
incentives to avoid earnings declines and CEO change (dummy variable for change in 
net income) 
REVt  = α + β1(NIt - REVt - NIt-1) + β2BACCt    +  β3(NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1)*BACCt  +  β4(NIt  - 
REVt  - NIt-1)*CEOt  +  β5BACCt *CEOt + β6(NIt - REVt - NIt-1)*BACCt *CEOt + β7SIZEt + 
β8MTBt + β9LEVt + β10CEOt  + εt               
 
 Predicted sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value 
Intercept 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 
BACC 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 *BACC 
NIt  - REVt  - NIt-1*CEO 
BACC*CEO   
NIt - REVt - NIt-1*BACC *CEO  
SIZE 
MTB 
LEV 
CEO 
N 
Likelihood  Ratio 
p-value (Likelihood Ratio) 
 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
? 
- 
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
 
-0.0118 
0.0030 
0.2204 
0.0798 
0.0005 
0.1741 
-1.119 
0.0003 
0.0003 
-0.0039 
0.0024 
310 
68.15 
0.000 
-1.20 
1.61 
4.73 
1.48 
0.11 
0.68 
-2.49 
0.52 
0.55 
-0.95 
0.55 
 
0.231 
0.107 
0.000 
0.139 
0.915 
0.500 
0.013 
0.601 
0.585 
0.342 
0.584 
 
 
 
 
Variable definitions:  
REVt  = reversal amount scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 = equal to zero if change in pre-reversal net income from year t-1 to year t 
is less than zero, and one otherwise; 
BACCt = beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss in year t deflated by total assets 
at end of year t; 
SIZEt = the natural log of total sales at end of year t; 
MTBt = the market to book ratio at end of year t; 
LEVt = total debts scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
CEOt = equals to one if firm changes its chief executive officer/general manager in year t-1 
or t-2, and zero otherwise. 
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APPENDIX X 
Difference in differences analysis of reversal earnings managers, reversal non-managers 
of earnings and control firms ranked by beginning balance of accumulated impairment 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
Difference between 
reversal high BACC 
firms and control 
firms (G1) 
Difference between 
reversal moderate and 
low BACC firms  and 
control firms (G2) 
 
 
Difference 
in 
differences 
 
 
 
 
p-value Mean 
(Median) 
N Mean 
(Median) 
 N 
AWCAs 
 
 
ROEadj 
 
 
CFOt 
 
 
CFOt+1 
 
 
OPINt 
 
 
OPIN*t 
 
 
OPINt+1 
 
 
OPIN*t+1 
 
 
Return 
 
0.0054 
(0.0136) 
 
0.0123 
(-0.0071) 
 
-0.0269 
(-0.0054) 
 
-0.0043 
(0.0103) 
 
-0.0315 
(-0.0114) 
 
-0.0707 
-0.0548 
 
0.0043 
(0.0348) 
 
0.0054 
0.0109 
 
0.0890 
(-0.0186) 
47 
 
 
47 
 
 
47 
 
 
47 
 
 
47 
 
 
47 
 
 
47 
 
 
47 
 
 
47 
-0.0109 
(-0.0142) 
 
0.0643 
(0.0304) 
 
0.0205 
(0.0206) 
 
0.0144 
(0.0180) 
 
0.0136 
(0.0086) 
 
0.0201 
0.0181 
 
0.0666 
(0.0681) 
 
0.0497 
0.0622 
 
0.0307 
(-0.0236) 
108 
 
 
108 
 
 
108 
 
 
108 
 
 
108 
 
 
108 
 
 
108 
 
 
108 
 
 
108 
0.0163 
0.0278 
 
-0.0520 
(0.0375) 
 
-0.0474 
(-0.0260) 
 
-0.0187 
(-0.0077) 
 
-0.0451 
(-0.0200) 
 
-0.0908 
-0.0729 
 
-0.0623 
(-0.0333) 
 
-0.0443 
-0.0513 
 
0.0583 
0.0050 
0.361 
(0.041) 
 
0.267 
(0.179) 
 
0.013 
(0.047) 
 
0.256 
(0.316) 
 
0.027 
(0.042) 
 
0.044 
0.061 
 
0.001 
(0.004) 
 
0.243 
0.210 
 
0.586 
(0.685) 
The differences in mean and median differences are tested using two-tailed t-test and Mann Whitney test, respectively. 
The operating income (OPIN) with * indicates the adjustment for depreciation and AWCA. 
The reversal firms are ranked by the size of BACC. The reversal firms at the top 30% are regarded as reversal high 
BACC firms (47 firm-years) and the rest as reversal moderate and low BACC firms (108 firm-years). 
Variable definitions: 
AWCAs = absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals (DeFond and Park, 2001) deflated by 
total assets at end of year t; 
ROEadj = return on equity (adjusted), calculated as net income minus impairment reversal in year t 
divided by total equity at end of year t; 
CFOt = net cash flow from operations in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
CFOt+1 = net cash flow from operations in year t+1 divided by total assets at end of year t; 
OPINt = operating income before reversals in year t divided by total assets at end of year t;  
OPINt+1=  operating income before reversals in year t+1 divided by total assets at end of year t;  
Return = stock returns beginning eight months before the financial year-end and ending four months 
after the financial year-end.  
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APPENDIX Y 
Descriptive statistics of firm performance before the reversal year  
Variables    Reversal high Reversal moderate and low Diff in     Diff in  
  BACC firm-years       BACC firms-years             Mean     Median 
          n = 47     n = 108                     p-value   p-value 
   Mean   Median                  Mean    Median 
Losst-1
a  
             0.51         1          0.14           0                      0.00         0.00        
ROEt-1   -0.07     -0.01          0.09         0.10                   0.00         0.00 
DYt-1                 0.01      0.00                      0.03         0.02                   0.07         0.04 
WCt-1                 0.12      0.08                     0.23         0.22    0.00         0.00 
LQt-1         1.80     1.34          2.38 1.79    0.04       0.00 
Losst-2
a
               0.64         1          0.17            0    0.00         0.00 
ROEt-2              -0.06      0.03          0.12         0.09    0.00         0.00 
DYt-2                  0.02      0.01                     0.03         0.02                   0.26         0.18 
WCt-2     0.12     0.12          0.24 0.24    0.00       0.00 
LQt-2      1.77      1.43          2.39 1.90    0.02       0.00 
The difference (diff) in means and medians between reversal high BACC (beginning 
accumulated impairment loss) are tested using two-tailed t-tests and Mann Whitney test, 
respectively.  
a
The test for the variables is test of proportion. 
All data are winsorized at the 1% level. 
 
Variable definitions: 
Losst-1 = equal to 1 if net income in year t-1 is negative and 0 otherwise; 
ROEt-1 = net income in year t-1 scaled by total equity at end of year t; 
DYt-1 = firm’s dividend yield, measured as dividends per share divided by the share price in 
year t-1; 
WCt-1 = working capital in year t-1 scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
LQt-1 = liquidity ratio, calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities in year t-1; 
Losst-2 = equal to 1 if net income in year t-2 is negative and 0 otherwise; 
ROEt-2 = net income in year t-2 scaled by total equity at end of year t; 
DYt-2 = firm’s dividend yield, measured as dividends per share divided by the share price in 
year t-2; 
WCt-2 = working capital in year t-2 scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
LQt-2 = liquidity ratio, calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities in year t-2. 
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APPENDIX Z 
 
Summary of variable definitions  
Variables                                Definitions 
 
Assets 
REV 
 
REV’ 
 
AWCA 
 
Sales 
BACC 
 
BACC’ 
 
ROE 
 
ROEadj 
 
CFOt 
 
CFOt+1 
 
∆CFOt 
 
∆CFOt+1 
 
OPINt 
OPIN*t+1 
 
 
∆OPINt 
 
∆OPIN*t+1 
 
 
AbReturn  
 
 
NI 
 
WC 
∆WC 
 
SIZE 
MTB 
BTM 
 
Natural logarithm of total assets at end of year t; 
Amount of impairment loss reversal deflated by total assets at end of 
year t; 
Amount of impairment loss reversal deflated by the market value of 
equity at the end of year t-1; 
Abnormal working capital accrual (DeFond and Park, 2001) deflated 
by total assets at end of year t; 
Natural logarithm of total sales at end of year t; 
Beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss in year t deflated 
by total assets at end of year t; 
Beginning balance of accumulated impairment loss in year t deflated 
by market value of equity at the end of year t-1; 
Return on equity, calculated as net income in year t divided by total 
equity at end of year t; 
Return on equity (adjusted), calculated as net income minus 
impairment reversal in year t divided by total equity at end of year t; 
Net cash flow from operations in year t divided by total assets at end 
of year t; 
Net cash flow from operations in year t+1 divided by total assets at 
end of year t; 
Change in net cash flow from operations from year t-1 to year t 
divided by total assets at end of year t; 
Change in net cash flow from operations from year t to year t+1 
divided by total assets at end of year t; 
Operating income in year t divided by total assets at end of year t;  
Operating income before depreciation and amortization expenses, 
reversal amount  and AWCA in year t+1 divided by total assets at end 
of year t;  
Change in operating income before reversals from year t-1 to year t 
divided by total assets at end of year t; 
Change in operating income before depreciation and amortization 
expenses, reversal amount and AWCA from year t to year t+1 divided 
by total assets at end of year t; 
Control group adjusted returns beginning eight months before the 
financial year-end and ending four months after the financial year-
end;  
Net income before reversals in year t scaled by market value of equity 
at end of year t-1; 
Working capital in year t divided by total assets at end of year t; 
Change in working capital from year t-1 to year t divided by total 
assets at end of year t; 
Natural logarithm of total sales at end of year t; 
The market to book ratio at end of year t; 
The book to market ratio at end of year t; 
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D 
 
 
 
NIt - REVt - NIt-1 
 
CG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEV 
CEO 
 
 
Equals to 1 for reversal firms at the middle 40% of abnormal working 
capital accruals measured using DeFond and Park, 2001 (non-
managers of earnings) and equals to zero for reversal firms at the top 
30% of abnormal working capital accruals (earnings managers); 
change in pre-reversal net income from year t-1 to year t scaled by 
total assets at end of year t; 
Corporate governance index calculated as the board size (one point if 
number of directors is between 5 and 11, and 0 otherwise) + audit 
committee independence (one point if the audit committee comprises 
solely of independent outside director and at least one of whom has 
financial expertise, and 0 otherwise) + board independence (one point 
if the proportion of independent non-executive directors is more than 
50%, and 0 otherwise); 
Total debts scaled by total assets at end of year t; 
Equals to one if firm changes its chief executive officer/general 
manager in year t-1 or t-2, and zero otherwise. 
 
 
 
